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The Second World War resulted in the deaths of around 85 million people. Additionally, tens of millions more people were displaced. However, amid all the carnage, people demonstrated remarkable courage, fortitude, compassion, mercy and sacrifice. We want to honour and celebrate all of those people. In the War Years Blog, we examine the extraordinary experiences of individual service personnel. We also review military history books, events, and museums. We also look at the history of unique World War II artefacts, medals, and anything else of interest.
HMS Formidable: Uncle Bert, Kamikaze, and Learning Under Fire
On 4 May 1945, a Japanese kamikaze crashed into HMS Formidable's armoured flight deck off Okinawa, killing eight men and wounding forty-seven. The 3-inch steel deck was penetrated, fires raged across the flight deck, and bomb fragments severed a steam pipe in the centre boiler room. Five days later, a second kamikaze struck almost the identical spot. This time, one man died, and four were wounded, a 91 per cent reduction in casualties.
What changed in those five days? The crew learned valuable lessons under fire and made life-saving adaptations during kamikaze attacks.
This is the story of HMS Formidable during Operation Iceberg, learning under fire, the cost of armoured flight decks, and the men who kept fighting despite two kamikaze strikes that would have crippled any other carrier.
On 4 May 1945, at approximately 11:35 hours, a Japanese Zero fighter completed a climbing turn over HMS Formidable, rolled inverted, and dove towards the carrier's flight deck. The aircraft had evaded radar by approaching low over the sea, then pulled up at the last moment. Every available close-range gun was brought into action and opened fire. The pilot released a bomb moments before impact. The aircraft and bomb struck simultaneously, just level with the island (the carrier’s command and control centre), creating an enormous orange flash and blowing in the bridge windows where Captain Philip Ruck-Keene stood. Down in the centre boiler room, Stoker Stanley Harris heard the action commentator shout: “Oh my God. There's one on the flight deck!” An instant later, bomb fragments cut through the armoured hangar deck, severed a steam pipe in Harris's boiler room, and continued down into the oil fuel tanks below.
Eight men died. Forty-seven were wounded. One Avenger blew up on deck with its pilot, Sub-Lieutenant Donald Jupp, still in the cockpit. Yet by 17:00 hours the same day, aircraft were landing back aboard. The 3-inch armoured flight deck had been breached, leaving a 2-foot-square hole, which was later repaired with quick-drying cement, covered with steel plates, and tack-welded back into service.
This article examines HMS Formidable's service with the British Pacific Fleet during Operation Iceberg in May 1945, focusing on two kamikaze attacks that struck the ship on 4 and 9 May. The comparison between these attacks demonstrates institutional learning under fire: practical adaptations developed in five days that reduced casualties by 91 per cent while maintaining operational effectiveness. My analysis draws on operational reports, the ship's official log, and crew members' testimonies, supplemented by published secondary sources. But that’s not quite the whole story, as I have a personal connection to the ship.
It’s Christmas morning in the 1970s. Charlie is dressed in a World War II battledress, complete with medals, a tin helmet, a webbing belt, and a holster, while holding a toy Webley revolver. On another Christmas, Charlie is dressed in a Triceratops dinosaur costume, all designed and made by Bert.
Magic Christmas Mornings in the 1970s
As a child growing up in the 1970s, Christmas mornings meant waking up to a pillowcase stuffed with presents. For most children of my era, that would have been the highlight of the day, but not in our house. Typically, on Christmas Eve, a shadowy figure would arrive in the early evening, and my siblings and I would be sent to watch television. My parents and my “Uncle Bert” would disappear into a downstairs room, emerge some hours later, and lock the door. Christmas morning would arrive, but the room would remain locked until Uncle Bert returned. Finally, all would be revealed. The room would be opened, and we would be ushered inside. Over the years, we were greeted by an array of handmade toys, ranging from a full-size racing car to miniature stables, a medieval castle, a Viking ship, a circus, and a battlefield, which included a landing craft, a pontoon bridge, tanks, and aircraft. Over the preceding months, Uncle Bert had meticulously designed, planned and built these unique and wondrous gifts. As children, whenever we asked how Uncle Bert built such things, we were simply told that he had been a shipwright in the navy, as if that were supposed to explain everything.
My Uncle Bert wasn’t a blood relative; his real name was Herbert Shortland, and he was a close friend of my father. After leaving the Royal Navy, Bert spent many years as a merchant seaman. At some point, my parents took Bert in and provided him with a room while he was away at sea. Later, he joined the prison service and lodged in a nearby house before eventually buying a home of his own and moving to Rochester, Kent, near the sea. After my father’s death, the family kept in touch with Bert, and as an adult, I would visit him. On one occasion, we discussed his time in the navy, and he showed me a photo album of his ship, HMS Formidable. The album contained a sequence of photographs of a Japanese kamikaze aircraft crashing onto the flight deck and the subsequent fire and chaos. Regrettably, I cannot recall what he said about the event, and he never spoke at length or in any detail about his time with the British Pacific Fleet. A short time later, he passed away. Since he had no living relatives that I know of, the Council cleared out his house. His photo albums, personal belongings, and all the memories of his extraordinary life at sea were put into rubbish bags and taken to the municipal recycling centre. Recently, I was reading, Crucible of Hell: Okinawa: The Last Great Battle of the Second World War by Saul David. In the book, there is the briefest mention of HMS Formidable. Well, it got me thinking.
HMS Formidable: Design and Service to 1945
HMS Formidable belonged to the Illustrious-class fleet carriers, revolutionary warships that encased the aircraft hangar in an armoured box. The flight deck itself formed the hull's strength deck and was built of 3-inch steel plate, with 4.5-inch armoured sides protecting the hangar. This armour came at a severe cost. Pre-war naval treaties limited displacement to 23,000 tons. The ship’s armoured hangar had to be lower and smaller, reducing aircraft capacity to 36 operational aircraft, compared with 80-100 on American carriers of similar size. According to the Wardroom Officer in his book, A Formidable Commission (1947), the ship’s second commission started on 16 May 1944.
