War Stories and Myths: Revisiting the Falklands, the Denison Smock, and Arnhem’s Legacy

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In recent months, I’ve been reading a range of books and viewing a series of documentaries exploring the realities of twentieth-century conflicts. From the windswept battlefields of the Falklands to the airborne drops of Operation Market Garden, these works both in print and on YouTube challenge accepted narratives, expose enduring myths, and offer fresh perspectives on events that continue to shape our understanding of war. In this article, I combine reflections on various military history books and videos to create a narrative about how easily historical facts can become obscured over time.

The Falklands War: Personal Accounts and Broader Perspectives

Roger Field’s Scimitar into Stanley (2022) offers a first-hand account of his experiences with the Blues and Royals during the 1982 Falklands War. Initially a staff officer, Field found himself commanding a Scimitar armoured car in battle, famously leading the charge into Port Stanley with journalist Max Hastings clinging to the back of his vehicle. The book is laced with humour, sometimes laugh-out-loud funny, though in today’s climate of political correctness, some may find parts of the text a little too candid. Field doesn’t shy away from naming names or calling out poor leadership, particularly criticising Brigadier Sir Tony Wilson. Yet, he’s equally honest about his own post-war struggles. The result is an open and honest personal account of modern conflict.

For those seeking a broader view, Hugh Bicheno’s Razor’s Edge (2007) steps back to examine the origins of the conflict. Bicheno, a former British spy in Argentina, foresaw the coming war, but his warnings fell on deaf ears in Whitehall. He spares no one in his critique, lambasting the Foreign Office, Civil Service, and politicians. The book is notable for its inclusion of the Argentine perspective, often overlooked elsewhere, and for its detailed descriptions of the campaign’s battles from both Argentine and Allied viewpoints. Bicheno highlights the role of chance in victory and defeat, and his unsparing criticism is directed at all parties in what he sees as an avoidable conflict. Interestingly, his book is used as a text at Argentina’s war college, a testament, perhaps, to its thoroughness.

If you want the soldier’s view, read Field. For the bigger picture, turn to Bicheno. Both are well worth your time.

Justice Denied: The Welsh Guards and the Sir Galahad Cover-Up

Another recent read, Too Thin for a Shroud by Lieutenant-Colonel Crispin Black (2023), delves into the bombing of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary’s Sir Galahad by the Argentine Air Force on 8 June 1982, the British Army’s deadliest day since 1945.

The Book's Claims

Black documents how 48 men died when Argentine A4 Skyhawks bombed Sir Galahad at Port Pleasant, Fitzroy. The ship was in the wrong location and lacked proper air defence. Packed with Welsh Guardsmen, Sir Galahad sat exposed in broad daylight for over six hours.

Using newly declassified Board of Inquiry documents from The National Archives, Black demonstrates that no direct orders to disembark were given to Major (later Colonel) Guy Sayle and the Welsh Guards. For 40 years, he was wrongly blamed for failing to disembark the troops. The inquiry proves this false. Black argues that senior Royal Navy and Royal Marines commanders made cascading failures: wrong location, defective landing craft, no air defence, and poor communications. The inquiry’s findings were classified until 2065, 83 years after the event.

The declassified files state, “At no time was a direct order to disembark given to Major Sayle by a superior officer.” Colonel Guy Sayle’s daughter has spoken to the media about how her father was made a “scapegoat” for the disaster, and now the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has said it “in no way blames” the Welsh Guards for the losses that day. Colonel Sayle died in 2022. According to Emma Sayle, her father died “haunted and penniless”.

Critical Reception

Unsurprisingly, reviews of Black’s book split sharply along service lines. Welsh Guards veterans and families praised the book as vindication. Royal Navy and Royal Marines personnel frequently criticise it as biased. The conservative Daily Telegraph called it “a repository of damning facts.” The Spectator acknowledged it “shows the Welsh Guards in a new light”, but questioned broader claims. In the court of public opinion, Amazon reviews range from five-star praise for the book's formidable detective work to one-star criticism for an inaccurate rewriting of history.

Senior commanders mounted coordinated rebuttals. RUSI Journal published responses from Major General Julian Thompson, Rear Admiral Jeremy Larken, and other Falklands officers. They challenged Black's interpretations whilst acknowledging errors in the original inquiry. Rear Admiral Larken contacted Black's publisher before reading the book, claiming the Welsh Guards were “unprofessional.” The Mirror reported that Larken claimed the Welsh Guards were an unprofessional and poorly led unit responsible for “pilfering” on his ship. Personally, if true, I think this statement says all we need to know about Larken.

On the flipside, General Sir Michael Rose supported Black's findings, suggesting a “cover-up” on national television.

Political Fallout

The book triggered parliamentary debates. On 25 March 2024, MPs pressed for the release of the documents. Sir Iain Duncan Smith stated: “There is now no question but that some kind of cover-up took place.” Defence Minister Andrew Murrison formally exonerated the Welsh Guards: “The board of inquiry is quite clear...the Welsh Guards were absolutely exonerated.” You can read the full transcript of the House of Commons debate on the Hansard website.

