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The Second World War resulted in the deaths of around 85 million people. Additionally, tens of millions more people were displaced. However, amid all the carnage, people demonstrated remarkable courage, fortitude, compassion, mercy and sacrifice. We want to honour and celebrate all of those people. In the War Years Blog, we examine the extraordinary experiences of individual service personnel. We also review military history books, events, and museums. We also look at the history of unique World War II artefacts, medals, and anything else of interest.
HMS Formidable: Uncle Bert, Kamikaze, and Learning Under Fire
On 4 May 1945, a Japanese kamikaze crashed into HMS Formidable's armoured flight deck off Okinawa, killing eight men and wounding forty-seven. The 3-inch steel deck was penetrated, fires raged across the flight deck, and bomb fragments severed a steam pipe in the centre boiler room. Five days later, a second kamikaze struck almost the identical spot. This time, one man died, and four were wounded, a 91 per cent reduction in casualties.
What changed in those five days? The crew learned valuable lessons under fire and made life-saving adaptations during kamikaze attacks.
This is the story of HMS Formidable during Operation Iceberg, learning under fire, the cost of armoured flight decks, and the men who kept fighting despite two kamikaze strikes that would have crippled any other carrier.
On 4 May 1945, at approximately 11:35 hours, a Japanese Zero fighter completed a climbing turn over HMS Formidable, rolled inverted, and dove towards the carrier's flight deck. The aircraft had evaded radar by approaching low over the sea, then pulled up at the last moment. Every available close-range gun was brought into action and opened fire. The pilot released a bomb moments before impact. The aircraft and bomb struck simultaneously, just level with the island (the carrier’s command and control centre), creating an enormous orange flash and blowing in the bridge windows where Captain Philip Ruck-Keene stood. Down in the centre boiler room, Stoker Stanley Harris heard the action commentator shout: “Oh my God. There's one on the flight deck!” An instant later, bomb fragments cut through the armoured hangar deck, severed a steam pipe in Harris's boiler room, and continued down into the oil fuel tanks below.
Eight men died. Forty-seven were wounded. One Avenger blew up on deck with its pilot, Sub-Lieutenant Donald Jupp, still in the cockpit. Yet by 17:00 hours the same day, aircraft were landing back aboard. The 3-inch armoured flight deck had been breached, leaving a 2-foot-square hole, which was later repaired with quick-drying cement, covered with steel plates, and tack-welded back into service.
This article examines HMS Formidable's service with the British Pacific Fleet during Operation Iceberg in May 1945, focusing on two kamikaze attacks that struck the ship on 4 and 9 May. The comparison between these attacks demonstrates institutional learning under fire: practical adaptations developed in five days that reduced casualties by 91 per cent while maintaining operational effectiveness. My analysis draws on operational reports, the ship's official log, and crew members' testimonies, supplemented by published secondary sources. But that’s not quite the whole story, as I have a personal connection to the ship.
It’s Christmas morning in the 1970s. Charlie is dressed in a World War II battledress, complete with medals, a tin helmet, a webbing belt, and a holster, while holding a toy Webley revolver. On another Christmas, Charlie is dressed in a Triceratops dinosaur costume, all designed and made by Bert.
Magic Christmas Mornings in the 1970s
As a child growing up in the 1970s, Christmas mornings meant waking up to a pillowcase stuffed with presents. For most children of my era, that would have been the highlight of the day, but not in our house. Typically, on Christmas Eve, a shadowy figure would arrive in the early evening, and my siblings and I would be sent to watch television. My parents and my “Uncle Bert” would disappear into a downstairs room, emerge some hours later, and lock the door. Christmas morning would arrive, but the room would remain locked until Uncle Bert returned. Finally, all would be revealed. The room would be opened, and we would be ushered inside. Over the years, we were greeted by an array of handmade toys, ranging from a full-size racing car to miniature stables, a medieval castle, a Viking ship, a circus, and a battlefield, which included a landing craft, a pontoon bridge, tanks, and aircraft. Over the preceding months, Uncle Bert had meticulously designed, planned and built these unique and wondrous gifts. As children, whenever we asked how Uncle Bert built such things, we were simply told that he had been a shipwright in the navy, as if that were supposed to explain everything.
My Uncle Bert wasn’t a blood relative; his real name was Herbert Shortland, and he was a close friend of my father. After leaving the Royal Navy, Bert spent many years as a merchant seaman. At some point, my parents took Bert in and provided him with a room while he was away at sea. Later, he joined the prison service and lodged in a nearby house before eventually buying a home of his own and moving to Rochester, Kent, near the sea. After my father’s death, the family kept in touch with Bert, and as an adult, I would visit him. On one occasion, we discussed his time in the navy, and he showed me a photo album of his ship, HMS Formidable. The album contained a sequence of photographs of a Japanese kamikaze aircraft crashing onto the flight deck and the subsequent fire and chaos. Regrettably, I cannot recall what he said about the event, and he never spoke at length or in any detail about his time with the British Pacific Fleet. A short time later, he passed away. Since he had no living relatives that I know of, the Council cleared out his house. His photo albums, personal belongings, and all the memories of his extraordinary life at sea were put into rubbish bags and taken to the municipal recycling centre. Recently, I was reading, Crucible of Hell: Okinawa: The Last Great Battle of the Second World War by Saul David. In the book, there is the briefest mention of HMS Formidable. Well, it got me thinking.
HMS Formidable: Design and Service to 1945
HMS Formidable belonged to the Illustrious-class fleet carriers, revolutionary warships that encased the aircraft hangar in an armoured box. The flight deck itself formed the hull's strength deck and was built of 3-inch steel plate, with 4.5-inch armoured sides protecting the hangar. This armour came at a severe cost. Pre-war naval treaties limited displacement to 23,000 tons. The ship’s armoured hangar had to be lower and smaller, reducing aircraft capacity to 36 operational aircraft, compared with 80-100 on American carriers of similar size. According to the Wardroom Officer in his book, A Formidable Commission (1947), the ship’s second commission started on 16 May 1944.
On 17 August 1939, at Harland and Wolff's Belfast shipyard, Formidable launched herself when the launch cradle collapsed prematurely, killing a spectator and injuring others. The whole unfortunate episode was captured on camera by Pathé News. Commissioned on 24 November 1940, Formidable saw extensive Mediterranean service, including the Battle of Cape Matapan (27-29 March 1941) and sustained severe damage from German Stuka dive bombers on 26 May 1941. After repairs and operations covering the Salerno landings and attacks on Tirpitz, a centre shaft gear wheel failure delayed her deployment to the Pacific until January 1945.
HMS 'Formidable' launches herself in Belfast shipyard, Northern Ireland, 1939.
Captain Philip Ruck-Keene, CBE, DSO, commanded Formidable from 23 September 1943. A submariner by background, he had commanded the experimental submarine HMS X1 and the submarine depot ship HMS Medway. Ruck-Keene possessed a foghorn voice and drove his ship hard. He appears to have been a man who demanded high standards of professionalism and competence from officers and ratings alike. During a Belfast refit in 1943, he removed what he termed “bad apples” throughout the fleet. It seems that rather than make any concessions to naval conscripts, who regarded themselves as civilians in uniform, he despised “lower-deck lawyers” who he said knew all their rights but nothing of their duty. Consequently, Formidable was not a particularly “happy ship” under his command but was highly efficient. Rear Admiral Philip Vian would later praise Ruck-Keene's performance during the kamikaze attacks.
British Pacific Fleet: Command Structure and Strategic Context
HMS Formidable’s flight deck captures sister carriers Implacable and Victorious turning in formation with their destroyer escort on 10 July 1945, as the British Pacific Fleet advances toward strikes on the Japanese mainland in the final weeks of the war.
Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM A 30192).
Gallery #1: Picture Captions
Aircraft from HMS Formidable attack Ishigaki Airfield on 16 April 1945 during Operation Iceberg, striking runways and dispersed aircraft positions.
Source: The National Archives, ADM 199/595, Operation Iceberg Photographs, AC1s No. 109/12/346.
A second view of HMS Formidable’s 16 April 1945 strike on Ishigaki Airfield, capturing additional bomb impacts and smoke rising from targeted areas.
Source: The National Archives, ADM 199/595, Operation Iceberg Photographs, AC1s No. 109/12/346.
HMS Formidable’s “Strike Charlie” on 17 April 1945 hits Hirara Airfield, showing explosive strikes against key facilities during continued support of Operation Iceberg.
Source: The National Archives, ADM 199/595, Operation Iceberg Photographs, AC1s No. 109/12/346.
The British Pacific Fleet assembled in Sydney in early 1945 under Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, Commander-in-Chief. Fraser commanded from shore headquarters whilst Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings commanded the fleet at sea from the battleship HMS King George V. Rear Admiral Sir Philip Vian commanded the 1st Aircraft Carrier Squadron.
Vian required particular mention. He had led the destroyer flotilla in the Altmark incident, participated in the pursuit of Bismarck, and commanded the Eastern Task Force on D-Day. Regarded as a “fighting admiral” and compared to Nelson, he was characterised by his intense dedication to duty, tactical brilliance, and demanding, often abrasive leadership style that earned him immense respect despite limited personal popularity.
The American command structure designated the British Pacific Fleet as Task Force 57 (later TF 37) under overall US operational control. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance commanded Fifth Fleet during Operation Iceberg. The Americans assigned the British carriers a specific mission: neutralise Japanese airfields in the Sakishima Gunto islands between Formosa (modern-day Taiwan) and Okinawa to prevent enemy aircraft from staging attacks on the Okinawa invasion fleet.
Alexander Beldam, an Observer with 848 Naval Air Squadron aboard Formidable, recalled the mission clearly: “Our task was to disable the Japanese airfields in the islands between Formosa and the Philippines and the Japanese mainland, and in particular, the island of Ishigaki.” The Japanese proved ingenious at airfield repair. “They had a little railway down to the sea,” Beldam remembered, “and they would fill trucks with spoil (coral), run them back up to the airfield, and fill the bomb holes, so that by teatime sometimes the airfields were able to be used again. So we had to go back in the afternoon and bomb them again.”
On 14 April 1945, Formidable joined Task Force 57. Her air group consisted of 1841 and 1842 Naval Air Squadrons flying Corsair Mk IV fighters (18 aircraft each) and 848 Naval Air Squadron operating Grumman Avengers (12-18 aircraft), for a total complement of approximately 54 aircraft.
HMS Formidable and HMS Euryalus refuel from a British Pacific Fleet tanker, while Euryalus simultaneously transfers stores to the destroyer HMS Undaunted. Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM A 30072).
Fleet Train: Logistics and American Lessons
The British Pacific Fleet confronted a fundamental strategic problem: distance. Sydney lay 3,200 nautical miles from the operational area off Okinawa. The Royal Navy had never sustained carrier operations at such distances from established bases. The solution required wholesale adoption of American logistical methods and development of a mobile fleet train on a scale the Admiralty had never attempted.
The Americans had pioneered fleet replenishment while at sea. Their Task Force 38 could remain at sea for months, supplied by a continuous stream of oilers, ammunition ships, store ships, and repair vessels. The Royal Navy possessed minimal experience with this operational concept. British carriers had traditionally operated within the range of established shore facilities like Malta, Alexandria, and Scapa Flow. The Pacific offered no such infrastructure.
The British Pacific Fleet assembled a fleet train of unprecedented size. It included four escort carriers packed with replacement aircraft, pilots, and aircrew to replenish combat losses. Two additional carriers operated on ferry duty. There were landing ships, escort vessels, destroyers, repair ships, oilers, store ships, victualling ships, distilling ships, a net layer, armament ships, and hospital ships.
Personnel assigned to the fleet train received concentrated training in underway replenishment techniques from American instructors. Refuelling procedures, cargo transfer methods, and maintenance protocols were adapted from US Navy practice. British artificers and engineers learned American repair techniques. The learning curve proved steep but vital.
Operational tempo required extended periods at sea. Stoker Stanley Harris recalled: “I think the longest one we did there was about 80 odd days at sea, and didn't go ashore at all because we had a fleet train that used to supply us.” The fleet alternated between operational zones and replenishment areas. “We used to say that we would be going into the long grass when we were going off to conduct bombing missions on Sakishima-Gunto,” Harris explained, “and then would come back to what we called the short grass, and it was there that the fleet train would come. It was like a load of shops floating around, and we would take on oil from the tankers, and we would take flour aboard for cooking, and mail.”
Observer Alexander Beldam confirmed this operational pattern: “We used to retire to refuel and pick up more bombs before going back the following day for more bombing raids.” The fleet train enabled sustained operations impossible under traditional Royal Navy logistics doctrine.
Maintenance presented particular challenges. American carriers possessed larger maintenance crews and more extensive workshop facilities. British carriers operated with smaller engineering complements and less equipment. Repairs had to be improvised. Artificers developed field expedients. Spare parts were cannibalised from damaged aircraft. The forward aircraft lift on Formidable, disabled on 4 May, could not be repaired at sea and remained inoperative for the duration of operations.
Aircraft serviceability rates improved through practical experience. Initially, British carriers struggled to match American sortie rates. Engineering crews learned through observation and practice. Maintenance procedures were refined. By the strikes on Japan in July-August 1945, Formidable achieved fighter sortie rates of 1.54 sorties per aircraft; a 40 per cent improvement over Sakishima operations and approaching American performance levels.
The British Pacific Fleet demonstrated institutional capacity for rapid adaptation. Traditional Admiralty logistics doctrine proved inadequate for distances in the Pacific. American methods were studied, adopted, and integrated within months. Personnel at every level, from Admiral Fraser's headquarters staff to individual artificers on carrier hangar decks, developed practical solutions to unprecedented operational challenges.
This adaptability would prove equally valuable in combat damage control, as the events of 4 and 9 May would demonstrate.
A Japanese Mitsubishi Zero dives toward USS Missouri off Okinawa in April 1945, attempting a suicide crash. The impact missed the deck and struck only the battleship’s hull, causing no major damage. Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM NYF 70679).
4 May 1945: First Kamikaze Attack
Tactical Situation
At 10:02 hours on 4 May 1945, the battleships and cruisers of Task Force 57 detached from the carrier squadron for shore bombardment of targets on Miyako Island. This decision had significant tactical implications. The departing ships carried substantial anti-aircraft firepower and long-range radar coverage. The four British carriers, Formidable, Victorious, Indomitable, and Indefatigable, continued operations with eight destroyers providing close escort.
Shortly after 11:00 hours, radar detected bogeys (enemy aircraft) to the west. The weather provided perfect attack conditions: cumulus clouds at 3,000 feet with bright sun breaking through intermittently. Japanese pilots often conducted decoy attacks to distract the fleet's Combat Air Patrols (CAP), allowing individual attackers to approach low enough to avoid radar detection.
At 11:27 hours, Captain Ruck-Keene ordered Damage Control State II, then, three minutes later, moved to State I, the highest alert level. Watertight doors were secured, and damage control parties came to full readiness. Formidable turned into wind. At 11:27 hours, two Corsairs flew off on bombardment spotting missions. After launching, the ship turned to starboard, and eleven Avengers taxied forward in a single line to clear the deck aft in case the Corsairs needed to make emergency landings. This was a standard operating procedure.
HMS Formidable, after being hit abreast the island on 4 May 1945 during Operation Iceberg, was captured in official wartime photography documenting the Okinawa campaign. Source: The National Archives, ADM 199/595, Operation Iceberg, Photographs AC1s No. 109/12/346.
The Attack
At approximately 11:30 hours, without further warning, a Mitsubishi A6M Zero (referred to by the Allied codename, Zeke) passed overhead at 50 feet, firing its machine guns and strafing the deck park. The aircraft had evaded radar detection by approaching low over the sea. A few personnel glanced up in time to see the red Japanese roundels on the fuselage.