On 17 August 1939, at Harland and Wolff's Belfast shipyard, Formidable launched herself when the launch cradle collapsed prematurely, killing a spectator and injuring others. The whole unfortunate episode was captured on camera by Pathé News. Commissioned on 24 November 1940, Formidable saw extensive Mediterranean service, including the Battle of Cape Matapan (27-29 March 1941) and sustained severe damage from German Stuka dive bombers on 26 May 1941. After repairs and operations covering the Salerno landings and attacks on Tirpitz, a centre shaft gear wheel failure delayed her deployment to the Pacific until January 1945.
HMS 'Formidable' launches herself in Belfast shipyard, Northern Ireland, 1939.
Captain Philip Ruck-Keene, CBE, DSO, commanded Formidable from 23 September 1943. A submariner by background, he had commanded the experimental submarine HMS X1 and the submarine depot ship HMS Medway. Ruck-Keene possessed a foghorn voice and drove his ship hard. He appears to have been a man who demanded high standards of professionalism and competence from officers and ratings alike. During a Belfast refit in 1943, he removed what he termed “bad apples” throughout the fleet. It seems that rather than make any concessions to naval conscripts, who regarded themselves as civilians in uniform, he despised “lower-deck lawyers” who he said knew all their rights but nothing of their duty. Consequently, Formidable was not a particularly “happy ship” under his command but was highly efficient. Rear Admiral Philip Vian would later praise Ruck-Keene's performance during the kamikaze attacks.
British Pacific Fleet: Command Structure and Strategic Context
HMS Formidable’s flight deck captures sister carriers Implacable and Victorious turning in formation with their destroyer escort on 10 July 1945, as the British Pacific Fleet advances toward strikes on the Japanese mainland in the final weeks of the war.
Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM A 30192).
Gallery #1: Picture Captions
Aircraft from HMS Formidable attack Ishigaki Airfield on 16 April 1945 during Operation Iceberg, striking runways and dispersed aircraft positions.
Source: The National Archives, ADM 199/595, Operation Iceberg Photographs, AC1s No. 109/12/346.
A second view of HMS Formidable’s 16 April 1945 strike on Ishigaki Airfield, capturing additional bomb impacts and smoke rising from targeted areas.
Source: The National Archives, ADM 199/595, Operation Iceberg Photographs, AC1s No. 109/12/346.
HMS Formidable’s “Strike Charlie” on 17 April 1945 hits Hirara Airfield, showing explosive strikes against key facilities during continued support of Operation Iceberg.
Source: The National Archives, ADM 199/595, Operation Iceberg Photographs, AC1s No. 109/12/346.
The British Pacific Fleet assembled in Sydney in early 1945 under Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, Commander-in-Chief. Fraser commanded from shore headquarters whilst Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings commanded the fleet at sea from the battleship HMS King George V. Rear Admiral Sir Philip Vian commanded the 1st Aircraft Carrier Squadron.
Vian required particular mention. He had led the destroyer flotilla in the Altmark incident, participated in the pursuit of Bismarck, and commanded the Eastern Task Force on D-Day. Regarded as a “fighting admiral” and compared to Nelson, he was characterised by his intense dedication to duty, tactical brilliance, and demanding, often abrasive leadership style that earned him immense respect despite limited personal popularity.
The American command structure designated the British Pacific Fleet as Task Force 57 (later TF 37) under overall US operational control. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance commanded Fifth Fleet during Operation Iceberg. The Americans assigned the British carriers a specific mission: neutralise Japanese airfields in the Sakishima Gunto islands between Formosa (modern-day Taiwan) and Okinawa to prevent enemy aircraft from staging attacks on the Okinawa invasion fleet.
Alexander Beldam, an Observer with 848 Naval Air Squadron aboard Formidable, recalled the mission clearly: “Our task was to disable the Japanese airfields in the islands between Formosa and the Philippines and the Japanese mainland, and in particular, the island of Ishigaki.” The Japanese proved ingenious at airfield repair. “They had a little railway down to the sea,” Beldam remembered, “and they would fill trucks with spoil (coral), run them back up to the airfield, and fill the bomb holes, so that by teatime sometimes the airfields were able to be used again. So we had to go back in the afternoon and bomb them again.”
On 14 April 1945, Formidable joined Task Force 57. Her air group consisted of 1841 and 1842 Naval Air Squadrons flying Corsair Mk IV fighters (18 aircraft each) and 848 Naval Air Squadron operating Grumman Avengers (12-18 aircraft), for a total complement of approximately 54 aircraft.
HMS Formidable and HMS Euryalus refuel from a British Pacific Fleet tanker, while Euryalus simultaneously transfers stores to the destroyer HMS Undaunted. Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM A 30072).
Fleet Train: Logistics and American Lessons
The British Pacific Fleet confronted a fundamental strategic problem: distance. Sydney lay 3,200 nautical miles from the operational area off Okinawa. The Royal Navy had never sustained carrier operations at such distances from established bases. The solution required wholesale adoption of American logistical methods and development of a mobile fleet train on a scale the Admiralty had never attempted.
The Americans had pioneered fleet replenishment while at sea. Their Task Force 38 could remain at sea for months, supplied by a continuous stream of oilers, ammunition ships, store ships, and repair vessels. The Royal Navy possessed minimal experience with this operational concept. British carriers had traditionally operated within the range of established shore facilities like Malta, Alexandria, and Scapa Flow. The Pacific offered no such infrastructure.
The British Pacific Fleet assembled a fleet train of unprecedented size. It included four escort carriers packed with replacement aircraft, pilots, and aircrew to replenish combat losses. Two additional carriers operated on ferry duty. There were landing ships, escort vessels, destroyers, repair ships, oilers, store ships, victualling ships, distilling ships, a net layer, armament ships, and hospital ships.