In May 2024, the MoD released 62 pages of previously classified documents. These largely confirmed Black's central claims: no orders were given to the Welsh Guards to disembark, the ship was sent to the wrong location, inadequate landing craft were available to offload the vessel, and no air defence was established.

Luckily for the families of those lost, the wounded and veterans, Black's credentials proved difficult to ignore by the Government, MoD and Navy. After all, he was on board Sir Galahad that fateful day, worked for the Cabinet Office as an intelligence adviser, and received an MBE for his work with the Defence Intelligence Staff during the crisis in the Former Yugoslavia. He is also a frequent contributor to the BBC and major British newspapers on terrorism and intelligence matters.

Crispin Black's book focuses on the bombing of RFA Sir Galahad, the subsequent cover-up, and the release of documents that prove the Welsh Guards were not to blame. He successfully campaigned for the declassification of these documents, which led to the official exoneration of the Welsh Guards after 42 years. While some critics question his interpretation of the events during the Falklands War, they present little counter-evidence. Many fundamental questions remain, and numerous documents will stay classified until 2065. Furthermore, no public inquiry has been announced. Black's work has challenged the previously accepted “official” narrative that unfairly scapegoated the Welsh Guards, turning it into an ongoing controversy.

Unravelling the Myths: The Denison Smock

On a lighter note, my recent purchase of a reproduction 1972-pattern Denison smock led me to a fascinating YouTube video by David Willey, formerly of The Tank Museum: “So you thought you knew about Denison Smocks…” The Denison smock, with its distinctive “brushstroke” camouflage, became iconic among British airborne forces, the SAS, and commandos. Yet, as Willey and Jon Baker (Curator at the Airborne Assault Museum) reveal, much of what we think we know is myth. There’s no evidence the smock was named after Major Denison—indeed, there’s no proof such a person existed. The famous “beaver tail” wasn’t designed to stop the garment riding up during jumps, as is often claimed. Willey’s video is a reminder of how easily repeated stories can become accepted fact.

Market Garden Revisited: Myths and Realities at Arnhem

Turning to Operation Market Garden, I recently watched two videos that challenge established narratives about the battle for Arnhem. The first was Niall Cherry’s Some Arnhem Myths... and a dose of reality! Part 2 on WW2TV, hosted by Paul Woodadge. Cherry, a former Royal Army Medical Corps senior NCO, has written eleven military history books. He is secretary of the Arnhem 1944 Veterans Club, a member of the 23 Parachute Field Ambulance OCA and Secretary of the Arnhem 1944 Fellowship. In the video, Cherry addresses specific myths and misconceptions with documentary evidence. Perhaps one of the most commonly held misconceptions about Market Garden is that because the radio equipment failed, the operation failed. On radios, Cherry explains that the 68 sets had known range limitations in wooded terrain. Tests in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and Normandy confirmed this. Commanders knew the Arnhem operational area exceeded set capabilities. In John Frost’s book, A Drop Too Many, he states that the failure of radio equipment was a perennial problem for Britain’s airborne forces.

Regarding the arming of British medics during the operation, establishment tables indicate that each parachute field ambulance was equipped with 123 pistols, 12 rifles, and 31 Sten guns. Of the 630 medics, only six were conscientious objectors. Photographic evidence confirms that most medics carried sidearms. As for the 21st Independent Parachute Company, the nominal rolls reveal that there were eleven foreign personnel among a total of 886 men, disproving the claim that there was a significant number of German Jews, which has become something of a myth.

In terms of planning failures, Cherry argues the 1st Air Landing Brigade should have seized the bridges at Arnhem. Air landing battalions had 750 men versus 550 in parachute battalions, formed up in seconds rather than forty minutes, and possessed superior firepower with four rifle companies, additional mortars, machine guns and anti-tank weapons. He examines General Browning’s influence on Jim Gavin at Nijmegen, where securing the Groesbeek Heights took priority over the Waal road bridge. Browning subsequently blamed Polish General Stanisław Sosabowski in a damning letter before departing for the Far East. Sosabowski's military career never really recovered from Browning’s unfounded criticisms.

During the WW2TV video, Cherry mentioned a short documentary film produced by Anglia Television on the 25th anniversary of Operation Market Garden in 1969. A quick search of YouTube, I found the programme in question, The Battle of Arnhem, directed by Harry Aldous. The programme is largely a collection of documentary interviews with many of the key protagonists and some local witnesses to events during the fighting for Arnhem and Oosterbeek.

In the documentary, Major General Roy Urquhart explained his 36-hour absence from divisional headquarters. He claimed wireless failures prompted his forward movement on the first afternoon. German opposition then trapped him with Brigadier Lathbury near St Elisabeth's Hospital. Lieutenant Colonel John Frost described reaching the Arnhem bridge intact on Sunday evening with over 500 men. Fewer than 200 remained alive and unwounded when resistance ended on Thursday morning. Brigadier John Hackett recounted arriving on Monday afternoon into active combat. His disagreement with Brigadier Pip Hicks over troop deployment at the Hartenstein reflected command confusion during Urquhart's absence.