The pilot proved highly skilled. Dissatisfied with his angle of approach, he flew over the bow from port to starboard, threw the aircraft into a vertical climb, flew alongside the carrier in an arc past the island, then banked sharply to come round again towards the starboard quarter. Personnel on the flight deck ran for their lives, some throwing themselves headfirst down ladders.
'A' Group opened fire with both 4.5-inch gun turrets. All pom-poms and Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns with a clear line of sight engaged the target. The aircraft was hit repeatedly and caught fire, but the pilot continued his dive. Ruck-Keene ordered an emergency hard turn to starboard. Too late. A moment before impact, the pilot released his bomb, estimated to weigh between 500 and 1,000 pounds.
The ship's log recorded: “11:35hrs: Japanese aircraft crash dived onto flightdeck causing a hole 2-feet square. Centre boiler room evacuated due to steam leak. Fires on flightdeck and starboard boat deck.”
Gallery #2: Picture Captions
Firefighting crews work amid scorched metal, foam, and scattered wreckage on HMS Formidable’s flight deck after a kamikaze crash during operations supporting the Okinawa landings. Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM A 29312).
Crew members battle flames on HMS Formidable’s deck following a suicide plane crash, with a folded‑wing Corsair beside the ship’s heavily damaged island as smoke pours from wreckage aft. Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM A 29313).
HMS Formidable burns after a kamikaze strike off Sakishima Gunto during the Okinawa campaign, seen from HMS Victorious in April–June 1945. Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM A 29717).
Immediate Damage and Casualties
The bomb and aircraft struck simultaneously, just level with the ship's island control centre. The explosion blew in all the windows on the bridge where Captain Ruck-Keene was standing. The bomb struck at the intersection of four armoured deck plates, a weak point, and punched a 2-foot square hole through the 3-inch steel flight deck. The surrounding area was depressed to a depth of up to 2 feet, approximately 24 feet by 20 feet.
Bomb fragments and armour splinters tore through the hangar below, collapsing a fire curtain roller which smashed an Avenger parked beneath it. The fragments continued down through the hangar deck, through the main deck, and into the centre boiler room, severing the Auxiliary Superheated Steam Pipe. Stoker Stanley Harris and his crew had to evacuate immediately before being boiled alive. The centre boiler room remained out of action for hours.
Further fragments struck the oil fuel tanks, starting fires. A fire also broke out in the torpedo shop when flames spread down the torpedo lift shaft.
On the flight deck, one Avenger exploded. Its pilot, Sub-Lieutenant Donald George Jupp, RNVR, was taxiing the aircraft forward when the kamikaze struck. Despite being enveloped in flames, Jupp managed to climb out of his burning cockpit and somehow walk to the sick bay, terribly burned over a large part of his body and unable to see.
The former First Aid Post inside the island had been taken over by the Air Intelligence Department a few days before the attack. Senior Medical Officer, Surgeon Commander St. George Delisle Gray viewed this change “with equanimity” given that in the first kamikaze attack on HMS Indefatigable, the entire First Aid Party including the Medical Officer had been wiped out. The old F.A.P. opened directly onto the flight deck, with one door permanently left open for easy access. When the bomb exploded, the room was crowded with personnel from the Air Intelligence Department. Lieutenant (A) Burger was standing near a scuttle and pressed his face against the small window to see what was happening. The scuttle was blown inwards by the blast, mortally wounding him.
Commander (Ops) Walter Elliott and his assistant were in the operations room. Their veteran's instinct told them to run. Burger did the opposite and died as a result. The explosion lifted Elliott and his assistant off their feet and threw them into the next room.
On that day, Observer Alexander Beldam was not flying. Instead, he was assisting the Commander of Operations, based in the plot room. His pilot and close friend, Don Jupp, was helping move aircraft on the flight deck. Beldam recounted the events that followed the explosion: “The first assistant to the Commander of Ops was on the floor at that time. Unfortunately, he had been looking out of the scuttle when the kamikaze struck the Formidable, and he was killed because the explosion blasted the glass from the scuttle directly into his face.”
The official casualty list:
Killed immediately: 6 (including 2 officers: Lt Burger and Sub-Lt Bell, plus 4 ratings)
Died within 30 minutes: 2 more
Injured: 47 (6 officers, 41 ratings), of whom 48 were detained in Sick Bay.
Damage Control Response
Speed saved lives. Ruck-Keene immediately ordered the ship to turn 250 degrees downwind and reduce speed to 16 knots, blowing fires away from the island. All hands were called to the flight deck. Aircraft Handling Parties and firefighting teams went to work.
Geoffrey Brooke, who led the firefighting operation, grabbed foam generator nozzles and directed teams to attack the fires. One novice began hosing burning aviation fuel with water. The fuel simply floated on the surface and spread across the flight deck. Hand extinguishers were grabbed to douse smaller fires. Additional drums of foam compound were brought up from stores.
Senior Medical Officer Gray was making his way forward on the boat deck when the explosion occurred. “An enormous sheet of flame extended 10 feet over the side of the ship,” he recalled, “and parts of the aircraft passed overhead.” He ran to the sick bay, which quickly became overcrowded with injured men. All patients in cots were turned out to make room for the seriously wounded. Casualties lay in corners and in the gangway. The immediate task was to determine which patients had already received morphine and administer it to others who needed it. None had been labelled.
The worst casualties:
Gray’s report and clinical description of wounds suffered by members of the ship’s crew make sobering reading.
Sub-Lieutenant Donald George Jupp: For 50 hours, it was impossible to do more than administer morphine and give continuous transfusions of reconstituted plasma. On the evening of 5 May, he had recovered sufficiently to be taken to the sick bay theatre to examine and dress his injuries. His condition initially improved. His friend and crewmate, Observer Alexander Beldam, visited him every night and read to him. On one occasion, Jupp looked up at the doctor and said, “Doc, you never told me you had blue eyes.” It was the first indication he could see again. He was transferred to a hospital ship. Beldam shook his hand and said, “I'll see you in Sydney.” That was the last Beldam saw of him. Jupp died suddenly about 10 days later from the effects of his burns. He was just 20 years old.
Petty Officer Thomas Lamb, P/JX 149881, age 44: Aircraft Handling Party on the flight deck when the bomb exploded. He suffered a compound fracture of the right thigh, multiple wounds to both legs, and a wound on the dorsum of the left instep. He was tender over his abdomen and complained of chest pain. He had suffered much domestic trouble and told the medical staff that he was going to die and did not wish to live. He was too ill for surgical intervention beyond morphine and plasma transfusions for 48 hours. When his condition stabilised sufficiently, surgeons excised the wound edges and packed the sinuses with sulphanilamide cream. A hard object was located in his left foot, a piece of steel, apparently the head of a piston, was removed from in front of his os calcis (heel bone). It was decidedly larger than the entry wound; there was no wound on his sole. The next morning, he took a turn for the worse and died at approximately 11:50 on 7 May, 72 hours after being wounded.
A Chance‑Vought Corsair launches with a bomb mounted beside its auxiliary fuel tank, heading out on a dive‑bombing raid against the German battleship Tirpitz. Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM A 25440).
Repair and Return to Operations
All fires were reported under control by 11:55 hours, approximately 20 minutes after the attack. Captain Ruck-Keene gripped the American liaison officer, Lieutenant Commander Ben Hedges, by the arm and shook his other fist at him. The Americans had been unimpressed with British carrier design, particularly the steel flight decks that radiated heat through the ship. “What do you think of our bloody British flight-decks now?” Ruck-Keene demanded. Hedges looked at the skipper and replied: “Sir, they're a honey.”
With fires out, Ruck-Keene set about making good the damage. He had aircraft in the air and wanted them back aboard. Gangs of shipwrights and artificers went to work plugging the hole with quick-drying cement. Timber was placed first, then cement, before steel plates were positioned over it and tack-welded into place. Brooms cleared any small pieces of debris off the flight deck that might burst an aircraft's tyres.
By 12:54 hours, the ship could make 24 knots. The centre boiler room was not reconnected until 04:00 hours on 5 May, but steam had been diverted from the starboard boiler room to restore speed more quickly. The flight deck barriers were assessed: one was a complete write-off, but the other could be repaired. All arrestor cables and both lifts remained intact. By 13:15 hours, the damage was made good. The skipper was told the barrier should be fixed by 16:00 hours. By 17:00 hours, the aircraft were landing back aboard.
Four Avengers and one Corsair were pushed over the side as damaged beyond repair. At 15:30 hours, funerals were held for Lt Burger, Sub-Lt Bell, and six ratings.
The Admiralty signal to Rear Admiral Vian read simply: “Good show, Formidable.”
Lessons Learned: Adaptations Between 4 and 9 May
The five days between the first and second kamikaze attacks saw intensive analysis and practical adaptation. No formal Admiralty doctrine covered these improvements; they emerged from observation, thought, and a willingness to act on painful experience.
Anti-Hawk Stations Procedures Refined
The alarm system had failed on 4 May. The mechanical roar of eleven Avenger engines drowned out the klaxon warning personnel to clear the flight deck. Many crew members never heard the anti-hawk alarm and were caught on deck at the moment of the explosion. Lieutenant Burger died because he was looking out of a scuttle window. Sub-Lieutenant Jupp was taxiing his aircraft. Petty Officer Lamb was working with the Aircraft Handling Party. All were exposed because the warning system was inadequate.
The solution proved simple: a red flag system. When radar detected an incoming kamikaze, a red flag would be raised from the bridge as a visual signal. This cut through aircraft engine noise where sirens failed. It was an improvisation, not Navy doctrine, and it saved lives.
Anti-Hawk Stations procedures were refined to maximum protective posture. Both aircraft lifts were to be raised and sealed. All hangar armoured doors were to be closed. The fire main was split into six independent sections so damage to one would not disable the entire system. Specialist flight-deck fire parties were pre-positioned in nettings and lobbies below the armoured deck with equipment ready to rush topside immediately after impact. Most critically, every person on the flight deck was ordered below the armoured deck except gun crews. Twenty “Squadron Action Gangs” (one Petty Officer plus ten men each) closed up on the Upper Gallery Deck, ready to rush topside after the attack to clear wreckage and fight fires.
Firefighting Doctrine
Foam compound supply was doubled from 1,000 to 2,000 gallons. Additional foamite extinguishers were pre-positioned. The hangar spraying system drill was rehearsed. One critical lesson was learned the hard way on 4 May: burning aviation fuel must never be fought with water. Water simply spreads the burning fuel. Flight deck fires required foam only. This became an absolute doctrine.
A second counterintuitive lesson: immediately after a kamikaze strike, reduce speed to approximately 15 knots. High speed creates airflow that fans the deck fires. Slower speeds starve fires of oxygen and make firefighting more effective.
Medical Preparations
The sick bay proved inadequate. Located on the port side, not under the armoured deck, it was exposed, awkward to access, and extremely noisy when the anti-aircraft guns fired. The laundry was converted to an operating theatre. Camp beds were drawn from stores to rig emergency wards. The after half of the Wardroom and the Warrant Officers' Mess were taken over and fitted with camp beds to accommodate wounded under protective armour. However, having the laundry out of service created its own problems.
Plasma supplies were found to be critically inadequate. The ship carried 400 bottles and used 360 of them to treat casualties from the first attack. Official allocation was only 260 bottles, just one for every ten men. Senior Medical Officer Gray recommended that each fleet carrier carry 1,000 bottles of plasma to be prepared for multiple emergencies.
Anti-Flash Gear Discipline
The medical report noted an important detail: “All cases of burns [on 9 May] were wearing overalls and anti-flash gear at the time.” Despite this protection, several men received severe burns on their backs. The Senior Medical Officer theorised that men facing the explosion and bending forward had the backs of their overalls gape open, allowing flash to pass down their backs. Nevertheless, anti-flash gear discipline was rigorously enforced despite tropical heat.
One detail from the 4 May attack proved significant: “There were no cases of burns among the fire parties.” Personnel who wore proper anti-flash gear and followed procedures remained protected.
Gallery #3: Picture Captions
HMS Formidable seen from the starboard bow moments after the 9 May 1945 suicide attack, showing damage and smoke rising from the forward area. Source: The National Archives, ADM 199/595, Operation Iceberg Photographs, AC1s No. 109/12/346.
A head‑on perspective of HMS Formidable shortly after the 9 May 1945 strike, showing the extent of damage to her forward flight deck and island area. Source: The National Archives, ADM 199/595, Operation Iceberg Photographs, AC1s No. 109/12/346.
Crew members work rapidly to clear HMS Formidable’s damaged flight deck after the 9 May 1945 attack, with wreckage strewn aft as emergency teams restore the deck to operational condition. Source: The National Archives, ADM 199/595, Operation Iceberg Photographs, AC1s No. 109/12/346.
A close view of the impact point on HMS Formidable’s armoured deck, revealing the force of the explosion and the structural resilience that prevented deeper penetration. Source: The National Archives, ADM 199/595, Operation Iceberg Photographs, AC1s No. 109/12/346.
9 May 1945: Second Kamikaze Attack
Tactical Situation
Task Force 57 continued operations off Sakishima Gunto. At 16:53 hours on 9 May, radar detected bogeys. Damage Control State I was set immediately. Anti-Hawk Stations were sounded. The flight deck was cleared. Six Corsairs were on deck at the time.
At 17:02 hours, HMS Victorious was hit by a kamikaze. At 17:06 hours, Formidable's guns engaged an aircraft attacking the battleship HMS Howe. At 17:08 hours, a third aircraft, the fourth in the overall raid, was detected Red 100 (bearing 100 degrees relative), making a shallow dive.
The aircraft, either a Zero or a Nakajima B6N (Allied codename Jill), initially appeared to attack Formidable from astern, then changed course toward the fleet carrier HMS Indomitable, banked sharply back, and dove at approximately 30 feet above the sea. The Japanese aircraft was hit repeatedly, but the gunfire appeared to have no effect.
The Impact
At 17:09 hours, the aircraft crashed onto the flight deck slightly starboard of the centreline, abreast the after end of the island, only a few feet aft of the 4 May impact point. The aircraft disintegrated. The bomb the plane was carrying, estimated at 250 pounds or possibly a modified heavy shell, only partially detonated.
The ship's log recorded: “17:07hrs: Japanese aircraft crash dived onto flightdeck setting fire to three aircraft and denting armoured plates (of the flightdeck). One rating killed and five injured. 17:40hrs: Fires extinguished.”
Note: The ship's log records the date as the 8th of May, but I believe this was an error, and the date was the 9th of May 1945. All other sources confirm 9 May as the correct date.
Effectiveness of Adaptations
The red flag system worked exactly as intended. Flight Commander Keith Quilter was strapped into his Corsair with the engine running when he saw the red flag. He killed the engine, unstrapped, leapt out along with three other pilots, and jumped down two or three decks before impact. His aircraft was completely destroyed. He was unhurt.
The cleared flight deck meant only gun crews were exposed. All others were protected by the ship’s 3 inches of armour plate. This single measure dramatically reduced casualties.
Foam-only firefighting and pre-positioned fire parties proved highly effective. All fires were brought under control by 17:25 and extinguished by 17:35, a total of 10 minutes. The immediate speed reduction to 15 knots starved fires of wind.
The hangar containment procedures worked. 'C' Hangar was sprayed as a precaution (Corsairs were carrying full drop tanks). The 'B' Hangar fire was handled “in most admirable manner.”
Casualties and Damage
The sole fatality of the second attack was Petty Officer George Hinkins. He commanded the S3 pom-pom mounting. As the kamikaze approached, he ordered his crew to take cover and ensured all were sheltered before the impact. He remained at his post and was killed by a flying Corsair wheel. His funeral was held on the quarterdeck at 19:15 hours on 9 May.
Four personnel were wounded (the ship's log states five). All survived.
Six Corsairs and one Avenger were destroyed on deck. Seven Corsairs and three Avengers in the hangar became “flyable duds” from saltwater contamination when the spraying system activated. Formidable was left with 11 serviceable Corsairs and 4 serviceable Avengers from her original complement of 54 aircraft.