Personnel assigned to the fleet train received concentrated training in underway replenishment techniques from American instructors. Refuelling procedures, cargo transfer methods, and maintenance protocols were adapted from US Navy practice. British artificers and engineers learned American repair techniques. The learning curve proved steep but vital.
Operational tempo required extended periods at sea. Stoker Stanley Harris recalled: “I think the longest one we did there was about 80 odd days at sea, and didn't go ashore at all because we had a fleet train that used to supply us.” The fleet alternated between operational zones and replenishment areas. “We used to say that we would be going into the long grass when we were going off to conduct bombing missions on Sakishima-Gunto,” Harris explained, “and then would come back to what we called the short grass, and it was there that the fleet train would come. It was like a load of shops floating around, and we would take on oil from the tankers, and we would take flour aboard for cooking, and mail.”
Observer Alexander Beldam confirmed this operational pattern: “We used to retire to refuel and pick up more bombs before going back the following day for more bombing raids.” The fleet train enabled sustained operations impossible under traditional Royal Navy logistics doctrine.
Maintenance presented particular challenges. American carriers possessed larger maintenance crews and more extensive workshop facilities. British carriers operated with smaller engineering complements and less equipment. Repairs had to be improvised. Artificers developed field expedients. Spare parts were cannibalised from damaged aircraft. The forward aircraft lift on Formidable, disabled on 4 May, could not be repaired at sea and remained inoperative for the duration of operations.
Aircraft serviceability rates improved through practical experience. Initially, British carriers struggled to match American sortie rates. Engineering crews learned through observation and practice. Maintenance procedures were refined. By the strikes on Japan in July-August 1945, Formidable achieved fighter sortie rates of 1.54 sorties per aircraft; a 40 per cent improvement over Sakishima operations and approaching American performance levels.
The British Pacific Fleet demonstrated institutional capacity for rapid adaptation. Traditional Admiralty logistics doctrine proved inadequate for distances in the Pacific. American methods were studied, adopted, and integrated within months. Personnel at every level, from Admiral Fraser's headquarters staff to individual artificers on carrier hangar decks, developed practical solutions to unprecedented operational challenges.
This adaptability would prove equally valuable in combat damage control, as the events of 4 and 9 May would demonstrate.
A Japanese Mitsubishi Zero dives toward USS Missouri off Okinawa in April 1945, attempting a suicide crash. The impact missed the deck and struck only the battleship’s hull, causing no major damage. Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM NYF 70679).
4 May 1945: First Kamikaze Attack
Tactical Situation
At 10:02 hours on 4 May 1945, the battleships and cruisers of Task Force 57 detached from the carrier squadron for shore bombardment of targets on Miyako Island. This decision had significant tactical implications. The departing ships carried substantial anti-aircraft firepower and long-range radar coverage. The four British carriers, Formidable, Victorious, Indomitable, and Indefatigable, continued operations with eight destroyers providing close escort.
Shortly after 11:00 hours, radar detected bogeys (enemy aircraft) to the west. The weather provided perfect attack conditions: cumulus clouds at 3,000 feet with bright sun breaking through intermittently. Japanese pilots often conducted decoy attacks to distract the fleet's Combat Air Patrols (CAP), allowing individual attackers to approach low enough to avoid radar detection.
At 11:27 hours, Captain Ruck-Keene ordered Damage Control State II, then, three minutes later, moved to State I, the highest alert level. Watertight doors were secured, and damage control parties came to full readiness. Formidable turned into wind. At 11:27 hours, two Corsairs flew off on bombardment spotting missions. After launching, the ship turned to starboard, and eleven Avengers taxied forward in a single line to clear the deck aft in case the Corsairs needed to make emergency landings. This was a standard operating procedure.
HMS Formidable, after being hit abreast the island on 4 May 1945 during Operation Iceberg, was captured in official wartime photography documenting the Okinawa campaign. Source: The National Archives, ADM 199/595, Operation Iceberg, Photographs AC1s No. 109/12/346.
The Attack
At approximately 11:30 hours, without further warning, a Mitsubishi A6M Zero (referred to by the Allied codename, Zeke) passed overhead at 50 feet, firing its machine guns and strafing the deck park. The aircraft had evaded radar detection by approaching low over the sea. A few personnel glanced up in time to see the red Japanese roundels on the fuselage.
The pilot proved highly skilled. Dissatisfied with his angle of approach, he flew over the bow from port to starboard, threw the aircraft into a vertical climb, flew alongside the carrier in an arc past the island, then banked sharply to come round again towards the starboard quarter. Personnel on the flight deck ran for their lives, some throwing themselves headfirst down ladders.
'A' Group opened fire with both 4.5-inch gun turrets. All pom-poms and Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns with a clear line of sight engaged the target. The aircraft was hit repeatedly and caught fire, but the pilot continued his dive. Ruck-Keene ordered an emergency hard turn to starboard. Too late. A moment before impact, the pilot released his bomb, estimated to weigh between 500 and 1,000 pounds.
The ship's log recorded: “11:35hrs: Japanese aircraft crash dived onto flightdeck causing a hole 2-feet square. Centre boiler room evacuated due to steam leak. Fires on flightdeck and starboard boat deck.”
Gallery #2: Picture Captions
Firefighting crews work amid scorched metal, foam, and scattered wreckage on HMS Formidable’s flight deck after a kamikaze crash during operations supporting the Okinawa landings. Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM A 29312).
Crew members battle flames on HMS Formidable’s deck following a suicide plane crash, with a folded‑wing Corsair beside the ship’s heavily damaged island as smoke pours from wreckage aft. Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM A 29313).
HMS Formidable burns after a kamikaze strike off Sakishima Gunto during the Okinawa campaign, seen from HMS Victorious in April–June 1945. Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM A 29717).