Major General Allan Adair, Guards Armoured Division, blamed the terrain for his formation’s slow progress up the central axis of advance. The single-road approach prevented flanking movements, and the marshy Dutch polder land between Nijmegen and Arnhem, an area known as the Island, prohibited armoured manoeuvre.

SS General Wilhelm Bittrich assessed British troops as an “absolute elite” and commented on his troops' respect for their enemies. Housewife and mother, Kate ter Horst, described caring for the many wounded who packed her Oosterbeek home. Casualties filled every room. In the final segment of the programme, General Urquhart read from his 1945 report stating all ranks would willingly undertake similar operations again. Frost believed that most men who served at Arnhem, if asked, would accept another “invitation to the party”.

The Anglia Television documentary is an interesting, if uncritical, oral history filmed before later narratives worked their magic on the public imagination. The inclusion of a German perspective remains unusual for a 1969 British production. Both videos offer valuable source material. Cherry challenges operational assumptions with documented evidence. The Anglia TV program features first-hand accounts from key figures who planned, executed, and fought in the Battle of Arnhem. However, time and concerns about preserving their own reputations likely influenced the accuracy of their memories.

From the windswept South Atlantic to the battlefields of Holland, these books and documentaries reveal the enduring power of personal testimony and the importance of challenging received wisdom. Whether exposing cover-ups, debunking myths, or simply telling it as it was, each work adds a vital thread to the tapestry of military history. In revisiting these stories, we honour the lived experience and also ensure that the lessons, whether bitter or inspiring, are not forgotten.

Amazon Affiliate

This blog contains Amazon affiliate links. If you purchase books through these links, I receive a small commission at no additional cost to you. This helps support the ongoing research and content on The War Years.

References, Justice Denied:

https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/could-the-bombing-of-sir-galahad-have-been-prevented/

https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/culture/63723/falkland-islands-war-rfa-sir-galahad-the-whiff-of-a-cover-up

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2024.2444114

https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2024-03-25/debates/584D525C-3E70-4380-87AD-AEB171BED087/RFASirGalahad

https://en.mercopress.com/2024/05/18/falklands-war-partly-released-documents-on-welsh-guard-losses-trigger-more-controversy

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crispin_Black

The Author's Trap: How Book Club Scams Really Work

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In recent months, I’ve started to receive emails claiming to be from book clubs. Typically, the sender begins the email with a paragraph of glowing praise about my book, A History of the Guards Armoured Formations 1941-1945. Next, they inform me that their particular club has thousands of loyal members just crying out to read a review of my book, or have me appear as a guest in an online “meet-up” (a bit like a Zoom call). The emails always seem to come from the USA or Canada. All very flattering. All very suspicious.

A couple of weeks after I received my first invitation to be reviewed by one of these so-called book clubs, the Society of Authors (SOA) issued a warning about various author-targeted scams currently circulating. I’m naturally suspicious of unsolicited emails, especially when they make unsubstantiated claims and promise the earth. I usually report them as spam, block them and forget about them. But I was a little curious about how the scams worked, why they targeted authors, and who got paid.

A Google search returned a very informative article by Victoria Strauss, co-founder of the Writer Beware® website. Based in the USA and sponsored by the Science Fiction and Fantasy Writers Association ( SFWA®), the stated mission of Writer Beware® is to “track, expose, and raise awareness of the prevalence of fraud and other bad practices in and around the publishing industry.” A very laudable endeavour. Published in September 2025, Victoria’s article is titled, Return of the Nigerian Prince Redux: Beware Book Club and Book Review Scams. It makes fascinating reading.

In one day, I received two suspicious emails offering to promote my book. Instead of simply deleting and blocking the senders, I thought I'd do a little digging of my own. What I found shows exactly why authors need to be careful about unsolicited outreach. (Note: I've changed the names and email addresses to protect privacy, but all other details are accurate.)

The first email claimed to be from “Andy Smith,” organiser of a book club in Washington, DC, with “4,000+ members.” The second purported to be from “Charlotte Doe,” claiming to be a bestselling author. Both were fake, and examining their email headers revealed why. Despite claiming to be from Washington, DC, and Sydney, Australia, respectively, both emails showed a +0100 time zone—indicating they originated in the UK or Western Europe. Someone in Washington would use US Eastern Time (-0400/-0500), not European time. And someone living in Sydney, certainly wouldn't be sending emails on UK time either.

The technical details provided more clues to the fraudulent origin of the emails. Both used free Gmail accounts with names like “bookclub.readers1@gmail.com” and “charlottedoe1@gmail.com” (note the “1” suffixes, suggesting someone already had those names). A legitimate book club with thousands of members is likely to have a professional, branded domain. I think the same is true for an established bestselling author. The “book club” email linked to a music journalism archive with no connection to book clubs. The author’s impersonation included Amazon links tagged with “utm_source=chatgpt.com,” suggesting that the content was generated by AI. Both emails contained tracking pixels to monitor whether I opened them, marking me as an active target for future scams.