Structural damage was far less severe than on 4 May despite a similar point of impact. The armoured deck was depressed 4.5 inches over an area of approximately 10 feet square. Approximately 90-100 rivets were loosened or gouged. The deep beam was depressed approximately 2 inches. The armoured deck was not penetrated. One rivet was blown out, allowing burning fuel to drip into the hangar below, hence the fire in 'B' Hangar.
The ship was ready to receive aircraft at 17:55 hours, under 50 minutes after being hit.
Comparative Analysis
The comparison between 4 May and 9 May demonstrates the effectiveness of systematic institutional learning:
Casualties:
4 May: 8 killed (possibly 9), 47 wounded = 56 total
9 May: 1 killed, 4-5 wounded = 5-6 total
Reduction: 91 per cent
Fire control:
4 May: 20 minutes, approximately
9 May: 10-15 minutes, approximately
Improvement: 25 per cent
Resumption of flight operations:
4 May: 5.5 hours, approximately
9 May: 50 minutes, approximately
Improvement: 85 per cent
Flight deck penetration:
4 May: Yes (2-foot square hole)
9 May: No
It must be noted that the differences in bomb size and detonation (a 500-pound SAP bomb fully detonating on 4 May versus a 250-pound bomb partially detonating on 9 May) account for significant differences in structural damage. However, the dramatic reduction in human casualties resulted primarily from procedural changes: red flag warnings, cleared flight decks, foam-only firefighting, and speed reductions.
18 May 1945: Hangar Deck Fire
At approximately 11:00 hours on 18 May, Formidable was in a logistics support area. Armourers were loading ammunition into aircraft guns in the hangar; routine maintenance between operational periods. A Corsair's guns accidentally discharged. Rounds struck an adjacent Avenger, which erupted in flames.
The overhead sprinkler system was activated, but the fire spread rapidly. The fire curtain motors were destroyed on 4 May and were never replaced. They could only be replaced in a properly equipped dockyard. Without the fire curtain, flames spread through the hangar without containment.
The fire burned for approximately 55 minutes before being extinguished. Extensive saltwater spraying was required. Stoker Petty Officer Arthur Camfield led the firefighting effort.
Casualties: None killed.
Aircraft losses: Twenty-one Corsairs and seven Avengers destroyed or severely damaged; more than both kamikaze attacks combined.
Alexander Beldam recalled the incident vividly. He was in his cabin with friend Doug Andreas when alarms sounded. Initially, they thought it was an exercise. Beldam went to investigate and found the hangar deck covered in water approximately 18 inches deep. The ship was rolling, causing the water to slosh from side to side. A bomb on a carriage was sliding across the deck. Two Air Fitters stood on either side, feet extended, trying to stop the trolley from careening.
“An armourer who had been rearming one of the Corsair aircraft had unfortunately tested the guns before making sure there was nothing that could be fired,” Beldam explained. “Anyway, he accidentally fired a bullet or a couple of bullets into the Corsair in front of him, which then caught fire.”
According to Beldam, the armourer was sentenced to 90 days in a labour battalion in New Guinea for his incompetence.
Rear Admiral Rawlings detached Formidable from Task Force 57 on 22 May. She arrived in Sydney on 31 May for nearly a full month of repairs in the Captain Cook Dry Dock at Garden Island.
Repairs, Further Operations, and Post-War Service
Sydney Repairs
The temporary cement and steel patches applied on 4 May were removed. Two of the three damaged 14-ton armour plates were straightened or replaced. The third was replaced with a double layer of 1.5-inch-high-quality steel, as no armour plate was available in Australia. The damaged deck girder was replaced.
The forward aircraft lift, damaged on 4 May when the explosion blew fragments through its housing, was permanently disabled. The lift shaft was reportedly converted to an Admiral's bathroom, though this detail appears in memoirs rather than official records and may be apocryphal.
Barracuda and Corsair aircraft are ranged across HMS Formidable’s flight deck as the carrier prepares to launch strike operations. Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM A 25441).
Silent film footage shows Seafires, Fireflies, and Avengers operating primarily from HMS Indefatigable—sister ship to HMS Formidable—during British Pacific Fleet operations in 1945. The aircraft of Indefatigable are identifiable by the distinctive “S” marking on their tails.
Return to Operations: Strikes on Japan
By late June 1945, Formidable was operational again. She became the flagship of the 1st Aircraft Carrier Squadron when Rear Admiral Vian transferred his flag aboard from HMS Indomitable. The 6th Naval Fighter Wing was disbanded and reorganised as No. 2 Carrier Air Group under Lieutenant-Colonel P.P. Nelson-Gracie, Royal Marines.
On 27 May, Admiral Halsey relieved Admiral Spruance. The Fifth Fleet became the Third Fleet. Task Force 57 was redesignated Task Force 37. The British Pacific Fleet carriers Formidable, Victorious, Indefatigable, and Implacable deployed approximately 250 aircraft, while American Task Force 38's twelve carriers had around 1,000 aircraft.
The fleet departed Manus on 6 July and rendezvoused with Third Fleet on 16 July. On 17 July 1945, British carriers launched the first air attacks on the Japanese home islands, striking targets on the east coast of Honshu. HMS King George V bombarded Hitachi alongside American battleships.
The British Pacific Fleet was excluded from the main attacks on the Imperial Japanese Navy at Kure. The Americans wanted sole credit for sinking the remnants of the Japanese fleet. British carriers were directed against Osaka and targets in the Inland Sea instead.
British fighter sortie rates improved significantly from Sakishima operations. At Sakishima Gunto, Formidable achieved 1.08-1.09 sorties per aircraft. During the strikes on Japan, this increased to 1.54 sorties per aircraft, a 40 per cent improvement reflecting better logistics, shorter distances, and crew experience.
On 9 August 1945, the day of the Nagasaki atomic bombing, the British Pacific Fleet dropped 120 tons of ordnance, the Royal Navy's highest single-day total of the entire war. Aircraft destroyed 22 Japanese planes and 24 gliders on the ground.
Portrait of Lieutenant Robert Hampton Gray, VC, DSO, RCNVR—Canada’s only Royal Canadian Navy Victoria Cross recipient of the Second World War. Serving as a fighter pilot from HMS Formidable, Gray sank a Japanese destroyer six days before VJ Day but was shot down in flames and declared missing, presumed dead. Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM A 30950).
Lieutenant Robert Hampton Gray, VC, DSC, RCNVR
Lieutenant Robert Hampton Gray of 1841 Naval Air Squadron, a Canadian pilot, had earned a Mention in Despatches for pressing home strafing attacks on Tirpitz in August 1944 despite severe aircraft damage. On 28 July 1945, he scored a direct hit, sinking a Japanese destroyer and earned the Distinguished Service Cross.
On 9 August 1945, Gray led eight Corsairs against shipping in Onagawa Bay, northeast Honshu. The area was heavily defended. Gray dove on the escort vessel Amakusa. Intense anti-aircraft fire struck his Corsair and set it ablaze. One bomb dislodged. Despite flames engulfing his aircraft, Gray pressed the attack. His remaining bomb struck Amakusa squarely, sinking her. The burning Corsair plunged into the bay. Gray's body was never recovered.
Lieutenant Robert Hampton Gray was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross, the last Canadian to receive the decoration and one of only two Fleet Air Arm aircrew to earn it during the entire war. In 1989, the Japanese erected a memorial at Onagawa Bay, the only such memorial in Japan dedicated to a foreign Allied serviceman.
HMS Formidable is towed into her berth in Sydney on 24 August 1945, returning with units of the British Pacific Fleet after Japan’s defeat, seen alongside a sister carrier.
Source: Imperial War Museums (IWM A 30364).
War's End
On 10 August, strikes continued as Japan considered the Potsdam terms. On 12 August, Formidable, Victorious, and Implacable departed for Australia as the supply line had failed. HMS Indefatigable and HMS King George V remained as Task Group 38.5.
On 15 August, Emperor Hirohito announced Japan's surrender. Dawn strikes from Indefatigable resulted in the last fighter combat of the war.
Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser signed the surrender document aboard USS Missouri on 2 September 1945. HMS Duke of York lay at anchor nearby.
A Royal Navy fleet carrier, HMS Formidable, lies berthed at Wharf R in Sydney Cove, with a MANXMAN‑class fast minelayer visible astern. At right, the Manly ferry South Steyne heads inbound across the harbour. Source: Graeme Andrews Working Harbour Collection, courtesy of the City of Sydney Archives.
British Movietone newsreel footage from 11 February 1946 records the aircraft carrier HMS Formidable arriving at Portsmouth, returning from wartime service in the Far East.
Source: British Movietone Newsreel.
Troopship Service and Decommissioning
With the war’s end, Formidable's aircraft were flown off one last time, and her hangars were converted to dormitories. In September 1945, she sailed from Manila to Sydney carrying over 1,000 liberated Australian prisoners of war. Over the following 18 months, she made multiple voyages throughout the Far East, Australia, India, and Singapore, carrying nearly 14,000 passengers and steaming over 100,000 miles.
Among the crew serving aboard during 1946-1947 was Able Seaman Thomas Connery, later known by his stage name, Sean Connery. He was training as an anti-aircraft gunner and was medically discharged in 1949 with a duodenal ulcer.
Her final voyage delivered 1,000 Royal Marine Commandos to Singapore. She arrived at Portsmouth on 3 February 1947.
In March 1947, Formidable went to Rosyth for a brief refit before being reduced to reserve. She paid off on 12 August 1947.
A post-war structural survey revealed that the hull had been permanently deformed by accumulated damage from the 1941 Mediterranean bombing, two kamikaze strikes, and subsequent heavy steaming. The armoured flight deck, which served as the strength deck and was integral to the hull girder, transmitted all impact stresses throughout the hull structure. As a result, the ship was deemed beyond economic repair.
She languished without preservation, moving from Rosyth to Spithead to Portsmouth. In January 1953, she was sold for scrap to the British Iron and Steel Corporation for demolition by Thomas W. Ward and Company. She arrived under tow at Inverkeithing, Scotland, on 12 May 1953. Breaking up continued into 1956. It was a sad end for such a valiant ship.
Statistical Summary and Assessment
The British Pacific Fleet report for May 1945 concluded: “Without armoured decks, TF 57 would have been out of action (with 4 carriers) for at least 2 months.”
British Pacific Fleet Operations, Operation Iceberg
Sorties: 5,335
Bombs dropped: ~958 tons
Enemy aircraft destroyed: 42 in air, 100+ on the ground
Aircraft losses: 160
Ship's company: 44 killed, 83 wounded
HMS Formidable Service, June 1944 – December 1945
Distance steamed: ~112,823.5 miles
Operational hours: ~6,118 hours 11 minutes
HMS Formidable enters Woolloomooloo Bay en route to Garden Island naval base, photographed sometime between January and December 1946. Source: Graeme Andrews Working Harbour Collection, courtesy of the City of Sydney Archives.
Conclusions
The comparison between the kamikaze attacks on May 4 and May 9, 1945, illustrates how the officers and crew of HMS Formidable adapted and learned under pressure. The measures taken, including red flag warnings, clearing the flight deck, implementing foam-only firefighting, and immediately reducing speed, were not derived from existing naval doctrine. Instead, they emerged from practical observation, thoughtful analysis, and a willingness to learn from combat experiences.
The armoured flight deck represented a fundamental design trade-off. It saved crews in 1945 but ultimately killed the ship. The accumulated structural damage proved irreparable. Every bomb or kamikaze that struck the strength deck transmitted stress through the entire hull girder. American carriers with wooden flight decks and strength decks lower in the hull could absorb localised damage without compromising the entire ship’s structure.
The British Pacific Fleet's contribution to the Pacific War is still a subject of debate among historians. Some characterise it as “more diplomatic than military.” While it may be true that the fleet's role often seemed more about maintaining British influence in the post-war Pacific than about making a significant operational impact, this view overlooks the hard work, hardships, and casualties it endured. To date, around eighty-two books have been written about the Battle of the Atlantic. Eighty-nine cover Mediterranean operations. Only fifteen examine the Royal Navy's Pacific campaign. The young sailors, Royal Marines and aircrew who served, fought and died with “the forgotten fleet” deserve better.
Petty Officer George Hinkins ordered his gun crew to take cover and remained at his post. Sub-Lieutenant Don Jupp climbed from his burning aircraft and walked to the sick bay before dying ten days later from his terrible injuries. Lieutenant Robert Hampton Grey pressed home his attack whilst his aircraft was on fire and earned the Victoria Cross for his valour. These were not diplomatic gestures.
HMS Formidable, known as “the ship that launched herself” when her slipway cradle collapsed, survived two kamikaze attacks and a severe hangar fire to continue her mission. She carried 14,000 souls home. Ultimately, however, she was defeated not by the enemy but by her own design. The accumulated damage from every impact, transmitted through an armoured deck that had saved so many lives, ultimately broke her spine. The ship that launched herself could not save herself.
As for Uncle Bert, well, his adventures were just beginning. After the Royal Navy, he joined the merchant fleet and spent years sailing the world’s oceans. On one occasion, during a terrible storm, he received an awful head wound while nearly being washed overboard. After joining the prison service, he would save his holidays and then disappear on treks across North and Central Africa, from Tunis and the Western Desert to the ancient city of Timbuktu, and to many other remote, inhospitable, and exotic places. He was truly one of a kind, part of the Greatest Generation from World War II.
If you would like to know more about one of your relatives' military service, contact me now.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
National Archives (ADM Series)
ADM 53/121382. HMS Formidable Ship's Log, May 1945.
ADM 118694. Report of Two Kamikaze Attacks on HMS Formidable. Senior Medical Officer Surgeon Commander St. George Delisle Gray, 8 June 1945.
ADM 199595. Report on Operation Iceberg Five, Commanding Officer HMS Formidable, 18 April 1945.
ADM 199595. Operation Iceberg Photo/ACI Report No. 10912346, 23 June 1945.
Oral Histories (Imperial War Museum)
Beldam, Alexander Roy Asplin. Interview, IWM Catalogue Number 34503, 18 November 2015.
Harris, Stanley. Interview, IWM Sound Archive Catalogue Number 33740, July 2012.
Secondary Sources
Books
Brown, David. Carrier Operations in World War II. Vol. 2. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1974.
Wardroom Officer. A Formidable Commission. London: Seeley Services & Co. Ltd, 1947.
Please note: this blog contains Amazon affiliate links. If you purchase books through these links, I receive a small commission at no additional cost to you. This helps support the ongoing research and content on The War Years.
War Stories and Myths: Revisiting the Falklands, the Denison Smock, and Arnhem’s Legacy
In this blog article, I bring together reviews of books and documentaries that revisit the Falklands War, unravel the myths of the Denison smock, and challenge long-held beliefs about Arnhem and Operation Market Garden. Join me as I explore how personal accounts and new evidence reshape our understanding of these pivotal moments in military history.
In recent months, I’ve been reading a range of books and viewing a series of documentaries exploring the realities of twentieth-century conflicts. From the windswept battlefields of the Falklands to the airborne drops of Operation Market Garden, these works both in print and on YouTube challenge accepted narratives, expose enduring myths, and offer fresh perspectives on events that continue to shape our understanding of war. In this article, I combine reflections on various military history books and videos to create a narrative about how easily historical facts can become obscured over time.
The Falklands War: Personal Accounts and Broader Perspectives
Roger Field’s Scimitar into Stanley (2022) offers a first-hand account of his experiences with the Blues and Royals during the 1982 Falklands War. Initially a staff officer, Field found himself commanding a Scimitar armoured car in battle, famously leading the charge into Port Stanley with journalist Max Hastings clinging to the back of his vehicle. The book is laced with humour, sometimes laugh-out-loud funny, though in today’s climate of political correctness, some may find parts of the text a little too candid. Field doesn’t shy away from naming names or calling out poor leadership, particularly criticising Brigadier Sir Tony Wilson. Yet, he’s equally honest about his own post-war struggles. The result is an open and honest personal account of modern conflict.