Immediate Damage and Casualties
The bomb and aircraft struck simultaneously, just level with the ship's island control centre. The explosion blew in all the windows on the bridge where Captain Ruck-Keene was standing. The bomb struck at the intersection of four armoured deck plates, a weak point, and punched a 2-foot square hole through the 3-inch steel flight deck. The surrounding area was depressed to a depth of up to 2 feet, approximately 24 feet by 20 feet.
Bomb fragments and armour splinters tore through the hangar below, collapsing a fire curtain roller which smashed an Avenger parked beneath it. The fragments continued down through the hangar deck, through the main deck, and into the centre boiler room, severing the Auxiliary Superheated Steam Pipe. Stoker Stanley Harris and his crew had to evacuate immediately before being boiled alive. The centre boiler room remained out of action for hours.
Further fragments struck the oil fuel tanks, starting fires. A fire also broke out in the torpedo shop when flames spread down the torpedo lift shaft.
On the flight deck, one Avenger exploded. Its pilot, Sub-Lieutenant Donald George Jupp, RNVR, was taxiing the aircraft forward when the kamikaze struck. Despite being enveloped in flames, Jupp managed to climb out of his burning cockpit and somehow walk to the sick bay, terribly burned over a large part of his body and unable to see.
The former First Aid Post inside the island had been taken over by the Air Intelligence Department a few days before the attack. Senior Medical Officer, Surgeon Commander St. George Delisle Gray viewed this change “with equanimity” given that in the first kamikaze attack on HMS Indefatigable, the entire First Aid Party including the Medical Officer had been wiped out. The old F.A.P. opened directly onto the flight deck, with one door permanently left open for easy access. When the bomb exploded, the room was crowded with personnel from the Air Intelligence Department. Lieutenant (A) Burger was standing near a scuttle and pressed his face against the small window to see what was happening. The scuttle was blown inwards by the blast, mortally wounding him.
Commander (Ops) Walter Elliott and his assistant were in the operations room. Their veteran's instinct told them to run. Burger did the opposite and died as a result. The explosion lifted Elliott and his assistant off their feet and threw them into the next room.
On that day, Observer Alexander Beldam was not flying. Instead, he was assisting the Commander of Operations, based in the plot room. His pilot and close friend, Don Jupp, was helping move aircraft on the flight deck. Beldam recounted the events that followed the explosion: “The first assistant to the Commander of Ops was on the floor at that time. Unfortunately, he had been looking out of the scuttle when the kamikaze struck the Formidable, and he was killed because the explosion blasted the glass from the scuttle directly into his face.”
The official casualty list:
Killed immediately: 6 (including 2 officers: Lt Burger and Sub-Lt Bell, plus 4 ratings)
Died within 30 minutes: 2 more
Injured: 47 (6 officers, 41 ratings), of whom 48 were detained in Sick Bay.
Damage Control Response
Speed saved lives. Ruck-Keene immediately ordered the ship to turn 250 degrees downwind and reduce speed to 16 knots, blowing fires away from the island. All hands were called to the flight deck. Aircraft Handling Parties and firefighting teams went to work.
Geoffrey Brooke, who led the firefighting operation, grabbed foam generator nozzles and directed teams to attack the fires. One novice began hosing burning aviation fuel with water. The fuel simply floated on the surface and spread across the flight deck. Hand extinguishers were grabbed to douse smaller fires. Additional drums of foam compound were brought up from stores.
Senior Medical Officer Gray was making his way forward on the boat deck when the explosion occurred. “An enormous sheet of flame extended 10 feet over the side of the ship,” he recalled, “and parts of the aircraft passed overhead.” He ran to the sick bay, which quickly became overcrowded with injured men. All patients in cots were turned out to make room for the seriously wounded. Casualties lay in corners and in the gangway. The immediate task was to determine which patients had already received morphine and administer it to others who needed it. None had been labelled.
The worst casualties:
Gray’s report and clinical description of wounds suffered by members of the ship’s crew make sobering reading.
Sub-Lieutenant Donald George Jupp: For 50 hours, it was impossible to do more than administer morphine and give continuous transfusions of reconstituted plasma. On the evening of 5 May, he had recovered sufficiently to be taken to the sick bay theatre to examine and dress his injuries. His condition initially improved. His friend and crewmate, Observer Alexander Beldam, visited him every night and read to him. On one occasion, Jupp looked up at the doctor and said, “Doc, you never told me you had blue eyes.” It was the first indication he could see again. He was transferred to a hospital ship. Beldam shook his hand and said, “I'll see you in Sydney.” That was the last Beldam saw of him. Jupp died suddenly about 10 days later from the effects of his burns. He was just 20 years old.
Petty Officer Thomas Lamb, P/JX 149881, age 44: Aircraft Handling Party on the flight deck when the bomb exploded. He suffered a compound fracture of the right thigh, multiple wounds to both legs, and a wound on the dorsum of the left instep. He was tender over his abdomen and complained of chest pain. He had suffered much domestic trouble and told the medical staff that he was going to die and did not wish to live. He was too ill for surgical intervention beyond morphine and plasma transfusions for 48 hours. When his condition stabilised sufficiently, surgeons excised the wound edges and packed the sinuses with sulphanilamide cream. A hard object was located in his left foot, a piece of steel, apparently the head of a piston, was removed from in front of his os calcis (heel bone). It was decidedly larger than the entry wound; there was no wound on his sole. The next morning, he took a turn for the worse and died at approximately 11:50 on 7 May, 72 hours after being wounded.
A Chance‑Vought Corsair launches with a bomb mounted beside its auxiliary fuel tank, heading out on a dive‑bombing raid against the German battleship Tirpitz. Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM A 25440).
Repair and Return to Operations
All fires were reported under control by 11:55 hours, approximately 20 minutes after the attack. Captain Ruck-Keene gripped the American liaison officer, Lieutenant Commander Ben Hedges, by the arm and shook his other fist at him. The Americans had been unimpressed with British carrier design, particularly the steel flight decks that radiated heat through the ship. “What do you think of our bloody British flight-decks now?” Ruck-Keene demanded. Hedges looked at the skipper and replied: “Sir, they're a honey.”