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The way the emails were written was suspicious. One email opened with “Hi,” missing my name entirely. Both offered generic praise that could apply to any book, without providing specific details about my work. The book club email made vague promises to “explore how we might spotlight” my book without any actual dates or plans, while the author’s message had an incomplete sentence: “I also wanted to share a recent discovery that might interest you”, followed by nothing, like the template was never finished.

The lessons learned are straightforward. Legitimate opportunities come through professional channels with verifiable credentials. They use proper business email addresses, include specific details about your work, and do not usually require tracking pixels. When you notice red flags, such as free email accounts, inconsistent sender locations, generic comments about your work, broken templates, unusual links, and tracking technology, it is a scam. These operations harvest author information, build email lists to sell, or set you up for future “promotional service” fees. If something feels wrong, follow your gut instincts, report the email as spam and block the sender.

Zero Trust: Your Digital Defence Against Social Engineering

At present, none of these fake emails have come with an attachment or specifically asked me to click a link, but some might. Whatever you do, and I cannot stress this enough, DO NOT OPEN any file or click on any link. At best, it will be an attempt to harvest your credentials and at worst, your computer or mobile device will be infected with malware or ransomware.

Cybercriminals are extremely good at devising new scams and manipulating their victims: it’s called social engineering. Their whole raison d'etre is to trick you into making a mistake and giving them access to your personal data or hijacking your computer and everything on it. This means you have to be ultra-suspicious of unsolicited email, text, voice, and any other sort of communication.

In the tech world, “Zero Trust” is a security principle that says “never trust, always verify” and assumes that no user or device can be trusted by default. Taking a zero-trust approach to your communications might seem bleak, but with AI tools making social engineering attacks and scams more sophisticated, it’s better than the alternative.

Book Club Scams - Key Points: Red Flags Every Author Should Know

According to Victoria Strauss from Writer Beware®, many of these scams originate in Nigeria. The scams involve emails that appear to be from book clubs offering to feature a book, but there's a catch: you must pay a “spot fee” or “participation fee” ranging from USD $55 to $350.

How the scams work and red flags:

• Gmail addresses instead of professional email domains

• Some of the book clubs simply do not exist and have no online presence, while others impersonate real book clubs that do exist on platforms like Meetup.com

• The emails are personalised by using AI to scrape data from sites like Amazon, and reference specific details about the target book and author

• Over-the-top fluff and flattery about the author and their work

• Payment is typically requested via a PayPal friends and family account (which cannot be reversed) or through an Upwork contract from third parties in Nigeria

• Real book clubs do not charge fees to authors for appearances or features

The good news is that the scammers may be sabotaging themselves by sending so many emails that authors are getting rightly suspicious and sharing warnings on social media. Remember, zero trust: if a book club or any group asks you to pay for the opportunity to be reviewed or interviewed, it’s a scam.

Ysselsteyn German War Cemetery: A Complex Memorial Site

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The Ysselsteyn German War Cemetery in the Netherlands is the largest Second World War German cemetery and the only German military cemetery in the country. Located near Venray (the area saw bitter fighting during Operation Aintree between the end of September and into October 1944) in Limburg province, this 28-hectare (69-acre) cemetery was established in 1946 by the Dutch war graves commission (Nederlandse Gravendienst) following the German occupation of the Netherlands from May 1940 to May 1945.

Who is Buried Here?

The cemetery contains over 32,000 burials from around 25 different nationalities, including:

• 87 German soldiers from the First World War whose bodies floated down rivers to the Netherlands

• Approximately 32,000 Second World War casualties

• Wehrmacht and SS soldiers, Dutch collaborators, supporters from other nations, and civilians, including women and children

• Over 5,000 unknown burials marked as "Ein Deutscher Soldat" (A German Soldier)

Ysselsteyn: Netherlands' only German WWII cemetery.

The Dark Reality

According to a plaque at the site, recent research reveals that approximately 2,000 to 3,000 of those buried were actively involved in war crimes, including the systematic persecution and murder of 102,000 Jews (mostly Dutch), as well as Sinti and Roma people. About 3,000 of the burials were soldiers detailed to occupation duties, including razzias, deportations, illegal incarceration, and Jew-hunting. Notable among the buried is Julius Dettmann, an SS officer who deported Anne Frank and her family from their hiding place in Amsterdam.

Modern Management and Purpose

In 1976, the Dutch government transferred administration of the cemetery to the German War Graves Commission (Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge). Today, the site serves as an international education centre that promotes peace and mutual understanding, complete with a visitor centre and youth meeting centre.