For those seeking a broader view, Hugh Bicheno’s Razor’s Edge (2007) steps back to examine the origins of the conflict. Bicheno, a former British spy in Argentina, foresaw the coming war, but his warnings fell on deaf ears in Whitehall. He spares no one in his critique, lambasting the Foreign Office, Civil Service, and politicians. The book is notable for its inclusion of the Argentine perspective, often overlooked elsewhere, and for its detailed descriptions of the campaign’s battles from both Argentine and Allied viewpoints. Bicheno highlights the role of chance in victory and defeat, and his unsparing criticism is directed at all parties in what he sees as an avoidable conflict. Interestingly, his book is used as a text at Argentina’s war college, a testament, perhaps, to its thoroughness.
If you want the soldier’s view, read Field. For the bigger picture, turn to Bicheno. Both are well worth your time.
Justice Denied: The Welsh Guards and the Sir Galahad Cover-Up
Another recent read, Too Thin for a Shroud by Lieutenant-Colonel Crispin Black (2023), delves into the bombing of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary’s Sir Galahad by the Argentine Air Force on 8 June 1982, the British Army’s deadliest day since 1945.
The Book's Claims
Black documents how 48 men died when Argentine A4 Skyhawks bombed Sir Galahad at Port Pleasant, Fitzroy. The ship was in the wrong location and lacked proper air defence. Packed with Welsh Guardsmen, Sir Galahad sat exposed in broad daylight for over six hours.
Using newly declassified Board of Inquiry documents from The National Archives, Black demonstrates that no direct orders to disembark were given to Major (later Colonel) Guy Sayle and the Welsh Guards. For 40 years, he was wrongly blamed for failing to disembark the troops. The inquiry proves this false. Black argues that senior Royal Navy and Royal Marines commanders made cascading failures: wrong location, defective landing craft, no air defence, and poor communications. The inquiry’s findings were classified until 2065, 83 years after the event.
The declassified files state, “At no time was a direct order to disembark given to Major Sayle by a superior officer.” Colonel Guy Sayle’s daughter has spoken to the media about how her father was made a “scapegoat” for the disaster, and now the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has said it “in no way blames” the Welsh Guards for the losses that day. Colonel Sayle died in 2022. According to Emma Sayle, her father died “haunted and penniless”.
Critical Reception
Unsurprisingly, reviews of Black’s book split sharply along service lines. Welsh Guards veterans and families praised the book as vindication. Royal Navy and Royal Marines personnel frequently criticise it as biased. The conservative Daily Telegraph called it “a repository of damning facts.” The Spectator acknowledged it “shows the Welsh Guards in a new light”, but questioned broader claims. In the court of public opinion, Amazon reviews range from five-star praise for the book's formidable detective work to one-star criticism for an inaccurate rewriting of history.
Senior commanders mounted coordinated rebuttals. RUSI Journal published responses from Major General Julian Thompson, Rear Admiral Jeremy Larken, and other Falklands officers. They challenged Black's interpretations whilst acknowledging errors in the original inquiry. Rear Admiral Larken contacted Black's publisher before reading the book, claiming the Welsh Guards were “unprofessional.” The Mirror reported that Larken claimed the Welsh Guards were an unprofessional and poorly led unit responsible for “pilfering” on his ship. Personally, if true, I think this statement says all we need to know about Larken.
On the flipside, General Sir Michael Rose supported Black's findings, suggesting a “cover-up” on national television.
Political Fallout
The book triggered parliamentary debates. On 25 March 2024, MPs pressed for the release of the documents. Sir Iain Duncan Smith stated: “There is now no question but that some kind of cover-up took place.” Defence Minister Andrew Murrison formally exonerated the Welsh Guards: “The board of inquiry is quite clear...the Welsh Guards were absolutely exonerated.” You can read the full transcript of the House of Commons debate on the Hansard website.
In May 2024, the MoD released 62 pages of previously classified documents. These largely confirmed Black's central claims: no orders were given to the Welsh Guards to disembark, the ship was sent to the wrong location, inadequate landing craft were available to offload the vessel, and no air defence was established.
Luckily for the families of those lost, the wounded and veterans, Black's credentials proved difficult to ignore by the Government, MoD and Navy. After all, he was on board Sir Galahad that fateful day, worked for the Cabinet Office as an intelligence adviser, and received an MBE for his work with the Defence Intelligence Staff during the crisis in the Former Yugoslavia. He is also a frequent contributor to the BBC and major British newspapers on terrorism and intelligence matters.
Crispin Black's book focuses on the bombing of RFA Sir Galahad, the subsequent cover-up, and the release of documents that prove the Welsh Guards were not to blame. He successfully campaigned for the declassification of these documents, which led to the official exoneration of the Welsh Guards after 42 years. While some critics question his interpretation of the events during the Falklands War, they present little counter-evidence. Many fundamental questions remain, and numerous documents will stay classified until 2065. Furthermore, no public inquiry has been announced. Black's work has challenged the previously accepted “official” narrative that unfairly scapegoated the Welsh Guards, turning it into an ongoing controversy.
Unravelling the Myths: The Denison Smock
On a lighter note, my recent purchase of a reproduction 1972-pattern Denison smock led me to a fascinating YouTube video by David Willey, formerly of The Tank Museum: “So you thought you knew about Denison Smocks…” The Denison smock, with its distinctive “brushstroke” camouflage, became iconic among British airborne forces, the SAS, and commandos. Yet, as Willey and Jon Baker (Curator at the Airborne Assault Museum) reveal, much of what we think we know is myth. There’s no evidence the smock was named after Major Denison—indeed, there’s no proof such a person existed. The famous “beaver tail” wasn’t designed to stop the garment riding up during jumps, as is often claimed. Willey’s video is a reminder of how easily repeated stories can become accepted fact.
Market Garden Revisited: Myths and Realities at Arnhem
Turning to Operation Market Garden, I recently watched two videos that challenge established narratives about the battle for Arnhem. The first was Niall Cherry’s Some Arnhem Myths... and a dose of reality! Part 2 on WW2TV, hosted by Paul Woodadge. Cherry, a former Royal Army Medical Corps senior NCO, has written eleven military history books. He is secretary of the Arnhem 1944 Veterans Club, a member of the 23 Parachute Field Ambulance OCA and Secretary of the Arnhem 1944 Fellowship. In the video, Cherry addresses specific myths and misconceptions with documentary evidence. Perhaps one of the most commonly held misconceptions about Market Garden is that because the radio equipment failed, the operation failed. On radios, Cherry explains that the 68 sets had known range limitations in wooded terrain. Tests in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and Normandy confirmed this. Commanders knew the Arnhem operational area exceeded set capabilities. In John Frost’s book, A Drop Too Many, he states that the failure of radio equipment was a perennial problem for Britain’s airborne forces.
Regarding the arming of British medics during the operation, establishment tables indicate that each parachute field ambulance was equipped with 123 pistols, 12 rifles, and 31 Sten guns. Of the 630 medics, only six were conscientious objectors. Photographic evidence confirms that most medics carried sidearms. As for the 21st Independent Parachute Company, the nominal rolls reveal that there were eleven foreign personnel among a total of 886 men, disproving the claim that there was a significant number of German Jews, which has become something of a myth.
In terms of planning failures, Cherry argues the 1st Air Landing Brigade should have seized the bridges at Arnhem. Air landing battalions had 750 men versus 550 in parachute battalions, formed up in seconds rather than forty minutes, and possessed superior firepower with four rifle companies, additional mortars, machine guns and anti-tank weapons. He examines General Browning’s influence on Jim Gavin at Nijmegen, where securing the Groesbeek Heights took priority over the Waal road bridge. Browning subsequently blamed Polish General Stanisław Sosabowski in a damning letter before departing for the Far East. Sosabowski's military career never really recovered from Browning’s unfounded criticisms.
During the WW2TV video, Cherry mentioned a short documentary film produced by Anglia Television on the 25th anniversary of Operation Market Garden in 1969. A quick search of YouTube, I found the programme in question, The Battle of Arnhem, directed by Harry Aldous. The programme is largely a collection of documentary interviews with many of the key protagonists and some local witnesses to events during the fighting for Arnhem and Oosterbeek.
In the documentary, Major General Roy Urquhart explained his 36-hour absence from divisional headquarters. He claimed wireless failures prompted his forward movement on the first afternoon. German opposition then trapped him with Brigadier Lathbury near St Elisabeth's Hospital. Lieutenant Colonel John Frost described reaching the Arnhem bridge intact on Sunday evening with over 500 men. Fewer than 200 remained alive and unwounded when resistance ended on Thursday morning. Brigadier John Hackett recounted arriving on Monday afternoon into active combat. His disagreement with Brigadier Pip Hicks over troop deployment at the Hartenstein reflected command confusion during Urquhart's absence.
Major General Allan Adair, Guards Armoured Division, blamed the terrain for his formation’s slow progress up the central axis of advance. The single-road approach prevented flanking movements, and the marshy Dutch polder land between Nijmegen and Arnhem, an area known as the Island, prohibited armoured manoeuvre.
SS General Wilhelm Bittrich assessed British troops as an “absolute elite” and commented on his troops' respect for their enemies. Housewife and mother, Kate ter Horst, described caring for the many wounded who packed her Oosterbeek home. Casualties filled every room. In the final segment of the programme, General Urquhart read from his 1945 report stating all ranks would willingly undertake similar operations again. Frost believed that most men who served at Arnhem, if asked, would accept another “invitation to the party”.
The Anglia Television documentary is an interesting, if uncritical, oral history filmed before later narratives worked their magic on the public imagination. The inclusion of a German perspective remains unusual for a 1969 British production. Both videos offer valuable source material. Cherry challenges operational assumptions with documented evidence. The Anglia TV program features first-hand accounts from key figures who planned, executed, and fought in the Battle of Arnhem. However, time and concerns about preserving their own reputations likely influenced the accuracy of their memories.
From the windswept South Atlantic to the battlefields of Holland, these books and documentaries reveal the enduring power of personal testimony and the importance of challenging received wisdom. Whether exposing cover-ups, debunking myths, or simply telling it as it was, each work adds a vital thread to the tapestry of military history. In revisiting these stories, we honour the lived experience and also ensure that the lessons, whether bitter or inspiring, are not forgotten.
Amazon Affiliate
This blog contains Amazon affiliate links. If you purchase books through these links, I receive a small commission at no additional cost to you. This helps support the ongoing research and content on The War Years.
References, Justice Denied:
https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/could-the-bombing-of-sir-galahad-have-been-prevented/
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2024.2444114
The Author's Trap: How Book Club Scams Really Work
In this article, we expose the tactics behind book club scams that prey on unsuspecting authors. Discover how these schemes operate, the warning signs to watch for, and why a zero-trust approach is your best defence against digital deception.
In recent months, I’ve started to receive emails claiming to be from book clubs. Typically, the sender begins the email with a paragraph of glowing praise about my book, A History of the Guards Armoured Formations 1941-1945. Next, they inform me that their particular club has thousands of loyal members just crying out to read a review of my book, or have me appear as a guest in an online “meet-up” (a bit like a Zoom call). The emails always seem to come from the USA or Canada. All very flattering. All very suspicious.
A couple of weeks after I received my first invitation to be reviewed by one of these so-called book clubs, the Society of Authors (SOA) issued a warning about various author-targeted scams currently circulating. I’m naturally suspicious of unsolicited emails, especially when they make unsubstantiated claims and promise the earth. I usually report them as spam, block them and forget about them. But I was a little curious about how the scams worked, why they targeted authors, and who got paid.
A Google search returned a very informative article by Victoria Strauss, co-founder of the Writer Beware® website. Based in the USA and sponsored by the Science Fiction and Fantasy Writers Association ( SFWA®), the stated mission of Writer Beware® is to “track, expose, and raise awareness of the prevalence of fraud and other bad practices in and around the publishing industry.” A very laudable endeavour. Published in September 2025, Victoria’s article is titled, Return of the Nigerian Prince Redux: Beware Book Club and Book Review Scams. It makes fascinating reading.
In one day, I received two suspicious emails offering to promote my book. Instead of simply deleting and blocking the senders, I thought I'd do a little digging of my own. What I found shows exactly why authors need to be careful about unsolicited outreach. (Note: I've changed the names and email addresses to protect privacy, but all other details are accurate.)
The first email claimed to be from “Andy Smith,” organiser of a book club in Washington, DC, with “4,000+ members.” The second purported to be from “Charlotte Doe,” claiming to be a bestselling author. Both were fake, and examining their email headers revealed why. Despite claiming to be from Washington, DC, and Sydney, Australia, respectively, both emails showed a +0100 time zone—indicating they originated in the UK or Western Europe. Someone in Washington would use US Eastern Time (-0400/-0500), not European time. And someone living in Sydney, certainly wouldn't be sending emails on UK time either.
The technical details provided more clues to the fraudulent origin of the emails. Both used free Gmail accounts with names like “bookclub.readers1@gmail.com” and “charlottedoe1@gmail.com” (note the “1” suffixes, suggesting someone already had those names). A legitimate book club with thousands of members is likely to have a professional, branded domain. I think the same is true for an established bestselling author. The “book club” email linked to a music journalism archive with no connection to book clubs. The author’s impersonation included Amazon links tagged with “utm_source=chatgpt.com,” suggesting that the content was generated by AI. Both emails contained tracking pixels to monitor whether I opened them, marking me as an active target for future scams.
The way the emails were written was suspicious. One email opened with “Hi,” missing my name entirely. Both offered generic praise that could apply to any book, without providing specific details about my work. The book club email made vague promises to “explore how we might spotlight” my book without any actual dates or plans, while the author’s message had an incomplete sentence: “I also wanted to share a recent discovery that might interest you”, followed by nothing, like the template was never finished.
The lessons learned are straightforward. Legitimate opportunities come through professional channels with verifiable credentials. They use proper business email addresses, include specific details about your work, and do not usually require tracking pixels. When you notice red flags, such as free email accounts, inconsistent sender locations, generic comments about your work, broken templates, unusual links, and tracking technology, it is a scam. These operations harvest author information, build email lists to sell, or set you up for future “promotional service” fees. If something feels wrong, follow your gut instincts, report the email as spam and block the sender.
Zero Trust: Your Digital Defence Against Social Engineering
At present, none of these fake emails have come with an attachment or specifically asked me to click a link, but some might. Whatever you do, and I cannot stress this enough, DO NOT OPEN any file or click on any link. At best, it will be an attempt to harvest your credentials and at worst, your computer or mobile device will be infected with malware or ransomware.
Cybercriminals are extremely good at devising new scams and manipulating their victims: it’s called social engineering. Their whole raison d'etre is to trick you into making a mistake and giving them access to your personal data or hijacking your computer and everything on it. This means you have to be ultra-suspicious of unsolicited email, text, voice, and any other sort of communication.
In the tech world, “Zero Trust” is a security principle that says “never trust, always verify” and assumes that no user or device can be trusted by default. Taking a zero-trust approach to your communications might seem bleak, but with AI tools making social engineering attacks and scams more sophisticated, it’s better than the alternative.
Book Club Scams - Key Points: Red Flags Every Author Should Know
According to Victoria Strauss from Writer Beware®, many of these scams originate in Nigeria. The scams involve emails that appear to be from book clubs offering to feature a book, but there's a catch: you must pay a “spot fee” or “participation fee” ranging from USD $55 to $350.
How the scams work and red flags:
Gmail addresses instead of professional email domains
Some of the book clubs simply do not exist and have no online presence, while others impersonate real book clubs that do exist on platforms like Meetup.com
The emails are personalised by using AI to scrape data from sites like Amazon, and reference specific details about the target book and author
Over-the-top fluff and flattery about the author and their work
Payment is typically requested via a PayPal friends and family account (which cannot be reversed) or through an Upwork contract from third parties in Nigeria
Real book clubs do not charge fees to authors for appearances or features
The good news is that the scammers may be sabotaging themselves by sending so many emails that authors are getting rightly suspicious and sharing warnings on social media. Remember, zero trust: if a book club or any group asks you to pay for the opportunity to be reviewed or interviewed, it’s a scam.