With fires out, Ruck-Keene set about making good the damage. He had aircraft in the air and wanted them back aboard. Gangs of shipwrights and artificers went to work plugging the hole with quick-drying cement. Timber was placed first, then cement, before steel plates were positioned over it and tack-welded into place. Brooms cleared any small pieces of debris off the flight deck that might burst an aircraft's tyres.
By 12:54 hours, the ship could make 24 knots. The centre boiler room was not reconnected until 04:00 hours on 5 May, but steam had been diverted from the starboard boiler room to restore speed more quickly. The flight deck barriers were assessed: one was a complete write-off, but the other could be repaired. All arrestor cables and both lifts remained intact. By 13:15 hours, the damage was made good. The skipper was told the barrier should be fixed by 16:00 hours. By 17:00 hours, the aircraft were landing back aboard.
Four Avengers and one Corsair were pushed over the side as damaged beyond repair. At 15:30 hours, funerals were held for Lt Burger, Sub-Lt Bell, and six ratings.
The Admiralty signal to Rear Admiral Vian read simply: “Good show, Formidable.”
Lessons Learned: Adaptations Between 4 and 9 May
The five days between the first and second kamikaze attacks saw intensive analysis and practical adaptation. No formal Admiralty doctrine covered these improvements; they emerged from observation, thought, and a willingness to act on painful experience.
Anti-Hawk Stations Procedures Refined
The alarm system had failed on 4 May. The mechanical roar of eleven Avenger engines drowned out the klaxon warning personnel to clear the flight deck. Many crew members never heard the anti-hawk alarm and were caught on deck at the moment of the explosion. Lieutenant Burger died because he was looking out of a scuttle window. Sub-Lieutenant Jupp was taxiing his aircraft. Petty Officer Lamb was working with the Aircraft Handling Party. All were exposed because the warning system was inadequate.
The solution proved simple: a red flag system. When radar detected an incoming kamikaze, a red flag would be raised from the bridge as a visual signal. This cut through aircraft engine noise where sirens failed. It was an improvisation, not Navy doctrine, and it saved lives.
Anti-Hawk Stations procedures were refined to maximum protective posture. Both aircraft lifts were to be raised and sealed. All hangar armoured doors were to be closed. The fire main was split into six independent sections so damage to one would not disable the entire system. Specialist flight-deck fire parties were pre-positioned in nettings and lobbies below the armoured deck with equipment ready to rush topside immediately after impact. Most critically, every person on the flight deck was ordered below the armoured deck except gun crews. Twenty “Squadron Action Gangs” (one Petty Officer plus ten men each) closed up on the Upper Gallery Deck, ready to rush topside after the attack to clear wreckage and fight fires.
Firefighting Doctrine
Foam compound supply was doubled from 1,000 to 2,000 gallons. Additional foamite extinguishers were pre-positioned. The hangar spraying system drill was rehearsed. One critical lesson was learned the hard way on 4 May: burning aviation fuel must never be fought with water. Water simply spreads the burning fuel. Flight deck fires required foam only. This became an absolute doctrine.
A second counterintuitive lesson: immediately after a kamikaze strike, reduce speed to approximately 15 knots. High speed creates airflow that fans the deck fires. Slower speeds starve fires of oxygen and make firefighting more effective.
Medical Preparations
The sick bay proved inadequate. Located on the port side, not under the armoured deck, it was exposed, awkward to access, and extremely noisy when the anti-aircraft guns fired. The laundry was converted to an operating theatre. Camp beds were drawn from stores to rig emergency wards. The after half of the Wardroom and the Warrant Officers' Mess were taken over and fitted with camp beds to accommodate wounded under protective armour. However, having the laundry out of service created its own problems.
Plasma supplies were found to be critically inadequate. The ship carried 400 bottles and used 360 of them to treat casualties from the first attack. Official allocation was only 260 bottles, just one for every ten men. Senior Medical Officer Gray recommended that each fleet carrier carry 1,000 bottles of plasma to be prepared for multiple emergencies.
Anti-Flash Gear Discipline
The medical report noted an important detail: “All cases of burns [on 9 May] were wearing overalls and anti-flash gear at the time.” Despite this protection, several men received severe burns on their backs. The Senior Medical Officer theorised that men facing the explosion and bending forward had the backs of their overalls gape open, allowing flash to pass down their backs. Nevertheless, anti-flash gear discipline was rigorously enforced despite tropical heat.
One detail from the 4 May attack proved significant: “There were no cases of burns among the fire parties.” Personnel who wore proper anti-flash gear and followed procedures remained protected.
Gallery #3: Picture Captions
HMS Formidable seen from the starboard bow moments after the 9 May 1945 suicide attack, showing damage and smoke rising from the forward area. Source: The National Archives, ADM 199/595, Operation Iceberg Photographs, AC1s No. 109/12/346.
A head‑on perspective of HMS Formidable shortly after the 9 May 1945 strike, showing the extent of damage to her forward flight deck and island area. Source: The National Archives, ADM 199/595, Operation Iceberg Photographs, AC1s No. 109/12/346.
Crew members work rapidly to clear HMS Formidable’s damaged flight deck after the 9 May 1945 attack, with wreckage strewn aft as emergency teams restore the deck to operational condition. Source: The National Archives, ADM 199/595, Operation Iceberg Photographs, AC1s No. 109/12/346.
A close view of the impact point on HMS Formidable’s armoured deck, revealing the force of the explosion and the structural resilience that prevented deeper penetration. Source: The National Archives, ADM 199/595, Operation Iceberg Photographs, AC1s No. 109/12/346.