The Konstantin Benzien Story

In December 1943, German fighter pilot Unteroffizier Konstantin Benzien crashed his Messerschmitt Bf 109 into a butcher's shop in Opeinde, Friesland, after aerial combat with American bombers. For 79 years, his identity remained unknown, and his remains were buried in an unnamed grave at Ysselsteyn cemetery. Researchers from the Missing Airmen Memorial Foundation finally solved the mystery using DNA extracted from envelope glue that his sister had licked decades earlier when sending letters. The DNA from the glue matched samples from the pilot's recovered bones, allowing German authorities to officially identify him and give his grave a proper headstone with his name.

Ongoing Controversy

The cemetery remains controversial, with protests from groups like the Dutch Anti-Fascists' League and Jewish organisations opposing commemorative events. The site occasionally receives visits from neo-Nazis, highlighting the ongoing tension between remembrance and the glorification of those who committed atrocities.

This cemetery represents a complex memorial site that serves both as a final resting place and a stark reminder of the atrocities of war, emphasising the importance of learning from history. Sadly, with war raging in Ukraine and across the globe, it seems some lessons remain outside human comprehension.

References:

Dutch News

Youth and Educational Meeting Centre Ysselsteyn

Death and Taxes: Financing Britain’s Wars

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Munition factory, England, 1916

In this intriguing exploration of British fiscal history, Simon Thomas, Managing Director of Ridgefield Consulting, reveals some of the surprising and intricate relationships between warfare and taxation in the United Kingdom. From medieval scutage to the modern PAYE system, this article reveals how moments of national crisis fundamentally shaped the tax structures we know today. Thomas takes us on a journey through centuries of innovation in public finance, showing how creative solutions to wartime funding challenges evolved into the cornerstone principles of modern taxation. Whether you're a history enthusiast, a tax professional, or simply someone who is curious about how our current system came about, this article offers valuable insights into how national emergencies have consistently driven financial innovation in Britain.

You may wonder what war and taxes have in common. Unbeknownst to many, the two have strong links throughout UK history. Wars, often expensive and prolonged, have frequently driven the Government and historically the Crown to seek new ways to generate revenue through the rise of existing taxes and the introduction of new taxes. Over the centuries, the burden of financing these conflicts has shaped the UK’s modern-day taxation system.

Early Taxation and War

The roots and early intertwining of taxation and war begin in medieval times. In tumultuous Norman England, Henry I often gifted land to his knights or nobles under the ‘feudal system’. In return he expected them to offer their military service, and this was central to supporting and building his military.

If these landholders did not want to offer their service in exchange for the land, they could pay a tax called ‘scutage’ and the King would use this money to hire professional soldiers in their place. This practice became a vital source of funding in war and the Crusades and was adopted further by Henry II. 

The Window Tax and Creative Revenue Measures

Over the centuries, financial pressures from ongoing wars pushed the government to come up with creative, controversial, and sometimes unusual, forms of taxation. One famous example was the window tax, introduced in 1696 under William III. This tax was designed as an indirect method to tax wealthier households without imposing a formal income tax. Homeowners were taxed based on the number of windows in their homes, as larger homes with more windows were often owned by the wealthier classes. However, to avoid the tax, many property owners began bricking up their windows, giving rise to the term “daylight robbery.”

Other unique taxes have followed in history, like the hearth tax, which charged per fireplace, and the hair powder tax, imposed on those who wore powdered wigs—a symbol of wealth at the time. These inventive taxes highlight how the government’s need for revenue during times of crisis arose. Many of these policies, despite their unusual nature, set the foundation for modern progressive taxes.

The Napoleonic Wars: Income and Inheritance Tax

The Napoleonic wars (1799-1815) marked a turning point in taxation and, to finance its immense costs, Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger introduced income tax in 1799. This was the first taxation of its kind on personal earnings and, even though it was originally meant as a temporary measure, set the stage for modern taxation.

The birth of inheritance tax was brought in initially known as ‘legacy duty’ under George III's reign, a tax was imposed on property passed through wills to raise revenue for the government. Legacy tax was levied on how close the relationship of those who inherited was to the deceased. This tax later evolved in the late 1800s as the wars needed more revenue and saw the introduction of succession duty which would tax the whole of the inherited state like today's form of inheritance tax.

The World Wars and Expansion of the Tax System

War is expensive for all; however, the government realized that some industries were profiting from ongoing troubles, for instance, arms manufacturers. During the First World War (1914-1918), because of this, they introduced an excess profits tax on profits that were above their normal pre-war level. This tax was levied at 50% on the profits that surpassed the normal level, with a £200 deduction per year for each business.

The Second World War (1939-1945) saw an expansion of these wartime taxes, with significant increases in income tax and other goods and services, to help raise the money needed to support the war effort. In 1938 they decided to increase income tax, the standard rate was increased to (27.5%) 5 shillings and 6 pence.

Additionally, a surtax, like today's additional tax bracket, was introduced: incomes over £50,000 were subject to a 41% surtax on top of the standard rate, meaning income below £50,000 was taxed at 27.5%, and any income above this threshold faced the higher surtax rate.

To streamline tax collection, the PAYE (Pay As You Earn) system was introduced in 1944 and now some 10 million people are paying direct taxation. This system allowed employers to deduct income tax directly from employees’ wages on a weekly or monthly basis, making tax collection more efficient and forming the basis of the modern income tax system.

