Clipped Wings: Red Tape and Command Failures during the Falklands Air War
In the spring of 1982, most British people knew Argentina primarily from the hit musical Evita by Andrew Lloyd Webber and Tim Rice. And if British people didn’t know much about Argentina, they knew even less about an obscure group of islands in the South Atlantic Ocean known as the Falklands.
I was sixteen years old in 1982, and just like everyone else, I was surprised to wake up one morning in early April to discover that the British inhabitants of the Falkland Islands had been invaded and occupied by Argentine armed forces. Initially, no one seemed too concerned, and a diplomatic resolution looked the most likely outcome of the crisis. However, things took a dramatic turn when Margaret Thatcher’s government, which had badly misjudged the intentions of Argentina’s military junta and its leader, General Leopoldo Galtieri, announced Britain would immediately dispatch a naval task force to recover the islands.
On 5 April 1982, a hastily organised armada set sail from British waters to steam around 8,000 miles to the South Atlantic. The timing of the crisis proved advantageous for the unpopular Thatcher government, which was busy pulling the fangs of Britain’s armed forces with sweeping defence cuts, which included selling off or decommissioning numerous Royal Navy warships and support vessels. If Galtieri had waited to launch his invasion until the following year, then Prime Minister Thatcher would have been forced into a humiliating surrender of the territory. But Galtieri and the junta had domestic woes of their own and hoped capturing the “Islas Malvinas” would be a suitable distraction for their unhappy compatriots. Argentina’s military planners saw Britain’s defence cuts as a green light for invasion, assuming Thatcher’s government would acquiesce once the Falklands were under Argentine control.
As the task force steamed toward its date with destiny, Britain’s tabloid press had a field day whipping the country into a patriotic frenzy. At the same time, the US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, flew backwards and forwards between London, Washington and Buenos Aires, attempting to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis. On 21 May 1982, the task force arrived off the Falklands. Haig’s “shuttle diplomacy” had failed, and the shooting started. Every lunchtime, a couple of school friends and I would walk to my sister’s flat to watch the one o’clock news. We would sit and listen in silence to the slow, deliberate, monotone voice of Ian McDonald, the official Ministry of Defence spokesman, who would deliver good and bad news in the same deadpan tone. Once the fighting started, the tabloid press printed dramatic, sometimes shocking photographs, such as HMS Antelope exploding in San Carlos Bay.
HMS Antelope explodes after being the subject of repeated air attacks in ‘bomb alley’ in San Carlos Water, the Falkland Islands. Photograph courtesy of Royal Navy News www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/
At the time, my sister was married to a member of the 1st Battalion, Scots Guards. The 1st Battalion was not part of the task force, but the 2nd Battalion was sent south. On the night of 13–14 June, the Guards launched an offensive against the strategically important Mount Tumbledown and the surrounding high ground. The Guards forced the Argentine troops off the mountain and back into the Falkland’s Capital of Port Stanley. The 2nd Battalion, Scots Guards, suffered eight dead and 43 wounded. The Guards took 30 prisoners while the bodies of 30 Argentine soldiers and marines were later recovered from the battlefield. For us, every television, radio and newspaper report carried weight and meaning.
At the time, we initially focused on the naval actions and then the land battles to recapture the islands. My memories of the air war over the Falklands are vague. I do not recall being aware that our carrier-based Sea Harriers were outnumbered around ten to one. Only now, 43 years after the Argentine surrender, have I learned a little about what the courageous pilots of the Fleet Air Arm contributed to the safety of the task force and ultimate victory in the Falklands War.
Commander “Sharkey” Ward commanded 801 Naval Air Squadron aboard HMS Invincible during the Falklands. He served as senior Sea Harrier adviser to the command on tactics and air war direction, flew over 60 CAP (combat air patrol) missions, achieved three air-to-air kills, and participated in or witnessed ten kills. He was decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross for gallantry. In 1992, Pen & Sword published his book, Sea Harrier Over the Falklands.
The book is Ward's dramatic first-hand story of the air war in the South Atlantic. It is also an extraordinarily outspoken account of inter-service rivalries, bureaucratic interference, and dangerous ignorance of the realities of air combat among many senior commanders. Ward reveals how the pilots of the 801 Squadron found themselves fighting more than the enemy, experiencing exhaustion, atrocious weather, and prejudice and ignorance on their own side.