9 May 1945: Second Kamikaze Attack
Tactical Situation
Task Force 57 continued operations off Sakishima Gunto. At 16:53 hours on 9 May, radar detected bogeys. Damage Control State I was set immediately. Anti-Hawk Stations were sounded. The flight deck was cleared. Six Corsairs were on deck at the time.
At 17:02 hours, HMS Victorious was hit by a kamikaze. At 17:06 hours, Formidable's guns engaged an aircraft attacking the battleship HMS Howe. At 17:08 hours, a third aircraft, the fourth in the overall raid, was detected Red 100 (bearing 100 degrees relative), making a shallow dive.
The aircraft, either a Zero or a Nakajima B6N (Allied codename Jill), initially appeared to attack Formidable from astern, then changed course toward the fleet carrier HMS Indomitable, banked sharply back, and dove at approximately 30 feet above the sea. The Japanese aircraft was hit repeatedly, but the gunfire appeared to have no effect.
The Impact
At 17:09 hours, the aircraft crashed onto the flight deck slightly starboard of the centreline, abreast the after end of the island, only a few feet aft of the 4 May impact point. The aircraft disintegrated. The bomb the plane was carrying, estimated at 250 pounds or possibly a modified heavy shell, only partially detonated.
The ship's log recorded: “17:07hrs: Japanese aircraft crash dived onto flightdeck setting fire to three aircraft and denting armoured plates (of the flightdeck). One rating killed and five injured. 17:40hrs: Fires extinguished.”
Note: The ship's log records the date as the 8th of May, but I believe this was an error, and the date was the 9th of May 1945. All other sources confirm 9 May as the correct date.
Effectiveness of Adaptations
The red flag system worked exactly as intended. Flight Commander Keith Quilter was strapped into his Corsair with the engine running when he saw the red flag. He killed the engine, unstrapped, leapt out along with three other pilots, and jumped down two or three decks before impact. His aircraft was completely destroyed. He was unhurt.
The cleared flight deck meant only gun crews were exposed. All others were protected by the ship’s 3 inches of armour plate. This single measure dramatically reduced casualties.
Foam-only firefighting and pre-positioned fire parties proved highly effective. All fires were brought under control by 17:25 and extinguished by 17:35, a total of 10 minutes. The immediate speed reduction to 15 knots starved fires of wind.
The hangar containment procedures worked. 'C' Hangar was sprayed as a precaution (Corsairs were carrying full drop tanks). The 'B' Hangar fire was handled “in most admirable manner.”
Casualties and Damage
The sole fatality of the second attack was Petty Officer George Hinkins. He commanded the S3 pom-pom mounting. As the kamikaze approached, he ordered his crew to take cover and ensured all were sheltered before the impact. He remained at his post and was killed by a flying Corsair wheel. His funeral was held on the quarterdeck at 19:15 hours on 9 May.
Four personnel were wounded (the ship's log states five). All survived.
Six Corsairs and one Avenger were destroyed on deck. Seven Corsairs and three Avengers in the hangar became “flyable duds” from saltwater contamination when the spraying system activated. Formidable was left with 11 serviceable Corsairs and 4 serviceable Avengers from her original complement of 54 aircraft.
Structural damage was far less severe than on 4 May despite a similar point of impact. The armoured deck was depressed 4.5 inches over an area of approximately 10 feet square. Approximately 90-100 rivets were loosened or gouged. The deep beam was depressed approximately 2 inches. The armoured deck was not penetrated. One rivet was blown out, allowing burning fuel to drip into the hangar below, hence the fire in 'B' Hangar.
The ship was ready to receive aircraft at 17:55 hours, under 50 minutes after being hit.
Comparative Analysis
The comparison between 4 May and 9 May demonstrates the effectiveness of systematic institutional learning:
Casualties:
4 May: 8 killed (possibly 9), 47 wounded = 56 total
9 May: 1 killed, 4-5 wounded = 5-6 total
Reduction: 91 per cent
Fire control:
4 May: 20 minutes, approximately
9 May: 10-15 minutes, approximately
Improvement: 25 per cent
Resumption of flight operations:
4 May: 5.5 hours, approximately
9 May: 50 minutes, approximately
Improvement: 85 per cent
Flight deck penetration:
4 May: Yes (2-foot square hole)
9 May: No
It must be noted that the differences in bomb size and detonation (a 500-pound SAP bomb fully detonating on 4 May versus a 250-pound bomb partially detonating on 9 May) account for significant differences in structural damage. However, the dramatic reduction in human casualties resulted primarily from procedural changes: red flag warnings, cleared flight decks, foam-only firefighting, and speed reductions.
18 May 1945: Hangar Deck Fire
At approximately 11:00 hours on 18 May, Formidable was in a logistics support area. Armourers were loading ammunition into aircraft guns in the hangar; routine maintenance between operational periods. A Corsair's guns accidentally discharged. Rounds struck an adjacent Avenger, which erupted in flames.
The overhead sprinkler system was activated, but the fire spread rapidly. The fire curtain motors were destroyed on 4 May and were never replaced. They could only be replaced in a properly equipped dockyard. Without the fire curtain, flames spread through the hangar without containment.
The fire burned for approximately 55 minutes before being extinguished. Extensive saltwater spraying was required. Stoker Petty Officer Arthur Camfield led the firefighting effort.
Casualties: None killed.
Aircraft losses: Twenty-one Corsairs and seven Avengers destroyed or severely damaged; more than both kamikaze attacks combined.
Alexander Beldam recalled the incident vividly. He was in his cabin with friend Doug Andreas when alarms sounded. Initially, they thought it was an exercise. Beldam went to investigate and found the hangar deck covered in water approximately 18 inches deep. The ship was rolling, causing the water to slosh from side to side. A bomb on a carriage was sliding across the deck. Two Air Fitters stood on either side, feet extended, trying to stop the trolley from careening.