Recovering from World War II, the government faced the financial challenge of rebuilding the country, leading to further increases in taxes, particularly inheritance tax. Rates soared from below 60% to as high as 80% by 1969, which is a stark contrast to today's rate of 40%.

In summary, the history of taxes has always been intertwined with wars in the UK and shows how taxation has often been a balancing act between government goals and public needs. These taxes, originally meant to be temporary, have become a lasting part of today’s system, reminding us of how times of crisis can shape what society expects from taxation.

About the Author

Simon Thomas, Managing Director of Ridgefield Consulting. Simon has a longstanding background in tax and accounting, starting with his father, Brian Thomas, who is a Chartered Accountant. Simon trained in London, at one of the Big4 – EY, where he gained expert knowledge and experience. Simon started Ridgefield Consulting in 2010. In April 2021, he expanded the business by acquiring a sister practice Kench & Co. 

Sources:

•  J.R.T. Hughes, Financing the British War Effort, Cambridge University Press, 2011

• Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark, War & Taxes, Journal of Scholarly Perspectives, 2008  

• Post-war taxation, UK Parliament

Strategic Insights from the Battle for Crete

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German paratroops landing on Crete from Junkers Ju 52 transports, 20 May 1941. Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 3.0.

In May 1941, the idyllic Mediterranean island of Crete, a strategic location for controlling the region, became the stage for one of the Second World War’s most daring and innovative military operations. Operation Mercury, Nazi Germany's airborne invasion of Crete, marked a turning point in military tactics and offers valuable lessons for modern business leaders. This blog post explores why the German forces succeeded against British and Commonwealth defenders, and what today's organisations can learn from this historic battle.

The German Gambit for Crete: Innovation and Risk

The brainchild of Luftwaffe General Kurt Student, Operation Mercury represented a huge gamble by the German high command. Prior to this operation, no military force had ever tried to capture a whole island mainly through airborne assault. According to one of his closest aides, Student possessed the unusual ability to combine his inclination for the new, unconventional and adventurous with a working method based on meticulous staff work and precise attention to detail. As Mark Bathurst notes in his article for New Zealand Geographic, “Operation Mercury - the invasion of Crete by Nazi Germany - began on 20 May 1941, when gliders and paratroops (Fallschirmjäger) swooped through the dust and smoke thrown up by Luftwaffe bombs and cannon”. The Germans employed innovative tactics such as using silent gliders to land troops behind enemy lines, catching the defenders off guard.

This innovative approach surprised the Allied defenders, despite their superior numbers and defensive positions. The Germans’ willingness to embrace new tactics and technologies paid off, albeit at a high cost in casualties. Between 20 May and 1 June 1941, the Germans suffered 3,352 casualties. However, we must not forget the immense human cost paid by the Cretans during the Nazi occupation, resulting in the deaths of more than 3,400 individuals.

For business leaders, this underscores the potential rewards of innovation and calculated risk-taking. Companies that dare to challenge conventional wisdom and pioneer new approaches, such as adopting disruptive technologies or entering untapped markets, often gain a significant competitive advantage. However, it is crucial to balance innovation with proven methods and have contingency plans in place, as the high casualty rate among German paratroopers demonstrates.

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Fallschirmjäger (paratroops) attacking during the German invasion of Crete.

Allied Failures: The Perils of Poor Communication and Complacency

Despite having advance knowledge of the German invasion plans through Ultra intercepts (signals intelligence), the Allies failed to mount an effective defence. This failure stemmed from several factors, including poor communication, complacency, and ineffective leadership.

As one historical account points out, “The Allied forces on Crete were a mix of British, Australian, New Zealand, and Greek troops, with unclear command structures and poor coordination”. This lack of clear leadership and communication channels severely hampered the defenders’ ability to respond effectively to the German assault. 

Moreover, Allied commanders, including New Zealand’s General Bernard Freyberg, seemed overly concerned about a potential seaborne invasion, diverting crucial resources away from the defence of key airfields. This misallocation of forces proved disastrous when the Germans seized control of the Maleme airfield, allowing them to fly in reinforcements and ultimately secure victory.

For businesses, this serves as a stark reminder of the importance of clear communication, effective leadership, and the dangers of complacency. Even with superior resources or market intelligence, companies can fail if they do not have systems in place to act on information quickly and decisively. Leaders must ensure that all team members are aligned with strategic priorities and can adapt swiftly to changing circumstances.

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Maleme airfield after the Battle of Crete.

The Power of Seizing Opportunities

Despite heavy initial losses, the German forces managed to capture the critical Maleme airfield, west of Chania. This success allowed them to fly in reinforcements and ultimately turn the tide of the battle. As Johann Stadler, a German veteran, recalled, “I was very proud. It was the first time in war history an island was conquered from the air”.