Why Traditional Publishing Mostly Fails Military History Authors
In this blog article, I reveal the uncomfortable truth about military history publishing: most authors lose money. Drawing from my experience of publishing two books with traditional UK publishers, I will outline the real costs associated with image licensing, the limited marketing support you can expect, and explain why typical royalties of £525 to £750 often fail to cover even basic research expenses.
I will compare traditional publishing with academic presses, specialist imprints, and self-publishing platforms, highlighting which options offer the best chance of reaching readers without risking financial ruin. Whether you are a first-time author or considering your next project, understanding these economic realities is crucial before dedicating hundreds of hours to preparing your manuscript.
Disclosure: As of January 2026, this blog contains Amazon affiliate links. If you purchase books through these links, I receive a small commission at no additional cost to you. This helps support the ongoing research and content on The War Years.
According to Richard Godwin, a columnist for The Guardian, around 200,000 books are published in the UK each year.1 Most military history books sell only 200 to 300 copies before going out of print. The competition for readers' attention has never been more intense. However, many first-time authors will find that their publisher does very little, if anything, to actively promote their book.
Publishing military history requires more than just research and writing; it also involves navigating the submission process, securing image licenses, and collaborating with editors, each of which presents its own set of challenges. In recent months, I have gained a better understanding of these practical realities as I have submitted my second manuscript and worked through the complexities of traditional publishing.
Manuscript Submission and Image Licensing
In January 2025, my first book, A History of the Guards Armoured Formations 1941-1945, was published by Pen & Sword Military. In July 2025, I submitted the manuscript for my second book to Fonthill Media. My submission included the manuscript, 18 photographs, 2 diagrams, 1 map, and a comprehensive list of captions. The manuscript needed to be formatted according to the publisher's 20-page Submission and House Style Guide. Formatting the manuscript proved to be a surprisingly tedious and time-consuming process. Publishers also require the completion of multiple forms and questionnaires for marketing and sales purposes. This seems odd, since they rely heavily on authors to promote their own books. Overall, the administrative burden accounts for a significant portion of the submission process.
The Cost of Illustration
Finding suitable photographs to illustrate military history books takes time and money. For my latest book, the average copyright licensing fee was around £50 per image. Authors are responsible for these costs, as publishers do not cover image licensing expenses.
The final licensing fee per image is based on several factors. Cover images generally incur higher fees than those used inside the book because of their greater visibility. Additionally, the print run size, distribution methods, and other considerations influence the final price. Different jurisdictions have varying regulations regarding public domain materials and the expiration of copyright.
In the UK, copyright typically expires after 70 years, though exceptions exist. The Imperial War Museum (IWM) provides an excellent source for Second World War imagery. However, Crown Copyright applies to many photographs, allowing the institution to charge perpetual licensing fees that support its operations.
Some images are free to use, including those with Creative Commons licenses, public domain materials, and content from free stock photography sites. However, it is important to properly attribute the image creator.
If an author wants to include maps and diagrams in their book, they will either need to create the artwork themselves or hire an illustrator. Hiring an illustrator is an additional expense for the author, not the publisher. I hired a qualified graphic designer to produce the maps that appear in my first book, for example.
An author may choose to take their own photographs to illustrate their book; however, institutions often require licensing fees for images of artefacts in their collections, even if the photographs are original. Don't assume you can take a picture of a military vehicle on public display and simply publish the image. Always request permission and check whether fees apply before proceeding.
The Financial Reality: A Cost-Benefit Analysis
The economics of military history publishing become stark when examined systematically. Based on my own experience, the following table illustrates author expenses against realistic earnings for military history books:
| Expense Category | Typical Cost Range | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Image licensing (15–20 images) | £750–£1,200 | £50 per image average from IWM, TNA, Getty |
| Archival research (multi-day visits) | £400–£800 | Travel, accommodation, document fees (TNA, IWM) |
| Professional map design (2–3 maps) | £300–£600+ | Graphic designer/illustrator fees |
| Marketing and promotion | £200–£500+ | Website hosting, social media ads, review copies |
| Professional memberships | £100–£250 | SAHR, RHS, SOA, HWA annual fees for credibility |
| Total Author Investment | £1,750–£3,350 | Before any research and writing time is invested |
Against the costs outlined in the diagram above, typical returns for military history books remain modest. Advances have become increasingly rare in military history publishing. Typically, only established and successful authors receive advances. In my case, I received a small advance, which was then deducted from my royalties until paid off.
The majority of first-time authors receive no advance whatsoever. Royalties of 7-10% on net receipts represent the industry standard for traditional publishers. Based on a retail price of £25 and a typical print run of 500-1,000 copies for specialist military history, selling 300 copies generates approximately £525-£750 in total royalties. For authors who received no advance, this represents their complete earnings from the book. Many authors will receive less. This calculation excludes the time investment required to research and write a history book.
A typical military history book requires 400-800 hours of research, writing, and editing. At even a modest £15 per hour, this represents a labour value of £6,000- £12,000. The financial reality is unambiguous: traditional publishing of specialist military history operates as a subsidised endeavour, with authors effectively paying publishers for the privilege of seeing their work in print. If you are in it for the money, you would be better off taking a job with a supermarket chain, as you will earn more than most authors and the money is guaranteed.
Why Most History Books Fail
Unfortunately, the harsh reality is that most military history books do not provide a return on investment. The military history publishing sector reflects a broader crisis identified by James McConnachie, editor of the Society of Authors Journal. He observed that "far more books are published than could ever succeed" because publishers are "underinvesting in editing or marketing while outsourcing much of the risk to authors".2
For military historians, this imbalance is particularly severe. Authors face significant upfront expenses, including an average of £50 per image for copyright licenses, commissioning map and diagram costs, and fees for conducting archival research at institutions such as The National Archives. At the same time, they are expected to manage their own marketing campaigns with minimal support from publishers.
The Marketing Burden
The promotional workload expected of authors has expanded dramatically. Since my first book was published in mid-January 2025, I have invested approximately 2-3 hours weekly in marketing activities. This includes maintaining a presence across Facebook, YouTube, and LinkedIn, with occasional posts on Instagram and TikTok.
Content production involves creating posts, video material, and occasional blog articles analysing military history topics to maintain audience engagement.
I have also worked with a local journalist who wrote several articles about my book and my family history research services for local residents. This generated regional awareness but required coordination time for interviews and fact-checking.
My publisher's contribution consisted of a single press release distributed to their existing mailing list and inclusion in their seasonal catalogue. A couple of social media posts, no review copy distribution to military history journals, no outreach to specialist bookshops or military museums. The expectation was clear: authors handle their own promotions, or their books disappear without a trace.
As McConnachie pointed out in an article in The Guardian, "traditional authors are doing much of the marketing anyway." This is concerning, especially given that the median income of full-time authors has dropped by about 60% since 2006, to just £7,000 per year.3 The figures are stark: Hundreds of hours spent in archives, thousands of pounds invested in illustrations and permissions, and extensive time devoted to social media promotion—all for books that most publishers acquire cheaply and produce with minimal investment, often with ineffective promotion.
This situation transforms what should be a scholarly pursuit into a struggle for financial stability, where authors end up subsidising publishers' profits while grappling to recover even their direct research costs, let alone receive fair compensation for years of specialised historical work.
Alternative Publishing Routes
Given the economic realities of traditional publishing, authors should evaluate alternative routes to market. Each approach presents distinct advantages and limitations. There is no perfect route to market here; everything is a compromise. And steer clear of websites and organisations that promise to do all the heavy lifting in terms of marketing and sales. If it seems too good to be true, that’s because it is. New authors should be wary of any company that demands upfront fees for vague services.
Academic Publishers
University presses such as Cambridge and Oxford remain the gold standard for scholarly credibility, but their commercial model has fundamentally shifted away from author earnings. Typical print runs for specialist military history monographs now range from 100 to 500 copies, down from approximately 1,500 in the 1980s.4 Oxford Historical Monographs, for example, publishes just 6-8 titles annually.5 Royalties typically sit at 8% of net receipts, not the cover price, meaning an author might earn approximately £1,008 total from a £70 monograph selling 300 copies after distributor discounts.6 Advances, when offered, are minimal: first-time academic authors report receiving "hundreds of pounds" rather than thousands. Pricing reflects the library-focused market, with British Academy Monographs ranging from £55 to £100 depending on length.
Authors considering open-access book publishing face high costs. Book Processing Charges at major presses include Cambridge and Oxford (£8,000-£12,000), Palgrave Macmillan (£10,000), and Routledge (£10,000+).7 Academic publishers prioritise scholarly rigour over commercial appeal, which suits detailed military analysis, but authors sacrifice broader public engagement for credibility within historical research communities.
Specialist Military History Publishers
The UK specialist military history market is dominated by three publishers: Pen & Sword, Helion & Company, and Osprey. These offer substantially better terms than academic presses whilst maintaining professional trade distribution.
Pen & Sword Books (Barnsley) publishes over 350 titles annually across multiple imprints.8 Documented author contracts show 10% royalties on all print sales and 15% on eBooks, calculated on net price received rather than cover price. When books sell at trade discounts of 50% or more, effective royalties drop accordingly. The company accepts submissions from new writers but expects authors to do most of the marketing.
Helion & Company (Warwick) has carved out the specialist-academic niche, publishing approximately 100 titles annually and holding 1,200 books in its catalogue. Pricing ranges from £24.95 to £35 for paperbacks and from £35 to £45 for larger academic titles. Helion organises titles into period-specific series and provides US distribution through Casemate Publishers.9
Osprey Publishing (Oxford), currently owned by Bloomsbury, dominates the illustrated reference market with 3,100+ titles and a monthly output of 10-12 books. Osprey typically operates a work-for-hire model for series contributors rather than standard royalty contracts.10
Self-Publishing via Amazon KDP
Amazon's Kindle Direct Publishing platform offers the highest per-copy margins but creates significant barriers to physical bookshop and library distribution. The royalty structure changed in June 2025: print books priced at or above £7.99 receive a 60% royalty (minus printing costs), whilst those priced below £7.99 receive only a 50% royalty. Ebooks qualify for a 70% royalty within the £2.99- £9.99 price band.11
Print production costs for a 300-page black-and-white military history paperback are approximately £3.85. At a £14.99 list price with 60% royalty, author earnings would be £5.14 per copy sold—substantially higher than traditional publishing's £1-2 per copy.
Professional service costs for self-publishing a military history title in the UK typically include: developmental editing (£1,300-£4,000 for an 80,000-word manuscript), copy-editing (£950-£2,400), proofreading (£350-£800), cover design (£250-£600), interior formatting (£250-£500), battlefield cartography (£300-£1,200 per map), and ISBNs (£89 single or £164 for ten from Nielsen).12
The distribution limitations are severe. KDP titles are not eligible for UK Public Lending Right because Amazon uses ASINs rather than ISBNs licensed for library systems. Most independent bookshops refuse to stock KDP publications, viewing Amazon as a direct competitor. The Expanded Distribution option reduces royalties to 40% whilst still failing to match traditional trade terms.
Hybrid Publishers
The Society of Authors issued its landmark report, Is It a Steal?, in April 2022, investigating 240 authors across 91 hybrid publishing companies. The conclusion was unambiguous: hybrid/paid-for publishing is "the worst option a writer can take" because sales are insufficient to justify the author's investment, and there are concerns about aggressive marketing tactics and opaque contracts.13
Troubador Publishing (Leicester), operating the Matador imprint, represents the more reputable end of the UK hybrid market. As an Alliance of Independent Authors Partner Member, Troubador offers bespoke pricing: eBook-only (approximately £650); print plus eBook with 200 copies (approximately £3,000); full service with 500 copies and marketing (approximately £6,000); and premium with website and digital marketing (approximately £7,500).14
Troubador's royalty structure pays authors 85% of net receipts on eBooks (after retailer discounts) and manages print royalties after a 15% commission for distribution and fulfilment. Crucially, Troubador operates selectively, rejecting manuscripts that don't meet quality standards, and provides genuine trade distribution through its own warehousing.
Key red flags of vanity press operations include accepting all manuscripts regardless of quality, aggressive cold-calling tactics, pressure to purchase immediately, vague distribution claims, and hidden costs that appear after signing. The Independent Book Publishers Association Hybrid Publisher Criteria establishes 11 standards for legitimate hybrids, but these criteria are voluntary and non-binding.15
Practical Advice for Aspiring Military Historians
Based on my experience navigating military history publishing, the following recommendations may help authors avoid common pitfalls and establish realistic expectations. I want to specifically acknowledge the Society of Authors for their invaluable advice and practical assistance as I approach the publication of my second book.
Questions to Ask Publishers Before Signing
Publishers should provide clear answers to specific questions before authors commit to contracts. Essential enquiries include:
What editorial support will be provided? Request details about structural editing, copy-editing, and proofreading processes, including whether these are included in the contract or represent additional author expenses.
What marketing activities will the publisher undertake? Obtain specific commitments regarding review copy distribution, social media promotion, and outreach to specialist retailers and military history platforms.
Who covers image licensing costs? Clarify whether the publisher provides a budget for photograph licenses or whether authors must fund these expenses independently.
What is the expected print run and pricing strategy? Understanding initial print quantities and retail pricing helps establish realistic sales projections and royalty calculations.
What rights revert to the author if the book goes out of print? Ensure contracts specify clear conditions for rights reversion, enabling authors to pursue alternative publishing options if the publisher ceases promotion.
Building an Online Presence Before Publication
Publishers increasingly expect authors to arrive with an established social media presence. Beginning author-brand development 12-18 months before manuscript submission provides several advantages. A research blog demonstrating expertise in your subject area builds credibility with both publishers and readers. Regular social media posts analysing primary sources, discussing historiography, or exploring archival discoveries establish your authority whilst generating content for promotion. Social media engagement with military history communities, museums, and fellow historians creates networks that support book launches. Publishers view authors with 2,000+ engaged social media followers as lower-risk investments, though the quality of engagement matters more than follower count.
Identifying Low-Cost Image Sources
Image licensing represents a significant expense, but several strategies reduce costs without compromising quality. Wikimedia Commons hosts substantial collections of military history under Creative Commons licenses, particularly for pre-1945 material. The U.S. National Archives offers extensive Second World War imagery in the public domain. The UK's national archive provides free images for non-commercial use. In contrast, other national archives, such as the Nationaal Archief (National Archives of the Netherlands), offer some images that are out of copyright. Regional museums and regimental archives may also waive fees for authors who give prominent credit to the institution. Additionally, building relationships with military vehicle preservation societies and re-enactment groups can grant access to contemporary photography of historical equipment. However, it's essential to obtain written permission before using any of these images. Your publisher might help you find license-free images or negotiate prices with stock libraries. For example, Pen & Sword Books offered to search for license-free images while I was working on my first book.
Creating Your Own Maps and Diagrams
Professional map production costs £150-£250 per map, but several tools enable authors to create acceptable alternatives. QGIS, an open-source geographic information system, provides sophisticated mapping capabilities for battle maps and campaign movements. The learning curve is steep but worthwhile for authors planning multiple books. Inkscape offers vector graphics editing suitable for organisational charts, order-of-battle diagrams, and tactical illustrations.
For authors lacking design skills, commissioning university geography or design students provides high-quality results at reduced rates, typically £50- £100 per map. Always retain source files and copyright for any commissioned work to enable reuse in future publications. These approaches require time investment but reduce direct costs and provide valuable skills transferable across multiple projects.
You can find freelancers on platforms like Fiverr and Upwork. However, based on my own experience, the quality of work can vary greatly, and prices can escalate quickly. If you need to redo work because the quality is poor, the cheap option can end up costing more.