“An armourer who had been rearming one of the Corsair aircraft had unfortunately tested the guns before making sure there was nothing that could be fired,” Beldam explained. “Anyway, he accidentally fired a bullet or a couple of bullets into the Corsair in front of him, which then caught fire.”
According to Beldam, the armourer was sentenced to 90 days in a labour battalion in New Guinea for his incompetence.
Rear Admiral Rawlings detached Formidable from Task Force 57 on 22 May. She arrived in Sydney on 31 May for nearly a full month of repairs in the Captain Cook Dry Dock at Garden Island.
Repairs, Further Operations, and Post-War Service
Sydney Repairs
The temporary cement and steel patches applied on 4 May were removed. Two of the three damaged 14-ton armour plates were straightened or replaced. The third was replaced with a double layer of 1.5-inch-high-quality steel, as no armour plate was available in Australia. The damaged deck girder was replaced.
The forward aircraft lift, damaged on 4 May when the explosion blew fragments through its housing, was permanently disabled. The lift shaft was reportedly converted to an Admiral's bathroom, though this detail appears in memoirs rather than official records and may be apocryphal.
Barracuda and Corsair aircraft are ranged across HMS Formidable’s flight deck as the carrier prepares to launch strike operations. Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM A 25441).
Silent film footage shows Seafires, Fireflies, and Avengers operating primarily from HMS Indefatigable—sister ship to HMS Formidable—during British Pacific Fleet operations in 1945. The aircraft of Indefatigable are identifiable by the distinctive “S” marking on their tails.
Return to Operations: Strikes on Japan
By late June 1945, Formidable was operational again. She became the flagship of the 1st Aircraft Carrier Squadron when Rear Admiral Vian transferred his flag aboard from HMS Indomitable. The 6th Naval Fighter Wing was disbanded and reorganised as No. 2 Carrier Air Group under Lieutenant-Colonel P.P. Nelson-Gracie, Royal Marines.
On 27 May, Admiral Halsey relieved Admiral Spruance. The Fifth Fleet became the Third Fleet. Task Force 57 was redesignated Task Force 37. The British Pacific Fleet carriers Formidable, Victorious, Indefatigable, and Implacable deployed approximately 250 aircraft, while American Task Force 38's twelve carriers had around 1,000 aircraft.
The fleet departed Manus on 6 July and rendezvoused with Third Fleet on 16 July. On 17 July 1945, British carriers launched the first air attacks on the Japanese home islands, striking targets on the east coast of Honshu. HMS King George V bombarded Hitachi alongside American battleships.
The British Pacific Fleet was excluded from the main attacks on the Imperial Japanese Navy at Kure. The Americans wanted sole credit for sinking the remnants of the Japanese fleet. British carriers were directed against Osaka and targets in the Inland Sea instead.
British fighter sortie rates improved significantly from Sakishima operations. At Sakishima Gunto, Formidable achieved 1.08-1.09 sorties per aircraft. During the strikes on Japan, this increased to 1.54 sorties per aircraft, a 40 per cent improvement reflecting better logistics, shorter distances, and crew experience.
On 9 August 1945, the day of the Nagasaki atomic bombing, the British Pacific Fleet dropped 120 tons of ordnance, the Royal Navy's highest single-day total of the entire war. Aircraft destroyed 22 Japanese planes and 24 gliders on the ground.
Portrait of Lieutenant Robert Hampton Gray, VC, DSO, RCNVR—Canada’s only Royal Canadian Navy Victoria Cross recipient of the Second World War. Serving as a fighter pilot from HMS Formidable, Gray sank a Japanese destroyer six days before VJ Day but was shot down in flames and declared missing, presumed dead. Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM A 30950).
Lieutenant Robert Hampton Gray, VC, DSC, RCNVR
Lieutenant Robert Hampton Gray of 1841 Naval Air Squadron, a Canadian pilot, had earned a Mention in Despatches for pressing home strafing attacks on Tirpitz in August 1944 despite severe aircraft damage. On 28 July 1945, he scored a direct hit, sinking a Japanese destroyer and earned the Distinguished Service Cross.
On 9 August 1945, Gray led eight Corsairs against shipping in Onagawa Bay, northeast Honshu. The area was heavily defended. Gray dove on the escort vessel Amakusa. Intense anti-aircraft fire struck his Corsair and set it ablaze. One bomb dislodged. Despite flames engulfing his aircraft, Gray pressed the attack. His remaining bomb struck Amakusa squarely, sinking her. The burning Corsair plunged into the bay. Gray's body was never recovered.
Lieutenant Robert Hampton Gray was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross, the last Canadian to receive the decoration and one of only two Fleet Air Arm aircrew to earn it during the entire war. In 1989, the Japanese erected a memorial at Onagawa Bay, the only such memorial in Japan dedicated to a foreign Allied serviceman.
HMS Formidable is towed into her berth in Sydney on 24 August 1945, returning with units of the British Pacific Fleet after Japan’s defeat, seen alongside a sister carrier.
Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM A 30364).
War's End
On 10 August, strikes continued as Japan considered the Potsdam terms. On 12 August, Formidable, Victorious, and Implacable departed for Australia as the supply line had failed. HMS Indefatigable and HMS King George V remained as Task Group 38.5.
On 15 August, Emperor Hirohito announced Japan's surrender. Dawn strikes from Indefatigable resulted in the last fighter combat of the war.
Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser signed the surrender document aboard USS Missouri on 2 September 1945. HMS Duke of York lay at anchor nearby.
A Royal Navy fleet carrier, HMS Formidable, lies berthed at Wharf R in Sydney Cove, with a MANXMAN‑class fast minelayer visible astern. At right, the Manly ferry South Steyne heads inbound across the harbour. Source: Graeme Andrews Working Harbour Collection, courtesy of the City of Sydney Archives.
British Movietone newsreel footage from 11 February 1946 records the aircraft carrier HMS Formidable arriving at Portsmouth, returning from wartime service in the Far East.
Source: British Movietone Newsreel.