This aspect of the battle highlights the importance of rapidly capitalising on opportunities, even in the face of setbacks. In business, the ability to quickly identify and exploit key opportunities, such as emerging market gaps or shifting customer preferences, can make the difference between success and failure. Leaders must cultivate a culture of agility and empower their teams to seize chances when they arise.

Adapting to Changing Circumstances

The battle for Crete also demonstrates the critical importance of adaptability. The Germans had to adjust their plans on the fly when they encountered stronger-than-expected resistance. Conversely, the Allies’ rigid adherence to their initial defensive plans, despite changing circumstances, contributed to their defeat. 

For business leaders, this underscores the need for agility and the ability to rapidly adjust strategies when market realities do not align with expectations. Successful companies are those that can pivot quickly in response to unexpected challenges or opportunities, such as technological disruptions or shifts in consumer behaviour. Building a flexible, responsive organisation is key to navigating today’s fast-paced business landscape.

The Cost of Victory: Long-term Strategic Implications

While Operation Mercury was ultimately successful, it came at a high cost. The heavy casualties suffered by the German paratroopers led Hitler to prohibit future large-scale airborne operations, effectively wasting this specialised resource.

This outcome offers a valuable lesson for businesses about the importance of considering long-term strategic implications when pursuing high-risk, high-reward strategies. Short-term successes that come at too high a cost can ultimately prove detrimental to long-term goals and capabilities. Leaders must carefully weigh the potential benefits of bold moves against their potential downsides and opportunity costs.

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A letter from General Freyberg, June 1941. The Historical Museum of Crete, photograph taken by the author June 2024.

Learning from Failure and Setbacks

Although the Allies lost the Battle of Crete, they learned valuable lessons that they applied to later amphibious invasions, such as the landings in Sicily and Normandy. Their ability to adapt and improve their tactics based on the hard-won experience at Crete ultimately contributed to their success in the war. However, it can be argued that the Allies learned some of the wrong lessons from the German victory on Crete. As the war progressed, the Allies amassed considerable airborne forces, but their deployment was infrequent and not always successful. In 1944, Britain was chronically short of infantrymen while thousands of ‘special service’ troops like paratroopers were held in reserve for airborne operations that were frequently postponed or cancelled.

Similarly, businesses must learn to treat failures and setbacks as opportunities for growth and improvement. By conducting thorough post-mortems, identifying root causes, and implementing corrective actions, companies can emerge stronger and more resilient. Leaders who encourage a culture of continuous learning and improvement will have better preparation to face the inevitable challenges of the business world.

Applying Historical Lessons to Modern Business

The Battle for Crete offers a wealth of insights for today's business leaders:

• Innovation and calculated risk-taking can provide a competitive edge but must be balanced with proven methods and contingency planning.

• Clear communication, effective leadership, and avoiding complacency are crucial, even when you seem to have an advantage.

• The ability to quickly seize opportunities and adapt to changing circumstances can be the difference between success and failure.

• It is essential to consider the long-term strategic implications of high-risk actions, not just short-term gains.

• Failures and setbacks should be treated as valuable learning opportunities for continuous improvement.

By studying historical events like Operation Mercury, business leaders can gain valuable insights on strategy, tactics, leadership, and communication. These lessons, drawn from one of military history’s most daring operations, remain remarkably relevant in today’s fast-paced, competitive business environment. As modern leaders navigate the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century, they would do well to remember the hard-fought lessons of Crete and apply them to their own strategic decisions.

References:

Bathurst, M. (2005). Operation Mercury: The Battle of Crete. New Zealand Geographic, Issue 073. https://www.nzgeo.com/stories/crete/

Bell, K. (2006). Battle of Crete: It Began with Germany’s Airborne Invasion—Operation Mercury. Historynet. https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-crete-it-began-with-germanys-airborne-invasion-operation-mercury/

MacDonald, C. (1995). The Lost Battle – Crete 1941.

Rehman, I. (2024). Britain’s Strange Defeat: The 1941 Fall of Crete and Its Lessons for Taiwan. War on the Rocks: https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/britains-strange-defeat-the-1941-fall-of-crete-and-its-lessons-for-taiwan/

The defence and loss of Crete, 1940-1941 (Part 1). (2020). The National Archives. https://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/the-defence-and-loss-of-crete-1940-1941-part-1/

The defence and loss of Crete, 1940-1941 (Part 2). (2020). The National Archives. https://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/the-defence-and-loss-of-crete-1940-1941-part-2/

The Silent Disaster: How Communication Failures Helped Doom Operation Market Garden

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Operation Market Garden: 17 to 25 September 1944

As we commemorate Operation Market Garden this September, it's worth reflecting on one of the most ambitious - and ultimately ill-fated - military operations of World War II. Launched in September 1944, Operation Market Garden aimed to secure a series of nine bridges in the Netherlands, potentially paving the way for a swift advance into Germany. It was a massive undertaking, involving over 34,000 airborne troops and 50,000 ground forces. Yet, what began with high hopes ended in a costly failure, partly because of a communications breakdown.