Conclusion
Like many first-time authors, I approached the publication process with expectations shaped more by optimism than by reality. I anticipated that my publisher would guide my manuscript through substantive editing, using their expertise to transform my first draft into a commercially viable history book. Unfortunately, that professional support never materialised. I received little editorial help, which left me to figure out the complexities of historical storytelling and pacing mostly on my own. Because of this, I now see that my book didn't reach its full potential. It wasn't due to a lack of research or hard work, but rather because I mistakenly thought that professional editing would be part of the publishing process.
My second book shares a different experience. While working with a new publisher, I have received valuable editorial support and guidance. This shows what good collaboration in publishing looks like. I have received helpful feedback, suggestions for the structure, and expert advice, which I hope will turn solid historical research into an interesting, engaging story. This time, I am hopeful that the final product will highlight my research skills and reflect the quality that comes from a strong editorial partnership. This shows that support greatly improves the quality of the final work.
However, my new publisher has been absorbed by a larger industry player, which will undoubtedly impose its own rules and cost-cutting measures, leaving minor authors with little support and minimal expectations. For me, personally, it means books that I’d planned to write on the Falklands War and Operation Market Garden have been shelved.
The fundamental tension in military history publishing lies between credibility and compensation. Academic presses offer institutional validation for scholars, but financial returns are measured in hundreds of pounds. Specialist trade publishers provide professional production and bookshop distribution at royalty rates of 10-15% on net receipts. Self-publishing through KDP maximises per-copy margins whilst sacrificing access to physical retail and library channels. For military historians, the reality is that Pen & Sword and Helion dominate the accessible trade market. This means that most pre-production costs and the ongoing marketing responsibilities fall on the author, who is very unlikely to ever see a return on their investment.
References
1. Godwin, R., 2025. More are published than could ever succeed: Are there too many books? The Guardian, 21 March. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2025/mar/21/more-are-published-than-could-ever-succeed-are-there-too-many-books [Accessed 6 January 2026].
2. McConnachie, J., 2024. The Crisis in Book Publishing: Why Authors Are Paying the Price. The Guardian, 15 October. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2024/oct/15/book-publishing-crisis-authors [Accessed 6 January 2026].
3. Society of Authors, 2024. Authors' Earnings 2024: A Survey of UK Authors. London: Society of Authors.
4. Thompson, J.B., 2023. The Future of the Monograph in the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences: Publisher Perspectives on a Transitioning Format. Publications, 11(1). Available at: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9946702/ [Accessed 6 January 2026].
5. Wikipedia, 2025. Oxford Historical Monographs. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_Historical_Monographs [Accessed 6 January 2026].
6. Oxford University Press, 2025. Royalties and payments for UK Office Agreements. Available at: https://academic.oup.com/pages/authoring/books/royalties/royalties-uk [Accessed 6 January 2026].
7. Cambridge Core, Publishing an open-access book. Available at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/authors/publishing-an-open-access-book/ [Accessed 9 January 2026].
8. Pen and Sword Books, Blog, About. Available at: https://www.pen-and-sword.co.uk/blog/about/ [Accessed 9 January 2026].
9. Helion & Company, 2025. Military History Books. Available at: https://www.helion.co.uk/ [Accessed 9 January 2026].
10. Wikipedia, 2025. Osprey Publishing. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osprey_Publishing [Accessed 9 January 2026].
11. Dibbly, 2025. Amazon KDP Royalty Changes 2025: What to Know and Do. Available at: https://dibbly.com/amazon-kdp-royalty-changes-2025-what-to-know-do/ [Accessed 9 January 2026].
12. Ex Why Zed, 2025. How Much Does It Cost to Self Publish a Book in 2025? Available at: https://exwhyzed.com/how-much-does-it-cost-to-self-publish-a-book/ [Accessed 9 January 2026].
13. Society of Authors, 2022. Is It a Steal? An investigation into ‘hybrid’ / paid-for publishing services. Available at: https://writersguild.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/is-it-a-steal-an-investigation-into-hybridpaid-for-publishing-services.pdf [Accessed 9 January 2026].
14. Troubador Publishing, 2025. Pricing. Available at: https://troubador.co.uk/pricing [Accessed 9 January 2026].
15. Independent Book Publishers Association, 2022. IBPA Hybrid Publisher Criteria. Available at: https://www.ibpa-online.org/page/hybridpublisher [Accessed 9 January 2026].
Operation Market Garden: Bridges and Cemeteries
Operation Market Garden battlefield tour 2025: From Joe's Bridge to Arnhem, exploring the 64-mile route of Montgomery's ambitious September 1944 plan to end the war by Christmas and its ultimate failure.
In July 2025, I spent four days in a coach full of like-minded individuals as we travelled from Dunkirk to Brussels and then followed the 64-mile route from Joe’s Bridge, Neerpelt, Belgium, to the famous John Frost Bridge at Arnhem, Holland.
Joe’s Bridge was the starting point of our Operation Market Garden tour, just as it had been the start line or centre line of advance for the Guards Armoured Division back in September 1944.
Operation Market Garden promised to end the war by Christmas 1944. Field Marshal Montgomery's audacious plan would drop 35,000 paratroopers (Three airborne divisions: the American 101st Division, the American 82nd Division, and the British 1st Airborne Division) across the Netherlands to capture key bridges. At the same time, British ground forces (30 Corps, spearheaded by the Guards Armoured Division) would advance 64 miles up a single highway, linking up with the airborne forces as they advanced. Furthest north, at the top of what would become known as ‘Hell’s Highway’, was the 1st Airborne Division, dropped and airlanded to the west of Arnhem. The British airborne troops expected to be relieved by the forward elements of 30 Corps within 48 hours of landing. Instead, what unfolded was nine days of desperate fighting that exemplified both the courage of ordinary British soldiers and the brutal, chaotic realities of war.
Joe's Bridge
Our battlefield tour began at Joe's Bridge in Lommel, Belgium, where Lieutenant Colonel John Ormsby Evelyn “J.O.E.” Vandeleur's Irish Guards achieved one of Market Garden's early victories. On 10 September 1944, a full week before the main operation, the 3rd Battalion Irish Guards launched a surprise assault that captured this strategic canal crossing intact.
The German defenders had prepared the wooden pontoon bridge for demolition, with two 88mm anti-tank guns positioned nearby and explosive charges wired for detonation. In his memoir, A Soldier’s Story (1967), J.O.E. Vandeleur recounts what happened:
At Exel, we found an unfinished road running due north to the Escaut Canal. It approached the canal in the shape of a “T”. The left half of the top of the “T” could not be seen from the Escaut Bridge. Halfway down the left half of the “T” stood a tall factory. We hid the head of the column behind the factory and ran upstairs, where we obtained a perfect view of the bridge. Incidentally, a large staff car full of German officers tried to cross us on the way up. We killed them and captured their maps. From the top window of the factory, every detail of the German defences could be clearly seen. At the top left corner of the “T”, there was a ‘jink’ in the road. This ‘jink’ was very important, because it denied the German 88 mm. guns a clear view of us until we were within 100 yards of the bridge. The problem now was, would the Germans blow the bridge or not?
We therefore decided to put it to the test. The plan was a very simple one. David Peel’s squadron was to send one troop of tanks commanded by Duncan Lampard up to the corner of the jink. This was to be accompanied by a platoon of the 3rd Battalion, commanded by John Stanley-Clark. This was to be the assault force with Michael Dudley’s company and the remainder of David Peel’s squadron engaging the enemy with point-blank fire for twenty minutes. It was to be a shooting match of twenty minutes’ duration. If, at the end of the twenty minutes, the bridge had not been blown, John Stanley-Clark and Duncan Lampard were to charge, followed by Hutton (R.E.) and six Guardsmen immediately to remove the explosive charges. We had no artillery support and were fifteen miles north of brigade headquarters, so there was no wireless touch. The signal for the assault was to be a green Very light.
It came off perfectly.
The structure, today known as Joe’s Bridge, was rebuilt after the war. The Irish Guards Memorial is situated on the northern bank and adjacent to Barrier Park.
Advancing up Hell’s Highway
On 17 September 1944, the seven-mile advance from Joe's Bridge to Valkenswaard, became the first test of Operation Market Garden's ambitious timetable.
The Irish Guards faced a brutal tactical reality: advance on a single road through terrain generally unsuitable for tanks. Dense woodland and marshy Dutch polder made deploying tanks off-road extremely difficult, and forced the Irish Guards to advance on a ‘one tank front’. The terrain proved a gift to the German defenders, who prepared a devastating ambush. In just two minutes, nine British Sherman tanks were knocked out.
Once again, J.O.E. Vandeleur describes what happened:
Zero hour was to be at 1435, and the start line was the Escaut Bridge. For this battle, we were supported by 350 guns and eight squadrons of Typhoon fighters of the Royal Air Force, who were to maintain a cab-rank of three aircraft immediately above us, ready to strike. The artillery was to fire a barrage, rolling at a speed of 200 yards a minute. Our tanks were marked with yellow streamers to identify them to the airmen. I was provided with an armoured signal tender for direct communication with the pilots in the sky. We were also given purple smoke shells to fire and identify targets for the airmen.
J.O.E. Vandeleur continues:
At zero hour, Keith Heathcote, commanding the leading tank, gave the order ‘Driver-Advance’ and he drove up to the edge of the barrage. Twenty-five minutes later, the rear half of the leading squadron (Mick O’Cock) and the leading half of No. 2 Squadron were knocked out, leaving Mick isolated and alone on the road. Luckily, Sergeant Cowan knocked out a self-propelled gun which had Mick in its sights. We had an armoured bulldozer high up in the column, ready to push aside knocked-out tanks and to help us cross a ditch just south of Valkenswaard.
No. 2 Squadron then took the lead, and Squadron Sergeant-Major Parkes was immediately killed. Duncan Lampard, who had distinguished himself at the Escaut Bridge, was wounded at the same time. I placed my headquarters behind the 2nd Squadron, which was fortunate on this occasion, as it gave us a ‘cushion’. Previously, we always moved at the tail of the leading squadron. I had a complicated wireless net to deal with. I had to speak to the pilots in the sky, telling them when to come in with their rockets and explaining targets to them. I had to keep my pulse on the artillery plan and call the barrage back when things were going badly. We had to issue orders to both battalions and feed information back. I insisted on the Air Force officer keeping the door of his tender open so that I could speak to him. He had never seen a ground battle before, and the afternoon’s affair must have been an eye-opener for him.
Division asked us how the battle was going. Denis lifted his microphone and merely said ‘Listen’. The noise was as if all hell had been opened; the crash of bursting shells and the screaming of the rockets as they left their cradles in the attacking aircraft.
Walking through Valkenswaard War Cemetery, I found the graves of Squadron Sergeant Major William Parkes and his comrades, men who died in those opening moments of the ground assault. Six unidentified Irish Guards lie within the cemetery. For those unfamiliar with the realities of tank warfare, when a vehicle was hit and caught fire, the crew usually had only seconds to escape the conflagration. Those crewmen who failed to escape were usually burned beyond recognition.
The cemetery, nestled in a pine forest between Valkenswaard and Westerhoven, contains 220 graves. The peaceful setting belies the violence that brought these soldiers to their deaths. Local Dutch families have adopted individual graves through the ‘Foundation Stichting 40-45’ program, decorating headstones and ensuring the soldiers’ sacrifices are not forgotten.
The ambush at Valkenswaard caused the first of many delays in the ‘Garden’ element of the operation. The Guards arrived in town during the evening instead of the planned early afternoon. Had the Irish Guards continued to Eindhoven in darkness, Market Garden’s timetable might have been preserved. Instead, the decision to spend the night in Valkenswaard contributed to delays that ultimately doomed the operation. However, it was a standard operating procedure that tanks ‘harboured’ overnight for maintenance, refuelling and rearming.
According to A History of the Irish Guards in the Second World War (1949), the first day’s fighting cost the 2nd Battalion nine tanks, eight men killed and several wounded. The 3rd Battalion lost seven killed and nineteen wounded. In the little cemetery outside the town are buried S.S.M. Parkes, Lance-Sergeant J. Waters, Guardsmen McD. Ackers, M. Delaney, W. Moore, J. Johnson, N. Malton and T. Watson.
The Day I Met Jackal
Our tour itinerary next took us to the vast German War Cemetery at Ysselsteyn before visiting the impressive Overloon War Museum. Within the museum resides a very special vehicle, an Mk. V Churchill tank of B Squadron, 4th (Tank) Battalion, Coldstream Guards, nicknamed Jackal. The tank was abandoned after hitting a mine during Operation Aintree (Battle of Overloon, 30 September to 18 October 1944). Two of the five crew were killed, Guardsmen Gordon Wright and Robert Silman, who are buried in Overloon War Cemetery, not far from the museum. Bob Dare, the tank’s driver, helped the other two crew members to safety. Bob and Jackal’s story is retold in my book, A History of the Guards Armoured Formations 1941-1945.
The Bridge at Grave
On 17 September, Lieutenant John “Jacko” Thompson of Easy Company, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division achieved one of the operation’s greatest successes when his small group of 16 men captured the strategically vital bridge over the Maas River at Grave. Although his company had been scattered during the parachute drop and landed far from their target, Thompson decided not to wait for reinforcements and immediately stormed the bridge, achieving complete surprise and capturing it undamaged. Thompson was wounded twice during the war and was decorated for his bravery with both the Bronze and Silver Stars. After the war, he returned to a career as a professional baseball player. The bridge remained crucial for Allied logistics throughout the war. In 2004, the crossing was renamed the John S. Thompson Bridge in honour of his decisive leadership and courage.
The Capture of the Nijmegen Road Bridge
For anyone who has seen the film, A Bridge Too Far (1977), you would be forgiven for believing Hollywood star Robert Redford captured the impressive Nijmegen road bridge, almost single-handedly, in the guise of Major Julian Cook. The truth is somewhat different, as any Grenadier Guardsman will happily tell you.
The war diary of the 2nd (Armoured) Battalion, Grenadier Guards for 20 September 1944 recounts the day’s events more prosaically than Director Richard Attenborough’s film:
Plan arranged with AIRBORNE FORCES to clear part of the town near the main road bridge, 1Bn AIRBORNE (AMERICAN) and the Bn Gp. Progress slow but sure and vicinity of bridge eventually reached at 1700 hrs with light casualties mainly through snipers. At 1900 hrs, a Tp of tanks was successfully rushed across the bridge, encountering at least one 88mm and passing through infantry on the far side, losing two tanks, one only temporarily, eventually linking up with AIRBORNE FORCES on the other side. Bridge consolidated by 2200 hrs.
The film is intended as entertainment rather than a historical documentary, so it glosses over the fact that the Americans had not secured either the road or rail crossings at Nijmegen by the time the Guards Armoured Division arrived. As a result, instead of passing over the road bridge and continuing to advance the ten miles to Arnhem, the Guards found themselves embroiled in the intense fighting that was ongoing in the town. In John Frost’s book, A Drop Too Many (1983), he cites the failure to secure the Nijmegen bridge on day one of the operation as perhaps the worst mistake of a tactical plan that was riddled with holes.
Crossing the Waal
The Grenadier Guards’ capture of the bridge required a coordinated attack with American paratroopers in one of the war’s most daring river crossings. Supported by the Irish Guards’ guns, Major Julian Cook’s 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment made a daylight crossing of the 400-yard-wide Waal River in 26 flimsy canvas boats. The first wave suffered over 50 per cent casualties as German machine guns and artillery poured fire into the boats. Major Cook, a devout Catholic, recited “Hail Mary” prayers to encourage his men as they used rifle butts for oars.
Meanwhile, three columns of Grenadier Guards attacked from the south. Lieutenant Colonel Edward Goulburn’s forces coordinated with the Americans in a complex pincer movement. At around 1800 hrs, after the 504th PIR had secured the north end of both bridges, Sergeant Peter Robinson, 2nd Battalion, Grenadier Guards, led four Sherman tanks in a desperate charge across the road bridge. For his bravery, Robinson was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal, and, later, a grateful city granted him the Freedom of Nijmegen. Lieutenant Colonel Giles Vandeleur, commanding the 2nd Battalion, Irish Guards, and cousin of J.O.E. Vandeleur, witnessed the ‘Waal Crossing’ and remarked that it was one of the most courageous sights he had ever seen.