Troopship Service and Decommissioning
With the war’s end, Formidable's aircraft were flown off one last time, and her hangars were converted to dormitories. In September 1945, she sailed from Manila to Sydney carrying over 1,000 liberated Australian prisoners of war. Over the following 18 months, she made multiple voyages throughout the Far East, Australia, India, and Singapore, carrying nearly 14,000 passengers and steaming over 100,000 miles.
Among the crew serving aboard during 1946-1947 was Able Seaman Thomas Connery, later known by his stage name, Sean Connery. He was training as an anti-aircraft gunner and was medically discharged in 1949 with a duodenal ulcer.
Her final voyage delivered 1,000 Royal Marine Commandos to Singapore. She arrived at Portsmouth on 3 February 1947.
In March 1947, Formidable went to Rosyth for a brief refit before being reduced to reserve. She paid off on 12 August 1947.
A post-war structural survey revealed that the hull had been permanently deformed by accumulated damage from the 1941 Mediterranean bombing, two kamikaze strikes, and subsequent heavy steaming. The armoured flight deck, which served as the strength deck and was integral to the hull girder, transmitted all impact stresses throughout the hull structure. As a result, the ship was deemed beyond economic repair.
She languished without preservation, moving from Rosyth to Spithead to Portsmouth. In January 1953, she was sold for scrap to the British Iron and Steel Corporation for demolition by Thomas W. Ward and Company. She arrived under tow at Inverkeithing, Scotland, on 12 May 1953. Breaking up continued into 1956. It was a sad end for such a valiant ship.
Statistical Summary and Assessment
The British Pacific Fleet report for May 1945 concluded: “Without armoured decks, TF 57 would have been out of action (with 4 carriers) for at least 2 months.”
British Pacific Fleet Operations, Operation Iceberg
Sorties: 5,335
Bombs dropped: ~958 tons
Enemy aircraft destroyed: 42 in air, 100+ on the ground
Aircraft losses: 160
Ship's company: 44 killed, 83 wounded
HMS Formidable Service, June 1944 – December 1945
Distance steamed: ~112,823.5 miles
Operational hours: ~6,118 hours 11 minutes
HMS Formidable enters Woolloomooloo Bay en route to Garden Island naval base, photographed sometime between January and December 1946. Source: Graeme Andrews Working Harbour Collection, courtesy of the City of Sydney Archives.
Conclusions
The comparison between the kamikaze attacks on May 4 and May 9, 1945, illustrates how the officers and crew of HMS Formidable adapted and learned under pressure. The measures taken, including red flag warnings, clearing the flight deck, implementing foam-only firefighting, and immediately reducing speed, were not derived from existing naval doctrine. Instead, they emerged from practical observation, thoughtful analysis, and a willingness to learn from combat experiences.
The armoured flight deck represented a fundamental design trade-off. It saved crews in 1945 but ultimately killed the ship. The accumulated structural damage proved irreparable. Every bomb or kamikaze that struck the strength deck transmitted stress through the entire hull girder. American carriers with wooden flight decks and strength decks lower in the hull could absorb localised damage without compromising the entire ship’s structure.
The British Pacific Fleet's contribution to the Pacific War is still a subject of debate among historians. Some characterise it as “more diplomatic than military.” While it may be true that the fleet's role often seemed more about maintaining British influence in the post-war Pacific than about making a significant operational impact, this view overlooks the hard work, hardships, and casualties it endured. To date, around eighty-two books have been written about the Battle of the Atlantic. Eighty-nine cover Mediterranean operations. Only fifteen examine the Royal Navy's Pacific campaign. The young sailors, Royal Marines and aircrew who served, fought and died with “the forgotten fleet” deserve better.
Petty Officer George Hinkins ordered his gun crew to take cover and remained at his post. Sub-Lieutenant Don Jupp climbed from his burning aircraft and walked to the sick bay before dying ten days later from his terrible injuries. Lieutenant Robert Hampton Grey pressed home his attack whilst his aircraft was on fire and earned the Victoria Cross for his valour. These were not diplomatic gestures.
HMS Formidable, known as “the ship that launched herself” when her slipway cradle collapsed, survived two kamikaze attacks and a severe hangar fire to continue her mission. She carried 14,000 souls home. Ultimately, however, she was defeated not by the enemy but by her own design. The accumulated damage from every impact, transmitted through an armoured deck that had saved so many lives, ultimately broke her spine. The ship that launched herself could not save herself.
As for Uncle Bert, well, his adventures were just beginning. After the Royal Navy, he joined the merchant fleet and spent years sailing the world’s oceans. On one occasion, during a terrible storm, he received an awful head wound while nearly being washed overboard. After joining the prison service, he would save his holidays and then disappear on treks across North and Central Africa, from Tunis and the Western Desert to the ancient city of Timbuktu, and to many other remote, inhospitable, and exotic places. He was truly one of a kind, part of the Greatest Generation from World War II.
If you would like to know more about one of your relatives' military service, contact me now.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
National Archives (ADM Series)
ADM 53/121382. HMS Formidable Ship's Log, May 1945.
ADM 118694. Report of Two Kamikaze Attacks on HMS Formidable. Senior Medical Officer Surgeon Commander St. George Delisle Gray, 8 June 1945.
ADM 199595. Report on Operation Iceberg Five, Commanding Officer HMS Formidable, 18 April 1945.
ADM 199595. Operation Iceberg Photo/ACI Report No. 10912346, 23 June 1945.
Oral Histories (Imperial War Museum)
Beldam, Alexander Roy Asplin. Interview, IWM Catalogue Number 34503, 18 November 2015.
Harris, Stanley. Interview, IWM Sound Archive Catalogue Number 33740, July 2012.
Secondary Sources
Books
Brown, David. Carrier Operations in World War II. Vol. 2. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1974.
Wardroom Officer. A Formidable Commission. London: Seeley Services & Co. Ltd, 1947.
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