The book examines the Harrier's prewar development as a carrier-borne fighter under Ward’s supervision and guidance. The Sea Harrier (SHAR) was a single-seat, subsonic VSTOL (vertical and/or short take-off and landing) fighter, reconnaissance, and strike aircraft. It was armed with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and 30mm Aden cannon and could also be fitted with bombs, rockets, and Lepus flares.
The book provides extensive detail about the Sea Harriers' capabilities, particularly the advanced Ferranti Blue Fox radar system, which Ward insisted his pilots master, while other squadrons underutilised and mistrusted it.
The book outlines the tasks of the Harriers during Operation Corporate, the codename for the British military operation to reclaim the Falkland Islands. The SHAR provided continuous CAP protection for the task force. Ward also offers detailed accounts of the numerous challenges in flying and fighting the Harrier from an aircraft carrier.
Ward argues that had he followed all his instructions to the letter, Britain might well have lost the Falklands War. The book is highly critical of various aspects of the British command structure, especially the Flag Officer, the admiral in operational control of the fleet aboard HMS Hermes, Rear Admiral (later Admiral) Sir John “Sandy” Woodward.
Ward is particularly derisive about the RAF, senior naval commanders, and even pilots from the other Sea Harrier squadron (800 Squadron on HMS Hermes). He is particularly scornful of the RAF’s Operation Black Buck. These missions saw the RAF deploy ageing Vulcan bombers, which involved in-flight refuelling by Victor tankers, aimed at disrupting Argentine air operations by targeting the runway at Port Stanley. According to Ward’s calculations, the Vulcan attacks on Port Stanley airfield consumed hundreds of thousands of gallons of expensive aviation fuel at the taxpayers’ expense so that the RAF could drop a handful of bombs, which caused minimal damage.
Ward contends that the RAF launched three V-bomber missions, which achieved next to nothing and consumed 400,000 gallons of fuel. That fuel could have supported 785 bombing sorties from the Carrier Group and would have delivered 2,357 bombs. Apparently, during one of the RAF’s missions, 20 of the bombs dropped on Port Stanley air strip failed to explode because someone forgot to arm them. A Vulcan mission was scrubbed on another occasion due to a cabin depressurisation problem. When the aircraft in question returned to Ascension Island, it was found that the cause of the ‘pressurisation failure’ had been that one of the cockpit windows had been left open.
The military effectiveness of Black Buck remains a matter of controversy. The Vulcan raids caused minimal damage to the runway, and the damage to the radars was quickly repaired. Nevertheless, many historians contend that the raids demonstrated Britain’s ability to attack the Argentine mainland. For this reason, squadrons of Mirage fighters were redeployed from the south to defend airfields and headquarters in northern Argentina.
Ward’s book addresses the question of what 20 Sea Harriers, operating from a flight deck in the South Atlantic, could do against more than 200 Argentine military aircraft flown by skilled and courageous pilots. Ward’s account provides insights into how this seemingly impossible victory was achieved.
The book is somewhat of a technical manual on Sea Harrier operations, which may not appeal to all readers. It is also a controversial insider’s critique of British military command during one of modern naval warfare's most significant air campaigns. Regrettably, Ward’s descriptions of inter-service rivalries, leadership failures, MoD interference, penny-pinching on defence and the shameful waste of taxpayers’ money have become the all-too-familiar hallmarks of successive British governments.
The Falklands War lasted 74 days. On 14 June 1982, Argentine forces surrendered. Argentina’s military gamble cost the lives of 649 military personnel. The recovery of the Falklands led to the deaths of 255 British military personnel and three islanders.
General Galtieri, who led Argentina into the Falklands War, was removed from power after the defeat. Margaret Thatcher’s popularity surged after the conflict, leading to her victory in the 1983 general election. Before the Falklands, Thatcher’s leadership of the Tory party was tenuous at best, and the Conservatives looked sure to lose the election. According to the Declassified UK website: “Just four days before Argentina’s invasion of the Falklands in April 1982, the British government was trying to sell the regime bomber airplanes.”