Standing on the Nijmegen road bridge today, you can imagine Robinson’s gunner engaging the German 88mm anti-tank gun in a brief but decisive duel. But by the time the bridge was secured, Market Garden was already 36 hours behind schedule. Early the next morning, Lieutenant Colonel John Frost would surrender his hold on the north end of the Arnhem bridge.
Arnhem Oosterbeek Cemetery
On the third day of our tour, we visited some of the Drop Zones and Landing Zones near Arnhem, seeing Ginkel Heath and the memorials there, the Glider Memorial at Wolfheze, and the original Airborne monument at Heelsum. Next, we stopped at the Arnhem Oosterbeek War Cemetery, where the dead from Arnhem are buried.
According to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission website, Arnhem Oosterbeek War Cemetery contains the graves of most of those killed during the September landings, and many of those killed in later fighting in the area.
There are now 1,684 Commonwealth servicemen buried or commemorated in the cemetery. 243 of the burials are unidentified, and special memorials commemorate two casualties. There are also 79 Polish, three Dutch and four non-war (including three former Commission employees) graves in the cemetery.
For Valour
The Victoria Cross (VC) is the highest and most prestigious military decoration awarded to British and Commonwealth personnel for acts of extreme valour. Notably, the cemetery includes the graves of Flight Lieutenant David Lord, Captain Lionel Queripel, and Lieutenant John Grayburn, all of whom were posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross for their bravery during the battle. The cemetery also commemorates Lance Sergeant John Baskeyfield.
While defending the Oosterbeek perimeter three days into the battle, Baskeyfield commanded a pair of anti-tank guns that destroyed several enemy tanks before the crews were killed. Baskeyfield subsequently fired the guns alone before he, too, was killed. His body was not identified after the war, and he has no known grave. The last paragraph of his VC’s citation states:
The superb gallantry of this N.C.O. is beyond praise. During the remaining days at Arnhem, stories of his valour were a constant inspiration to all ranks. He spurned danger, ignored pain and, by his supreme fighting spirit, infected all who witnessed his conduct with the same aggressiveness and dogged devotion to duty which characterised his actions throughout.
Every September, a joint Anglo-Dutch Service of Remembrance is held at the Oosterbeek War Cemetery, where local school children each lay a flower on the grave of a serviceman.
The General is Missing
In the afternoon, we travelled to the Hartenstein Hotel, Airborne Headquarters in 1944. Here we toured the superb museum with its extended displays and life-size recreations of the battle. A handful of us also walked the Oosterbeek defensive perimeter with battlefield guide Andy Ingham. For those not familiar with how the battle unfolded, when the attempt to capture Arnhem Bridge failed, Major General Roy Urquhart, commander of the 1st Airborne Division, ordered his forces into a defensive perimeter around Oosterbeek village, which is located about seven miles west of Arnhem. For six days, the airborne troops held this shrinking perimeter against overwhelming German forces in what became known as “the Cauldron.”
Next, we visited Oosterbeek Church and St Elisabeth’s Hospital. We also walked the nearby streets, retracing the steps taken by the “missing general”. At the start of the Battle of Arnhem, General Urquhart and Brigadier Lathbury went missing for some time. This created a dangerous command vacuum during the critical early stages of the operation, from Monday, 18 September, to the early hours of Tuesday, 19 September. Urquhart left his headquarters and went forward to assess the situation after radio communications failed. Lathbury was wounded, and Urquhart took refuge in the attic of a house near the hospital. As you approach Arnhem from Oosterbeek, the area around the hospital forms a bottleneck with the river and railway lines forming the sides, and where, in 1944, the Germans were quickly able to form blocking lines. The proximity of the railway marshalling yards meant that German reinforcements arriving from the Reich could immediately be fed into the battle. However, John Frost and a composite force of the 2nd and 3rd Parachute Battalions, Reconnaissance and Airborne Engineers made it through to the north end of the Arnhem road bridge before the Germans put a stopper in the bottle.
The John Frost Bridge
Our tour ended at the iconic Arnhem road bridge, or the John Frost Bridge (John Frostbrug) as it is known today. The actual road bridge defended by Frost’s 2nd Parachute Battalion was destroyed by the Allies a month after Operation Market Garden. Initially, the airborne troops held the north end of the bridge into Arnhem town and the surrounding buildings.
For three days and four nights, the lightly equipped airborne troops held off a superior German force that was armed with tanks, heavy artillery, and mortars. Eventually, the defenders' ammunition, food, and water ran low, forcing them to surrender, although some managed to evade capture. Of the 750 men who reached the bridge, 81 were killed, and virtually all the rest were wounded.
In 1977, the bridge was renamed for John Frost, despite his initial reluctance. He felt it was “too much of an honour” since they had lost the battle. Veteran Freddie Gough convinced him the accolade was deserved. Today’s bridge, rebuilt in 1948, closely resembles the original. However, due to urban development in the Arnhem area, the John Frost Bridge was not used in the filming of A Bridge Too Far. The scenes set around the Arnhem bridge were shot in Deventer, northeast of Arnhem.
The Cost of Market Garden
In all, the British 1st Airborne Division took just under 12,000 men into Arnhem. By Monday, 25 September, 1,485 men were dead, and around 6,500 were taken prisoner, and many of them were wounded. The RAF lost 68 aircraft shot down and around 500 aircrew killed. Due to incomplete records, German losses can only be estimated, and numbers vary between 2,500 and 5,000 casualties for the fighting around Arnhem. The evacuation of the Oosterbeek pocket saw 2,398 men escape capture. Around 450 Dutch civilians were also killed during the operation. Another 100,000 Dutch civilians were forcibly evicted from their homes in the Lower Rhine area by the Germans immediately after the fighting concluded. It is estimated that an additional 18,000 Dutch civilians died from malnutrition due to German reprisals, which included cutting the population's rations during what became known as the “Hunger Winter” of 1944/45.
Field Marshal Montgomery claimed that Market Garden was ninety per cent successful. Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands said that his country could ill afford another Montgomery success. In truth, for all the heroics and loss of life, the operation was a strategic failure.
The Irish Guards’ swift capture of Joe’s Bridge, their costly advance along Hell’s Highway, the Grenadier Guards’ seizure of the Nijmegen road bridge, and the doomed but heroic defence at Arnhem represent the finest traditions of British military service.
Final Thoughts
Today, these sites are accessible to anyone seeking to understand pivotal moments in European history. Museums provide context, cemeteries offer reflection, and the surviving bridges and battlefields let visitors walk in the footsteps of a remarkable generation.
The courage of the airborne forces, aircrew, and soldiers of 30 Corps during those nine days in September 1944 deserves to be remembered not just for their tactical achievements but for their embodiment of duty, courage, sacrifice, and camaraderie under the most extreme circumstances.
These historic sites remind us that behind every strategic decision and tactical manoeuvre were ordinary people, many barely out of their teens, who answered their nation’s call and paid the ultimate price in the fight against Nazi tyranny. In visiting these places, we hope to honour their memory and ensure their sacrifices will never be forgotten.
Further Reading
Much ink has been spilt on the subject of Operation Market Garden and the reasons for its failure. Amongst the books I have recently read on the subject are Arnhem by Major General R.E. Urquhart (1958), A Drop Too Many by Major General John Frost (1983), A Tour of the Arnhem Battlefields by John Waddy (1999), Arnhem 1944 by William F. Buckingham (2002), and Arnhem Black Tuesday by Al Murray (2024). I would also recommend It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem September 1944 by Robert Kershaw (2008) and The Last German Victory: Operation Market Garden 1944 by Aaron Bates (2021).
Photographs & Sketches
Items in order of appearance
Gallery 1: Joe’s Bridge
Portrait of Lieutenant Colonel John Ormsby Evelyn “J.O.E.” Vandeleur, Irish Guards.
A Sherman tank of the 2nd (Armoured) Battalion Irish Guards, Guards Armoured Division, crossing the Meuse-Escaut Canal, Neerpelt, during Operation Market Garden, September 1944. George Rodger, Photographer, LIFE Magazine Archives.
Joe’s Bridge, July 20215, by the author.
Irish Guards Group memorial, Joe’s Bridge, July 2025, by the author.
Gallery 2: Hell’s Highway
IWM (Imperial War Museum), BU 925, Sherman tanks of the Irish Guards Group advance past others which were knocked out earlier during Operation 'Market-Garden', 17 September 1944.
IWM, BU 926, A Sherman Firefly tank of the Irish Guards Group advances past Sherman tanks knocked out earlier during Operation 'Market-Garden', 17 September 1944.
Guardsman William Gill Moore died during the ambush of this tank. The Sherman commanded by Lance Sergeant Dave Roper was struck by a Panzerfaust on 17th September 1944 during Operation Market Garden. Copyright “De bevrijding in Beeld" / "Vantilt fragma”.
IWM, BU 927, Squadron Sergeant Major William John Parkes of No. 3 Squadron, 2nd Irish Guards, killed when his Sherman tank was knocked out during the advance towards Eindhoven as part of Operation Market Garden. Photo taken on 17th September 1944 by Sergeant Carpenter, No. 5 Army Film and Photographic Unit.
Front page of The Illustrated London News of September 30, 1944. The village square of Valkenswaard, Sherman tank, “Snow White”, Brigade HQ, 5th Guards (Armoured) Brigade. Nationaal Archief (National Archives of the Netherlands).
Gallery 3: Valkenswaard War Cemetery
Headstones:
Guardsman W. Ackers, Irish Guards
Guardsman, Michael Dee, Irish Guards
L. Cpl. M.J. Delaney, Irish Guards
Squadron Sergeant Major (SSM) William John Parkes, Irish Guards
L. Sgt. John Watters, Irish Guards
Unidentified Irish Guardsman, known only to God.
Irish Guardsmen, Valkenswaard War Cemetery, all photographs by the author.
Gallery 4: Jackal
IWM, B 10809, A Churchill tank of 6th Guards Tank Brigade supporting infantry of 3rd Division attacking Overloon in the Netherlands, 14 October 1944.
IWM, BU 1232, Churchill tanks of the 6th Guards Tank Brigade lay a smokescreen during the advance on Venraij, 17 October 1944.
Charlie Trumpess with Mk. V Churchill tank of B Squadron, 4th (Tank) Battalion, Coldstream Guards, 6th Guards (Tank) Brigade, named Jackal, Overloon War Museum, July 2025, by the author.
British Churchill tank named Jackal formed part of the staff platoon, 2nd Squadron, 4th Battalion, Coldstream Guards, 6th Guards Tank Brigade that supported the infantry attack on Overloon – by the author.
Gallery 5: Grave
VIRIN: 440917-A-ZZ999-791, U.S. Department of War, US Army paratroopers are dropped near Grave, Netherlands, while livestock graze near gliders that landed earlier. Operation Market Garden.
John S. Thompsonbrug over the river Maas at Grave, July 2025, by the author.
Sketch of the Grave Bridge, September 1944, Sergeant Charles Murrell, Welsh Guards. Courtesy of the Welsh Guards.
Cyclists on the John S. Thompsonbrug over the Maas River at Grave, by Havang(nl).
The 82nd Airborne Memorial, beside the John S. Thompson bridge over the Maas River between Grave and Nederasselt, Netherlands, July 2025, by the author.
Gallery 6: Nijmegen Bridge
Cromwell tank of the Welsh Guards, Guard Armoured Division passes the "Schoonoord" corn mill in Alverna, Wijchen municipality near Nijmegen during Operation Market Garden. Nationaal Archief (National Archives of the Netherlands).
American paratroopers advance while being attacked by German anti-aircraft fire. According to the caption, the location is Arnhem, but it is more likely Nijmegen. The photograph is dated 10 September 1944, which must be a mistake. The picture is attributed to the US Army Signal Corps. Nationaal Archief (National Archives of the Netherlands).
IWM, EA 44531, tanks of the 2nd (Armoured) Battalion, Irish Guards, Guards Armoured Division, British XXX Corps cross the road bridge at Nijmegen during its capture. Operation Market Garden.
Battalion crosses the Nijmegen Bridge, 22nd September 1944, sketch by Sergeant Charles Murrell, Welsh Guards. Courtesy of the Welsh Guards.
Two sketches of the Nijmegen Bridge or Grenadiers Bridge by Sergeant Charles Murrell, Welsh Guards, 3rd November 1944. Courtesy of the Welsh Guards.
The Waalbrug or Nijmegen Road Bridge over the River Waal, July 2025, by the author.
Gallery 7: Arnhem Oosterbeek War Cemetery
The memorial on Ginkel Heath, Drop zone “Y”, where the 4th Para Brigade landed on Monday, 18th September 1944, during Operation Market Garden, by the author.
Gravestones of the fallen, Arnhem Oosterbeek War Cemetery, by the author.
In the centre of the photograph, Lt. Col. Sir William Richard De B. Des Voeux, BT, Grenadier Guards, 156th Battalion, 4th Para Brigade. Household Brigade Lodge No 2614 website.
The gravestone of Lt. Col. Sir William Richard De B. Des Voeux, BT, Grenadier Guards, 156th Battalion, 4th Para Brigade, by the author.
John "Jack" Grayburn was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions with the 2nd Parachute Battalion at the Arnhem Bridge.
The gravestone of Lieutenant J.H. " Jack" Grayburn, VC, Parachute Regiment, Army Air Corps, by the author.
Lance Sergeant John Daniel Baskeyfield, VC. Gun Commander, 2 Anti-Tank Platoon, Support Company, 2nd (Airborne) Battalion, South Staffordshire Regiment, Battle of Arnhem. His body was never identified. Digitally enhanced portrait by the author.
Gallery 8: The General is Missing
IWM, BU 1136, Major-General Roy Urquhart DSO and Bar, commander of the British 1st Airborne Division during Operation Market Garden, plants the Airborne flag outside his headquarters (Hotel Hartenstein). By Smith, D M (Sgt), Army Film and Photographic Unit.
Rear of the Airborne Museum Hartenstein, Oosterbeek, July 2025, by the author.
A diorama of the 1st Airborne Division HQ and signals featuring a depiction of Major-General Roy Urquhart, Airborne Museum Hartenstein, Oosterbeek, July 2025, by the author.
Original wallpaper from the battle for Arnhem, inscribed “Never Surrender, Fuck the Gerry’s, 1st Airborne Division” and showing a tally of German soldiers killed. The photo also shows a No. 4 Lee Enfield rifle with a telescopic sight. Airborne Museum Hartenstein, Oosterbeek, by the author.
IWM, British paratroopers prepare for yet another attack on the Oosterbeek Perimeter.
Photo of a 3-inch mortar team, 1st Borders, defending the Oosterbeek perimeter, 200m from the Hartenstein Hotel (photo taken on the spot where the original was taken), by the author.
The ter Horst family home, which served as a Regimental Aid Post, inset, a picture of Kate ter Horst and her MBE medal, Oosterbeek. Known to the British as the “Angel of Arnhem”, she famously tended to hundreds of wounded and dying airborne troops during the Battle of Arnhem. By the author.
The Old Church (Oude Kerk) in Oosterbeek dates back to the 10th Century and is possibly the oldest church in the Netherlands. As the Oosterbeek Perimeter shrank, the church became a stronghold for the airborne troops, by the author.
A view of the Arnhem railway bridge from the rear of the Old Church, July 2025, by the author.
Our tour group outside the former St Elizabeth Hospital in Arnhem. The site was used as a military hospital by both sides during the fighting. Famously, Major-General Urquhart became trapped in the attic of No. 14 Zwarteweg, which is located to the rear of the hospital. Our battlefield guide, Andy Ingham, took the photo in July 2025.