At the heart of Market Garden's communication crisis was the inadequacy of the radio equipment. The British Army's standard radio set, the Wireless Set No. 22, proved insufficient for the task at hand. These radios had a maximum range of around six miles under ideal conditions, yet the Corps Headquarters was positioned a distant 15 miles away. To compound matters, the terrain around Arnhem presented additional challenges that the planners had failed to fully account for. The Arnhem area was characterised by woodland and urban buildings. These physical obstacles severely interfered with radio transmissions, further diminishing the already limited range of the No.22 sets. As a result, what should have been a vital lifeline for the paratroopers of the 1st Airborne Division fighting desperately to hold the north side of the bridge at Arnhem became a silent witness to their isolation and eventual defeat.

Interestingly, a potential solution to these communication problems was literally at hand. The Netherlands boasted an extensive and sophisticated telephone network, largely intact despite years of German occupation. This network was remarkably resilient, comprising three interconnected systems: the national Ryks Telefoon system, the Gelderland Provincial Electricity Board's private network, and a clandestine network operated by Resistance technicians. Even when key exchanges were disrupted, the Dutch were still able to communicate using alternative routings.

Yet, astonishingly, Allied planners failed to fully leverage this resource. This oversight raises profound questions about the rigidity of military thinking. Why did the Allied command, known for its adaptability in other areas, fail to pivot to this seemingly obvious solution? The answer likely lies in a combination of factors: overconfidence in existing systems, security concerns, lack of familiarity with local infrastructure, the fast-paced nature of the operation, and a wariness of the Dutch Resistance.

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British XXX Corps cross the road bridge at Nijmegen

The consequences of this failure were dire. While some units made limited use of the phone system, the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem - where the need was most critical - did not. They made no attempt to convey their urgent need for supplies or relief via the phone system to the corps headquarters. Ironically, Dutch agents inside the 82nd Airborne's landing area used the phone system early on D+1 to inform the 82nd that “the Germans are winning over the British at Arnhem” - the first indication that the 1st Airborne was in serious trouble.

In the face of radio failures, the Allied forces resorted to various other communication methods, each with its own limitations. Carrier pigeons proved unreliable, with many birds failing to deliver messages. Traditional forms of communication like land lines, runners, and dispatch riders were vulnerable to enemy fire and the chaos of battle. The artillery net ended up being one of the more reliable communication methods, allowing for effective artillery support and occasional relay of messages to higher command.

The communication failures during Operation Market Garden offer valuable insights into military organisational thinking. They underscore the importance of flexibility, the need to understand and potentially leverage local infrastructure, the crucial role of contingency planning, and the necessity of fostering a culture that encourages quick problem-solving and innovative thinking at all levels of command.

It's worth noting the contrast between the German military's mission-type tactics (Auftragstaktik), which emphasized flexibility and initiative, and the British Army's reliance on detailed orders and strict adherence to commands. This difference in command styles meant that German forces could often exploit opportunities more rapidly, while British forces maintained tighter control but at the cost of agility.

As we reflect on the events of eighty years ago, it's clear that the lessons learned extend far beyond the realm of military strategy. In any high-stakes endeavour, the ability to communicate effectively - and to adapt when primary methods fail - can mean the difference between success and catastrophic failure. The underutilisation of the Dutch phone system stands as a poignant example of how overlooking available resources can have far-reaching consequences.

The story of Operation Market Garden serves as a stark reminder of the critical role that effective communication plays not just in military operations, but in any complex undertaking. It's a lesson that remains relevant today, in fields ranging from business to disaster response. As we face our own challenges in an increasingly connected world, let's not forget the silent disaster that unfolded in Holland eighty years ago - and the valuable lessons it still has to teach us.

References

1. Middlebrook, M. (1994). Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle. Westview Press.

2. Ryan, C. (1974). A Bridge Too Far. Simon & Schuster.

3. Kershaw, R. (1990). It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944. Ian Allan Publishing.

4. Buckley, J. (2013). Monty's Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe. Yale University Press.

5. Beevor, A. (2018). The Battle of Arnhem: The Deadliest Airborne Operation of World War II. Viking.

6. Powell, G. (1992). The Devil's Birthday: The Bridges to Arnhem 1944. Leo Cooper.

7. Badsey, S. (1993). Arnhem 1944: Operation Market Garden. Osprey Publishing.

8. Hastings, M. (2004). Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945. Alfred A. Knopf.

9. Zaloga, S. J. (2014). Operation Market-Garden 1944 (1): The American Airborne Missions. Osprey Publishing.

10. Clark, L. (2008). Arnhem: Operation Market Garden, September 1944. Sutton Publishing.

11. MacDonald, C. B. (1963). The Siegfried Line Campaign. Center of Military History, United States Army.

12. Bennett, D. (2007). Airborne Communications in Market Garden, September 1944. Canadian Military History, 16(1), 41-42.

13. Greenacre, J. W. (2004). Assessing the Reasons for Failure: 1st British Airborne Division Signal Communications during Operation 'Market Garden'. Defence Studies, 4(3), 283-308. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1470243042000344777#d1e290