Gallery 9: The John Frost Bridge
Girders, the John Frost Bridge, July 2025, by the author.
IWM, MH 2061, aerial view of the bridge over the Neder Rijn, Arnhem; British troops and destroyed German armoured vehicles are visible at the north end of the bridge.
Lieutenant Colonel John Frost led the 2nd Parachute Battalion to capture the northern end of the Arnhem Bridge and was later promoted to the rank of Major General.
IWM, HU 2127, the Arnhem Bridge after Frost's force had been overrun and the road cleared. Notice the destroyed buildings on the right.
Photo of the steps leading down to the riverbank, the north end of the Arnhem road bridge. Battlefield guide, Andy Ingham, holds a picture taken from precisely the same spot after the battle, showing the surrounding devastation. By the author.
Arnhem. War damage 1944/1945. View from the Sabelspoort towards the Grote Kerk (Great Church), 1945, Nationaal Archief (National Archives of the Netherlands).
The destroyed Rhine bridge (Arnhem road bridge) is seen from under the nearby temporary Bailey bridge, 1945, Nationaal Archief (National Archives of the Netherlands).
On 7 October, the Arnhem bridge was bombed and destroyed by B-26 Marauders of the 344th Bomb Group, USAAF. The buildings of Arnhem were bombarded by the Allies over the next few months and suffered further during the Liberation of Arnhem in April 1945.
Aerial view of the devastation in Arnhem's city centre. Above, the Rhine Bridge is under construction; the temporary Bailey Bridge has already been removed. To the left of the church is the town hall, partially preserved, 1946, Nationaal Archief (National Archives of the Netherlands).
The John Frost Bridge from the north bank of the lower Rhine, July 2025, by the author.
Charlie Trumpess standing on the north ramp of the John Frost Bridge, Arnhem, July 2025.
The Bridge, July 2025, by the author.
Gallery 10: The Cost of Market Garden
The temporary graves of two British paratroopers at a kilometre marker with the inscription “Arnhem 6”, 1945, Nationaal Archief (National Archives of the Netherlands).
Commemoration on 17 September at the Airborne Cemetery in Oosterbeek. The graves of the British paratroopers who fell in September 1944 are being specially cared for by Oosterbeek schoolchildren, 15 September 1955, Nationaal Archief (National Archives of the Netherlands).
Since the end of the war, school children in Oosterbeek, specifically primary school children, have participated in what has become an annual tradition of laying flowers at the Arnhem Oosterbeek War Cemetery to honour the heroes of the Battle of Arnhem.
References
Airborne Assault: ParaData - A living history of The Parachute Regiment and Airborne Forces
J.O.E. Vandeleur, A Soldier's Story, privately printed for the author by Gale & Polden, 1967
Major D.J.L. Fitzgerald, History of the Irish Guards In the Second World War, published by Aldershot Gale and Polden Ltd, 1949
National Army Museum, Archive Reference, 2016-10-23-76, Papers of Lt Col Sir James Newton Rodney Moore, War Diary, 2nd (Armoured) Bn Grenadier Guards, 20 September 1944
Major General John Frost, A Drop Too Many, published by Pen & Sword Military, Kindle Edition, 2019
Commonwealth War Graves Commission, 2024, A Visitor's Guide to the Best Arnhem WW2 Sites, URL: https://www.cwgc.org/our-work/blog/a-visitors-guide-to-the-best-arnhem-ww2-sites/, Accessed 15 August 2025
Cornelius Ryan Collection of World War II Papers (Digital), Cornelius Ryan WWII papers, box 115, folder 36: Giles A. Vandeleur, page. 2
Commonwealth War Graves Commission, 2023, Lance Serjeant John Daniel Baskeyfield VC, URL: https://www.cwgc.org/stories/stories/lance-serjeant-john-daniel-baskeyfield-vc/, Accessed 16 August 2025
Imperial War Museum, The Story Of Operation 'Market Garden' In Photos, URL: https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-story-of-operation-market-garden-in-photos, Accessed 19 August 2025
WartimeNI, Scott Edgar, Operation Market Garden: A Bridge Too Far, URL: https://archives.wartimeni.com/article/operation-market-garden-a-bridge-too-far/, Accessed 12 September 2025
Operation Anthropoid: Heroes Who Refused to Surrender
This article recounts Operation Anthropoid, the 1942 assassination of Nazi leader Reinhard Heydrich by Czech resistance fighters Jozef Gabčík and Jan Kubiš. Despite brutal Nazi reprisals including the destruction of Lidice, the mission proved that resistance continued and helped secure international support for post-war Czechoslovakia. The piece draws parallels between the Munich Agreement's betrayal and contemporary geopolitical situations.
Authors: Martina Gregorcová, Art of Your Travel, and Charlie Trumpess, The War Years
On 30 September 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned to Heston Aerodrome brandishing a piece of paper and declaring he had achieved “peace for our time.” This followed the Munich Crisis, when the leader of Nazi Germany, Adolph Hitler, threatened to invade Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain visited Germany three times in an attempt to avert war. The resulting Munich Agreement, signed by Germany, Britain, France, and Italy, gave Hitler the Sudetenland, a border region of Czechoslovakia containing about three million ethnic Germans.
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, after landing at Heston Aerodrome following his meeting with Adolf Hitler and the signing of the infamous Munich Agreement. This photograph , D 2239, comes from the collections of the Imperial War Museums.
The agreement represented the climax of Britain’s appeasement policy, which sought to avoid war by making territorial concessions to Nazi Germany. Czechoslovakia was entirely betrayed in this process, with Czech diplomats excluded from the negotiations and barred from the conference room at Hitler's insistence.
Czech leader Edvard Beneš warned that losing the heavily fortified Sudetenland would leave his nation defenceless. Nevertheless, Britain and France forced Czechoslovakia to choose between resisting Germany alone or submitting to territorial dismemberment. Hitler claimed the Sudetenland was his “last territorial demand in Europe,” but these promises proved worthless.
On 15 March 1939, Nazi Germany violated the Munich Agreement and occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia, establishing the Protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia. Slovakia became a puppet state under the leadership of pro-Nazi Jozef Gašpar Tiso. Britain’s appeasement policy had disastrously failed, and a full-scale European war began when Germany invaded Poland.
Into Exile
On 5 October 1938, Beneš was forced to resign. He went into exile in Britain, where he organised the Czechoslovak National Liberation Committee, which declared itself the Provisional Government of Czechoslovakia the following year. In July 1940, the UK officially recognised the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, with Jan Šrámek as prime minister and Beneš as president. Beneš started working with British military intelligence in return for concessions to his government-in-exile.
In 1941, Edvard Beneš and František Moravec, working with MI6 and the Special Operations Executive (SOE), planned Operation Anthropoid to assassinate Reinhard Heydrich, the Deputy Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia.
Three Parachute Drops, One Priority: Payback
On 29 December 1941, a freezing night over occupied Bohemia and Moravia, three parachute teams dropped from a Halifax bomber toward their homeland. Operations Silver A and Silver B were tasked with restoring underground communications, supporting the resistance and sabotage. A third team carried the top-priority mission, Operation Anthropoid, a direct strike at Reinhard Heydrich, Hitler’s executioner in Prague. The brief was brutal and clear: payback for Nazi terror.
Reinhard Heydrich in the uniform of an SS-Gruppenführer ca. 1940/1941 by Heinrich Hoffmann. Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1969-054-16, recoloured.
The Target
On 28 September 1941, Reinhard Heydrich arrived at Prague Castle. He was replacing Konstantin von Neurath, whom Hitler and Himmler agreed had been too lenient in his approach to the Czechs. Within five days of his arrival, Heydrich proclaimed martial law and ordered the execution of 142 people. Known by various nicknames such as the “Blonde Beast” and “Butcher of Prague”, SS-General Reinhard Heydrich ruled the Protectorate through a calculated campaign of fear. Backed by Hitler, he moved to crush the Czech resistance, decapitate the leadership, and break the nation’s spirit. He banned the Sokol movement and sent its leaders to the Mauthausen concentration camp.
The Sokol movement was a popular gymnastics movement that promoted health and well-being, and it was also linked to the promotion of Czech patriotism and nationalism. The movement was brutally suppressed and later banned during the Nazi occupation. According to Heydrich: “Czechs need to know who is the boss here… Those who adapt will be Germanised; those who won’t will be sent to concentration camps.” Anthropoid set out to end the experiment.
A Mission to Live in History
From London, the operation’s planners demanded more than an assassination; they wanted to make a statement that would resound in history. The Munich Agreement remained in effect, and the exiled government needed dramatic action to prove that the Czechs and Slovaks were contributing to the Allied cause. The operation had to break the perception of Czech passivity and defeatism and show the world that resistance continued. More crucially, it aimed to make it politically impossible for Britain to forge another peace deal with Germany and betray Czech interests once again.
Jan Kubiš and Jozef Gabčík in Britain, 1941—photographed before deployment on Operation Anthropoid.
A Belated Christmas Gift
After being dropped by parachute into occupied Bohemia, the SEO trained Jozef Gabčík and Jan Kubiš moved to Prague. In preparation for their attack, weeks of surveillance were conducted: routes were timed, corners were measured, and rehearsals were repeated. The local resistance opened safe houses, passed messages, forged papers and whispered, with pride, that the paratroopers were a “belated Christmas gift that fell from the sky.” Hope had returned to a beaten city.
Heydrich’s Mercedes 320 Cabriolet after the blast at Libeň—shattered windscreen and torn bodywork from the 27 May 1942 Anthropoid attack.
Heydrich’s Curve
On the morning of 27 May 1942, Heydrich started his daily commute to his headquarters at Prague Castle. During the journey, Heydrich’s open-topped Mercedes 320 Cabriolet had to slow down at the tight bend in Libeň, known today as Heydrich’s Curve. Jozef Gabčík stepped into the road with a Sten submachine gun. At point-blank range, Gabčík could not miss, but when he squeezed the trigger, the weapon jammed and failed to fire. Rather than accelerate out of danger, Heydrich ordered his driver to stop. As Heydrich drew his pistol, Jan Kubiš hurled a hand grenade, which exploded by the rear wheel. The blast sent shards of metal and horsehair fibres from the car’s upholstery into Heydrich’s body. As shots cracked across the cobbles, driver Johannes Klein chased Gabčík on foot, leaving his mortally wounded boss prone in the street. The assassins slipped away. Despite the odds, the mission had succeeded.
A City Under the Jack Boot
Prague slammed shut, raids, curfews, and mass arrests swept the streets. The parachutists reached the Church of Saints Cyril and Methodius and took refuge in the crypt, a stone chamber with a single vent. On 4 June, Heydrich, after appearing to recover, suddenly died from infection and trauma. The men who had struck at the head of the Nazi oppression still lived for now.
10 June 1942 — Lidice
To terrorise the nation, the occupiers erased Lidice, a village with no connection to the assassination. One hundred seventy-three men were executed by firing squad. Most women were deported to the Ravensbrück concentration camp. Children were torn from their families; 82 were murdered in gas vans at Chełmno, while a few were selected for Germanisation. Homes were burned and bulldozed, the rubble scattered. The Nazis intended the name of Lidice to vanish forever. Instead, it became a worldwide rallying cry against Nazi tyranny.
The Last Stand in the Crypt
On 18 June 1942, the church was surrounded by German troops. Karel Čurda betrayed the network for Nazi blood money. At dawn, about seven hundred SS and Wehrmacht troops sealed off Resslova Street and launched their assault. Seven men stood ready inside the church. Upstairs, Adolf Opálka, Jan Kubiš, and Josef Bublík defended the nave and choir loft until two lay dying, and the last took his own life rather than surrender.
Down in the crypt, Jozef Gabčík, Josef Valčík, Jaroslav Švarc, and Jan Hrubý fought in near-total darkness as fire hoses flooded the chamber and tear gas choked the air. After seven hours of battle, with ammunition exhausted and water rising around them, they faced their final choice. They chose death over surrender. Witnesses would remember their defiant cry echoing from the stone chamber: “We are Czechs! We will never surrender!”
Why History Matters
This courage cost many lives; the alternative would have cost a nation’s future. Had Heydrich lived, terror in Prague would have tightened and resignation spread. Instead, Lidice showed the world the regime’s true face. Public outrage in Britain mounted; Britain terminated the Munich Agreement, France followed, and the revival of Czechoslovakia after the war moved from hope to commitment.
Operation Anthropoid still echoes at Heydrich’s Curve, at Lidice, and in the crypt on Resslova Street where, when reason said “submit,” seven men chose to stand for what they believed.
Historical Amnesia
Spanish philosopher George Santayana famously said, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Just a week ago, US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin met to discuss a possible settlement of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was not invited to the summit. In an echo of the Munich Betrayal, it seems Ukraine might be forced to trade territory for a peace agreement that no one expects Russia to respect.
Today, we see that despite widespread knowledge of Munich's consequences, historical awareness alone is not enough to prevent conflict. Each generation must actively choose to learn from the past or be doomed to repeat it.
Martina Gregorcová and Operation Anthropoid Tours
This guest blog was co-authored by Martina Gregorcová, Managing Director at Art of Your Travel agency, and a tour guide. Czechoslovak Resistance Tours, part of Art of Your Travel, is a specialised tour company that focuses exclusively on Czechoslovak World War II resistance history, notably the 1942 assassination of Reinhard Heydrich. The company offers private, custom-made historical tours throughout Prague and the surrounding areas, including significant sites like Lidice, Ležáky, Pardubice, and Terezín.
The company’s tours follow the actual footsteps of the resistance fighters involved in Operation Anthropoid and related missions, providing immersive historical experiences with expert local guides. The company positions itself around telling the “untold truth” of these resistance efforts, covering everything from the planning and execution of the assassination to the brutal Nazi reprisals and the lasting legacy of these acts of defiance. To learn more, visit the company’s website:
References:
BBC: Chamberlain returns from Munich
IWM: How Britain Hoped To Avoid War With Germany In The 1930s
Radio Prague International: Anthropoid: Czechoslovakia’s greatest resistance story
Radio Prague International: How the Sokol movement helped Operation Anthropoid succeed
Further Reading:
You’ll Be Hearing From Us!: Operation Anthropoid - the assassination of SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich and its consequences (2019), by Niall Cherry (Author), Tony Moseley (Contributor), Jonathan Saunders (Contributor), John Howes (Contributor)
The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich: The True Story Behind Operation Anthropoid (2007) by Callum Macdonald
Images in order of appearance:
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, after landing at Heston Aerodrome following his meeting with Adolf Hitler and the signing of the infamous Munich Agreement. Ministry of Information official photographer. This photograph, D 2239, comes from the collections of the Imperial War Museums.
Heydrich, Reinhard: as a SS-Gruppenführer, Leiter des SD, Chef des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes (RSHA), Deutschland. Author: Hoffmann, Heinrich. Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1969-054-16, Recoloured.
Jan Kubiš and Jozef Gabčík in Britain, 1941—photographed before deployment on Operation Anthropoid.
Heydrich’s Mercedes 320 Cabriolet after the blast at Libeň—shattered windscreen and torn bodywork from the 27 May 1942 Anthropoid attack.
Gallery
Libeň’s “Heydrich Curve” — the bend where, on 27 May 1942, his Mercedes slowed and Gabčík and Kubiš struck.
Orthodox Cathedral of Saints Cyril and Methodius (Prague). Author: Yair Haklai
National Monument to the Heroes of the Heydrich Terror, underground crypt of the Baroque Church of Sts Cyril and Methodius. The refuge of the Czechoslovak parachutists from 27 May to 18 June 1942 after the attack on Reinhard Heydrich.
Busts of Josef Gabčík and Jan Kubiš in the National Memorial of the Heroes of the Heydrichiada (Prague, Czechia). Author: Ondřej Žváček.
Kobylisy memorial—the 1942 execution ground where hundreds of Czech patriots were shot; a quiet lawn that holds a besieged city’s memory.